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Summary	  
 
Taxation is essential for development finance and good governance 
This PhD thesis analyses effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on developing countries. 
Developing countries need sustainable sources of finance for public expenditures and 
investments. Therefore, they ought to enhance domestic revenue mobilisation. However, 
developing countries are faced with various challenges to raise tax revenues, such as 
insufficient administrative capacity and corporate tax avoidance. Some of these 
challenges have an international character. This certainly applies to tax avoidance, for 
which firms often use strategies that involve Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) in donor 
countries. As a consequence, the tax policy of donor countries can affect revenue 
mobilisation in developing countries by creating or restricting tax avoidance 
opportunities. Dutch tax policy is particularly relevant, because multinationals use Dutch 
SPEs on a very large scale. 
 Chapter 1 argues that tax revenues are a key source of financing for development. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), migrant remittances, trade, and other private external 
flows can enhance investment and economic growth. However, private commercial 
flows do not contribute directly to the financing of public services, such as education, 
health care, sanitation, and basic infrastructure, which are essential for social 
development. Therefore public sector financing through tax revenues remains essential. 
Tax revenues in developing countries without large government income from oil, 
diamonds, or other natural resources are often between 15% and 25% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), much lower than in high income countries. In low income and lower-
middle income countries, Official Development Assistance (ODA) from donors is still a 
substantial source of public finance as well, but it is not a very reliable or sustainable 
source. This implies that developing countries need to strengthen their domestic revenue 
mobilisation.  
 From a developmental perspective, taxes are not only a source of revenue; a more 
comprehensive analytical framework takes into account four main purposes of taxation. 
The first purpose, revenue generation, is also an instrument for macroeconomic policy. 
A second purpose is redistribution, through progressive taxation and limiting tax 
incidence on people with lower ability-to-pay. Redistribution is important because 
development has increasingly become an issue of inequality, also at the national level. A 
third purpose is representation; taxation is a catalyst for the establishment of 
governments that are more responsive and accountable towards their own citizens. 
Development aid has no such effect and fosters accountability to external donors 
instead. A fourth purpose of taxation is re-pricing, which refers to minimising market 
distortions and providing tax incentives to address externalities. Different types of taxes 
have different properties. Taxes on personal and corporate income tend to have the 
strongest positive effect on governance, but provide a relatively strong disincentive to 
economic activity. 
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Taxation of multinationals is difficult because of international tax avoidance 
Corporate taxes are an important revenue component in developing countries. In middle 
income countries, corporate taxes typically generate between 10% and 30% of total tax 
revenues. This contrasts with high income countries, where corporate taxes are generally 
not a major source of revenue. The importance of corporate tax revenues for developing 
countries implies that potential threats to these revenues – such as tax avoidance by 
multinationals – are highly relevant in the context of financing for development. 
 For developing countries, taxing multinational enterprises involves multiple 
challenges and constraints. A major domestic constraint is weak administrative capacity. 
Furthermore, many countries lose revenues due to tax competition, often at the regional 
level, and poorly targeted tax incentives for foreign investors. At the international level, 
tax avoidance and evasion due to transfer mispricing is a major challenge. Transfer 
mispricing involves the manipulation of prices for trade between affiliates of the same 
multinational, usually to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Moreover, multinationals 
shift profits through royalty payments for the use of trademarks and other intellectual 
property and through interest payments, by financing subsidiaries in high-tax countries 
with a larger proportion of debt. These issues have been relatively well covered in 
existing research. 
 This thesis mainly focuses on avoidance of withholding taxes, an issue that has 
received limited attention so far. Withholding taxes are levied on dividend, interest, or 
royalty payments to foreign entities. They play an important role in corporate taxation 
for several reasons. Withholding taxes are relatively easy to collect and can be a 
substantial source of revenues. In Kenya and Zambia, for instance, withholding taxes 
accounted for approximately 5% of total tax revenues in 2007. Furthermore, withholding 
taxes can have the effect of shifting tax payments towards the host country of foreign 
investment, which is beneficial for capital-importing developing countries. Withholding 
taxes also prevent non-taxation of income paid to foreign security holders and can serve 
as a backstop measure against profit shifting.  
 
Dutch corporate tax policy facilitates certain tax avoidance structures 
A central element of Dutch corporate tax policy that facilitates tax avoidance by 
multinationals is the unique network of bilateral tax treaties. As of end 2012, the 
Netherlands had concluded tax treaties with six low income countries and 41 middle 
income countries outside the European Union (EU). Some of these tax treaties strongly 
reduce the treaty partners’ standard withholding tax rates, or eliminate them, for 
payments to Dutch entities. Moreover, only six of the 47 treaties contain anti-abuse 
provisions for dividend payments that protect tax revenues in the partner country and 
only three contain anti-abuse provisions for interest and royalties. The Netherlands itself 
has a dividend withholding tax of 15%, but this is often reduced to 5% or 0% for intra-
firm dividends under a tax treaty or the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive. There exists no 
Dutch withholding tax on interest or royalty payments. This combination of tax policy 
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elements makes the Netherlands particularly attractive for conduit structures that involve 
dividend, interest or royalty payments passing through a Dutch SPE to benefit from 
withholding tax reductions under Dutch tax treaties. 
 Another relevant aspect of Dutch tax policy is the special tax treatment of certain 
entities, resulting in low effective rates of corporate income tax. Between 1997 and 
2010, approximately 90 firms benefitted from the Group Financing Activities (GFA) 
regime, a low-tax facility for intra-group interest and royalty income that has been 
phased out. In 2006, the Dutch government adopted a new low-tax facility for interest 
income to replace the GFA regime, but this facility never entered into force because it 
was incompatible with EU legislation. Currently some SPEs benefit from advance 
pricing agreements (APAs) with the Dutch tax authority, often referred to as tax rulings, 
that specify small taxable margins on net interest, royalty, or trading income, even 
though actual margins can be higher. Such special tax treatment facilitates avoidance of 
corporate income tax in other countries through profit shifting, especially in combination 
with Dutch tax treaties that strongly reduce withholding tax on interest and royalties. 
 This thesis focuses on negative and unintended effects of Dutch tax policy. It does 
not contain a complete assessment of all effects, which materialise through different 
pathways. Dutch tax treaties stimulate foreign investments by Dutch multinationals and 
facilitate borrowing by developing country firms from Dutch banks and institutional 
investors. Dutch tax policy can therefore generate a positive volume effect, increasing 
investment in developing countries. At the same time, the reduced withholding taxes on 
payments to Dutch firms and creditors cause a negative rate effect, intentionally 
reducing revenues for a given level of investment. These intended positive and negative 
effects are relatively well understood and therefore not investigated here.  
 From a developing country perspective, negative rate effects of conduit structures 
are usually unintended. Conduit structures can reduce withholding taxes on payments to 
entities in third countries passing through a Dutch SPE. Furthermore, conduit structures 
and special tax treatment of Dutch SPEs provide incentives to increase borrowing or 
transfer intellectual property to the Netherlands. This may influence the composition of 
a firm’s assets and liabilities and negatively affect the tax base in developing countries. 
The present research focuses on these unintended rate and composition effects. The 
balance between positive and negative effects differs per developing country. 
 
Dutch tax and development policy have been incoherent 
Chapter 2 investigates how international aspects of Dutch corporate tax policy relate to 
Dutch development policy. It uses the concept of Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD), which refers to the absence of policy effects contrary to development aims as 
well as to the creation of synergies between different government departments to 
achieve development aims. Most PCD initiatives focus on the effects of trade policy. 
Since 2009, the EU’s PCD agenda also includes tax governance. This mainly provides 
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for technical assistance to strengthen tax systems in developing countries, but does not 
consider effects of corporate tax policies in EU member states. 
 In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims to promote PCD and 
recognises the relevance of Dutch corporate tax policy in this regard. Over the past 
decade, the Ministry has paid considerable attention to both domestic and international 
constraints for domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries, including 
transfer mispricing and excessive use of tax incentives. This development agenda 
implies that unintended negative effects of Dutch tax policy on developing countries are 
incoherent with development policy and can thus be considered adverse effects. 
 However, the use of Dutch SPEs in tax avoidance strategies of multinationals had 
largely escaped attention from policy makers and the broader public until 2007. As a 
result, Dutch tax policy has been incoherent with Dutch policy on development 
cooperation. The approval of a new low-tax regime in 2006 that could obviously be used 
to shift profits out of developing countries provides clear evidence of the policy 
incoherence. The causes of policy incoherence are structural and political in nature, 
because the interests of developing countries inherently conflict with special interests of 
various large multinationals and Dutch service providers. 
 The tax treaty policy of the Dutch Ministry of Finance published in 2011 reaffirms 
the importance of PCD. It interprets policy coherence as an imperative to strengthen tax 
compliance in and information sharing with developing countries. It also mentions that 
the Netherlands is willing to allow relatively high withholding taxes in treaties with 
developing countries and is committed to include anti-abuse provisions if requested. 
These principles reflect increasing attention for coherence between Dutch tax and 
development policy, but do not yet address existing adverse effects. 
 
Multinationals use Dutch SPEs for treaty shopping, avoiding dividend withholding 
tax 
Some multinationals avoid withholding taxes by diverting FDI through a conduit 
country with favourable tax treaties. This practice is called tax treaty shopping. Host 
countries of foreign investment generally disapprove of treaty shopping, because it 
breaches the principle of reciprocity. Case law provides clear examples of tax treaty 
shopping via Dutch SPEs. In addition, passing on equity investments is the largest 
activity of Dutch SPEs and accounts for up to 50% of their combined balance sheets.  
 To assess to what extent Dutch SPE investments are associated with tax treaty 
shopping, Chapter 3 analyses the effect of tax treaties and other structural determinants 
on FDI routed through the Netherlands. It uses anonymised micro data on large Dutch 
SPE, covering approximately 90% of total Dutch SPE assets. Excluding the major 
emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico, 37 low and 
middle income countries had a tax treaty with the Netherlands in 2007. At the aggregate 
level, out of the combined €582 billion inward FDI stock in these countries, €53 billion 
or approximately 9% was held via Dutch SPEs. For the group of developing countries 
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that did not have a tax treaty with the Netherlands, the proportion was 6%, thus a third 
lower. 
 Econometric analysis at the level of country pairs confirms that the share of diverted 
FDI is higher if the home and host country both have a tax treaty with the Netherlands, 
and lower if there exists a direct treaty between the home and host country. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) and gravity effects also contribute to FDI diversion. 
European headquarters or home and host country corruption do not have a significant 
effect. As tax benefits differ between treaties, the analysis also takes into account 
bilateral dividend withholding tax rates and home and host country tax systems. The 
results show that FDI diversion is partly driven by specific corporate structures that 
reduce the total tax on distributed foreign profits by taking advantage of Dutch tax 
treaties. It can therefore be concluded that FDI diversion partly results from tax treaty 
shopping. 
 On average, the possibility to avoid dividend withholding tax causes a few 
additional percent of bilateral FDI stock to be routed through the Netherlands. Macro 
data presented in Chapter 5, which investigates the impact of specific tax avoidance 
strategies in more detail, show that some individual host countries are affected more 
strongly. For example, the Philippines has a tax treaty with the Netherlands that provides 
for a 10% withholding tax on dividends to Dutch parents, whereas the applicable rate to 
the US, the UK, and a range of other countries is at least 15%. This is one of the reasons 
why FDI via the Netherlands amounted to 27% of total inward FDI stock in the 
Philippines in 2010. Other developing countries with a special Dutch tax treaty and a 
large share of diverted FDI include Ghana (20%), Ukraine (15%), and Indonesia (10%). 
 In theory, FDI diversion influences tax revenues via both a volume and a rate effect. 
However, studies analysing the volume effect of tax treaties on bilateral FDI have 
produced mixed results. For all developing countries combined, a significant positive 
volume effect is even more uncertain than for an individual country, because of 
competition for foreign investments. It can therefore be concluded that the rate effect is 
dominant. In 2007, Dutch SPEs received more than €5 billion of dividends from low 
and middle income countries, of which they passed on almost €3 billion to foreign 
parents. These figures imply that even a small rate effect, for example a 3%-point lower 
withholding tax on these dividend flows, can substantially reduce tax revenues. 
 
Dutch SPEs facilitate avoidance of interest withholding tax, increasing leverage 
Some multinationals also channel interest payments through Dutch SPEs to avoid 
withholding taxes. Using anonymised micro data, Chapter 5 shows that in 2007, Dutch 
SPEs had onlent more than €450 billion to foreign affiliates. The sources of these funds 
were roughly €250 billion of debt securities issued by the SPEs, €150 billion of intra-
group loans, and €50 billion of third party loans. The onlending activities account for 
more than 25% of Dutch SPEs’ combined balance sheets and are often combined with 
holding activities. 
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 Focussing on developing countries, securities data indicate that firms from Indonesia 
and Kazakhstan had issued by far the largest volume of debt securities via the 
Netherlands. In 2010, Dutch SPEs passed on €0.6 billion of interest payments from 
Indonesian firms to holders of debt securities. Due to the tax treaty between Indonesia 
and the Netherlands, most of these interest flows are free of withholding tax, whereas a 
rate of 10% to 20% applies to interest paid directly from Indonesia to external creditors 
in almost all other countries. For Kazakhstan, the Dutch treaty does not specify a lower 
rate than other tax treaties. Interest payments from developing countries passed on 
within the group are smaller than interest passed on to external creditors. Thus, the main 
rate effect of interest channelled through Dutch SPEs concerns a substantial reduction of 
Indonesian withholding tax revenues. 
 Debt financing via Dutch SPEs can have a composition effect as well. At the firm 
level, lower borrowing costs can lead to higher leverage. At the subsidiary level, firms 
may engage in debt shifting and use Dutch SPEs to pass on interest payments to lowly 
taxed affiliates, increasing the leverage of normal subsidiaries. Chapter 4 investigates 
these effects. An analysis of composition effects at the subsidiary level requires financial 
data that are not readily available from developing countries. Therefore, the analysis 
looks at the capital structure of EU-based multinationals and their EU subsidiaries 
instead. 
 Econometric analysis shows that at the firm level, debt issuance via Dutch SPEs is 
associated with significantly higher debt. Controlling for relevant firm characteristics, 
EU firms with a Dutch issuing SPE on average have a ten percentage points higher ratio 
of debt to equity capital plus debt. This large effect could result from differences in tax 
aggressiveness; firms with a more aggressive tax strategy may use more debt financing 
and are also more likely to avoid withholding taxes via Dutch SPEs. However, other 
Dutch SPE types are not associated with significantly higher firm leverage. This 
confirms that debt issuance via SPEs facilitates higher debt financing. 
 At the subsidiary level, the analysis yields three important results. First, EU 
subsidiaries of larger multinationals are more leveraged. Second, the use of Dutch 
onlending SPEs is associated with higher subsidiary leverage, whereas the use of other 
Dutch SPE types is not. Third, in large firms, the sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to 
host country tax rate is relatively low. In combination, these results suggest that large 
firms are more likely to shift profits from EU subsidiaries to special lowly taxed 
affiliates and that this is partly facilitated by Dutch onlending SPEs. 
 Thus, both external debt and intra-group loans channelled through Dutch SPEs 
involve composition effects. Regarding external debt, this implies an additional revenue 
loss for Indonesia, due to the high debt issuance via the Netherlands. The composition 
effect of intra-group loans is relatively small; in 2007, Dutch SPEs passed on only €0.2 
billion of interest payments from developing countries to low-tax affiliates. 
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Royalty structures involving Dutch SPEs facilitate income shifting 
Advance pricing agreements between SPEs and the Dutch tax authority that specify an 
alternative tax base can facilitate profit shifting to the Netherlands through royalty 
payments or other types of transactions. Chapter 5 shows that in 2007, Dutch SPEs 
received approximately €0.3 billion of royalty income from developing countries that 
was not passed onwards. At least part of these flows involved profit shifting to the 
Netherlands. Royalty payments from developing countries passing through Dutch SPEs 
were only €0.1 billion and thus relatively small. For developing countries, royalty 
structures involving Dutch SPEs therefore mainly have a composition effect, reducing 
the host country tax base. 
 
Conclusion: Dutch tax policy has adverse effects on certain developing countries 
Chapter 6 concludes that several aspects of Dutch corporate tax policy can have negative 
revenue effects in developing countries. A key policy aspect concerns Dutch tax treaties 
with developing countries that specify relatively large reductions of withholding taxes, 
without effective anti-avoidance provisions. Due to differences among tax treaties and 
partner country withholding tax regimes, Dutch tax policy affects some countries more 
strongly than others. The revenue effects are considered to be adverse because they are 
incoherent with the aims of Dutch development policy and against the interests of 
developing countries. 
 Tax avoidance strategies facilitated by Dutch corporate tax policy also have an 
impact on the redistribution, representation, and re-pricing roles of taxation. At the 
international level, tax avoidance leads to redistribution from developing countries to the 
Netherlands and other high income countries. Distributional effects at the national level 
depend on the domestic tax systems of developing countries. Regarding representation, 
tax avoidance by multinationals can weaken broader taxpayer morale and hinder 
constructive revenue bargaining. Finally, an important re-pricing effect is the distortion 
of competition between large firms that can engage in international tax arbitrage and 
smaller firms that cannot, reducing market efficiency. These negative effects on broader 
economic development are difficult to quantify, but may be at least as important as the 
direct effect on public revenue mobilisation. 
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Samenvatting	  (Summary	  in	  Dutch)	  
 
Belastingen zijn essentieel voor ontwikkelingsfinanciering en goed bestuur 
Dit proefschrift analyseert effecten die ontwikkelingslanden ondervinden van 
Nederlands belastingbeleid voor ondernemingen. Ontwikkelingslanden hebben 
duurzame financieringsbronnen nodig voor publieke uitgaven en investeringen. Daarom 
zouden zij hun capaciteit om binnenlandse opbrengsten te genereren moeten versterken. 
Bij het verhogen van belastinginkomsten hebben ontwikkelingslanden te maken met 
verschillende uitdagingen, zoals onvoldoende capaciteit bij de belastingdienst en 
belastingontwijking door bedrijven. Sommige van deze uitdagingen hebben een 
internationaal karakter. Dat is zeker het geval bij belastingontwijking, waarvoor 
ondernemingen vaak strategieën gebruiken waar Bijzondere Financiële Instellingen 
(BFI’s) in donorlanden een rol in spelen. Daarom kan het belastingbeleid van 
donorlanden invloed hebben op belastinginkomsten in ontwikkelingslanden door 
mogelijkheden voor ontwijking te creëren of juist te beperken. Nederlands 
belastingbeleid is hierbij van speciaal belang, want multinationale ondernemingen 
maken op zeer grote schaal gebruik van Nederlandse BFI’s. 
 Hoofdstuk 1 zet uiteen dat belastingopbrengsten een cruciale bron van financiering 
voor ontwikkeling zijn. Buitenlandse Directe Investeringen (FDI), overmakingen van 
migranten, handel en andere private internationale stromen kunnen leiden tot meer 
investeringen en economische groei. Private commerciële stromen dragen echter niet 
rechtstreeks bij aan de financiering van publieke diensten, zoals onderwijs, 
gezondheidszorg, riolering en basisinfrastructuur, die essentieel zijn voor sociale 
ontwikkeling. Financiering van de publieke sector door middel van belastinginkomsten 
blijft daarom essentieel. In ontwikkelingslanden die geen hoge overheidsinkomsten 
hebben uit olie, diamanten of andere natuurlijke hulpbronnen, bedragen de 
belastinginkomsten meestal tussen de 15% en 25% van het Bruto Binnenlands Product 
(BBP). Dit is veel lager dan in hoge inkomenslanden. Daarnaast vormt Officiële 
Ontwikkelingshulp (ODA) van donoren nog een substantiële bron van 
overheidsinkomsten in lage inkomenslanden en lagere middeninkomenslanden, maar 
ODA is geen erg betrouwbare of duurzame bron. Dit impliceert dat ontwikkelingslanden 
hun capaciteit om binnenlandse opbrengsten te genereren moeten versterken. 
 Vanuit een ontwikkelingsperspectief vormen belastingen niet alleen een bron van 
opbrengsten; een breder analytisch kader houdt rekening met vier hoofddoelen van 
belastingheffing. Het eerste doel, opbrengsten genereren, is ook een instrument voor 
macro-economisch beleid. Een tweede doel is herverdeling, via progressieve belastingen 
en beperking van de belastingdruk op personen met minder draagkracht. Herverdeling is 
belangrijk omdat ontwikkeling steeds meer een ongelijkheidsvraagstuk is geworden, ook 
op nationaal niveau. Een derde doel is vertegenwoordiging; belastingheffing is een 
katalysator voor het ontstaan van betrokken overheden die verantwoording afleggen aan 
hun eigen burgers. Ontwikkelingshulp heeft dat effect niet en werkt juist verantwoording 
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aan externe donoren in de hand. Een vierde doel van belastingheffing is prijssturing. Dit 
heeft betrekking op het minimaliseren van marktverstoringen en het inzetten van 
belastingprikkels om te compenseren voor externaliteiten. Verschillende soorten 
belastingen hebben vanuit dit perspectief verschillende positieve en negatieve 
eigenschappen. Belastingen op inkomsten van personen en bedrijven hebben vaak het 
sterkste positieve effect op overheidsbestuur, maar hebben tevens een relatief sterk 
ontmoedigend effect op economische activiteit. 
 
Belastingheffing op multinationale ondernemingen is lastig vanwege internationale 
belastingontwijking 
Bedrijfsbelastingen zijn een belangrijke component van overheidsinkomsten in 
ontwikkelingslanden. In middeninkomenslanden genereren bedrijfsbelastingen 
doorgaans tussen de 10% en 30% van de totale belastingopbrengst. Dit staat in sterk 
contrast met hoge inkomenslanden, waar bedrijfsbelastingen meestal geen grote bron 
van overheidsinkomsten vormen. Het belang van bedrijfsbelastingen voor 
ontwikkelingslanden impliceert dat potentiële bedreigingen hiervoor – zoals 
belastingontwijking door multinationale ondernemingen – zeer relevant zijn voor 
ontwikkelingsfinanciering. 
 Voor ontwikkelingslanden gaat belastingheffing op multinationale ondernemingen 
gepaard met verschillende uitdagingen en beperkingen. Een belangrijke binnenlandse 
beperking is beperkte capaciteit van de belastingdienst. Verder lopen veel landen 
opbrengsten mis vanwege belastingconcurrentie, die vaak plaats vindt op regionaal 
niveau, en slecht gerichte belastingvrijstellingen voor buitenlandse investeerders. Op 
internationaal niveau vormt belastingontwijking en -ontduiking via onjuiste 
verrekenprijzen een grote uitdaging. Daarbij vindt prijsmanipulatie plaats in 
handelstransacties tussen entiteiten die tot dezelfde multinational behoren, meestal om 
winsten te verplaatsen naar laag belastende jurisdicties. Bovendien verschuiven 
multinationale ondernemingen winsten via royaltybetalingen voor het gebruik van 
merkrechten of intellectueel eigendom. Winstverschuiving vindt ook plaats via 
rentebetalingen, waarbij dochterbedrijven in landen met een hoog belastingtarief voor 
een groter deel met schulden worden gefinancierd. Deze onderwerpen komen relatief 
uitgebreid aan bod in bestaand onderzoek. 
 Dit proefschrift focust voornamelijk op de ontwijking van bronbelastingen, een 
onderwerp dat tot nu toe beperkte aandacht heeft gekregen. Bronbelastingen worden 
geheven op dividend-, rente- en royaltybetalingen aan buitenlandse entiteiten. Deze 
belastingen spelen om verschillende redenen een belangrijke rol in belastingheffing op 
bedrijven. Bronbelastingen zijn relatief eenvoudig te innen en kunnen een substantiële 
bron van opbrengsten vormen. In Kenia en Zambia waren bronbelastingen bijvoorbeeld 
goed voor 5% van de totale belastingopbrengsten in 2007. Verder kunnen 
bronbelastingen leiden tot een verschuiving van belastingafdrachten naar het gastland 
van buitenlandse investeringen, wat gunstig is voor kapitaal importerende 
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  17	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ontwikkelingslanden. Bronbelastingen voorkomen ook het ontgaan van belastingen op 
inkomsten die toekomen aan buitenlandse aandeel- en obligatiehouders en kunnen een 
achtervangfunctie hebben bij het tegengaan van winstverschuiving. 
  
Nederlands belastingbeleid voor ondernemingen faciliteert bepaalde vormen van 
belastingontwijking 
Een centraal element in Nederlands belastingbeleid voor ondernemingen dat 
belastingontwijking door multinationals faciliteert, is het unieke netwerk van bilaterale 
belastingverdragen. Per ultimo 2012 heeft Nederland belastingverdragen gesloten met 6 
lage inkomenslanden en 41 middeninkomenslanden buiten de Europese Unie (EU). 
Sommige van deze verdragen voorzien in een aanzienlijke verlaging van de standaard 
bronbelastingtarieven van verdragspartners, of elimineren deze bronbelastingen, voor 
betalingen aan Nederlandse entiteiten. Bovendien bevatten slechts zes van de 47 
verdragen antimisbruikbepalingen voor dividenden die belastingopbrengsten in het 
partnerland beschermen en bevatten slechts drie verdragen antimisbruikbepalingen voor 
rente en royalty’s. Nederland heeft zelf een bronbelasting op dividend van 15%, maar 
voor deelnemingsdividenden wordt dit tarief  meestal verlaagd tot 5% of 0% onder een 
belastingverdrag of de EU Moeder-Dochterrichtlijn. Nederland heft geen bronbelasting 
op rente- of royaltybetalingen. Deze combinatie van beleidselementen maakt Nederland 
bijzonder aantrekkelijk voor doorsluisstructuren, waarbij dividend-, rente- of 
royaltybetalingen via een Nederlandse BFI lopen om te profiteren van verlaagde 
bronbelastingen vanwege Nederlandse belastingverdragen. 
 Een ander relevant aspect van Nederlands belastingbeleid is de bijzondere fiscale 
behandeling van bepaalde entiteiten, die leidt tot lage effectieve tarieven van 
vennootschapsbelasting (VpB). Tussen 1997 en 2010 maakten ongeveer 90 bedrijven 
gebruik van de regeling voor Concernfinancieringsactiviteiten (CFA), een fiscaal 
gunstig regime voor rente- en royaltyinkomsten binnen een internationaal concern dat 
inmiddels is uitgefaseerd. In 2006 nam de Nederlandse regering de groepsrentebox aan 
ter vervanging van de CFA-regeling, maar de groepsrentebox is nooit in werking 
getreden omdat deze in strijd was met EU-wetgeving. Tegenwoordig profiteren 
sommige BFI’s van advance pricing agreements (APA’s), afspraken met de 
belastingdienst die zekerheid vooraf geven en ook wel rulings worden genoemd, waarin 
lage belastbare marges worden vastgelegd voor netto rente-, royalty- of 
handelsinkomsten, terwijl de werkelijke marges hoger kunnen zijn. Een dergelijke 
fiscale behandeling faciliteert ontwijking van VpB in andere landen via 
winstverschuiving, vooral in combinatie met Nederlandse belastingverdragen die de 
bronbelasting op rente en royalty’s sterk verlagen. 
 Dit proefschrift focust op negatieve en onbedoelde effecten van Nederlands 
belastingbeleid. Het bevat geen complete beoordeling van alle effecten, die zich 
manifesteren via verschillende kanalen. Nederlandse belastingverdragen stimuleren 
buitenlandse investeringen van Nederlandse bedrijven en faciliteren leningen van 
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Nederlandse banken en institutionele investeerders aan bedrijven in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Nederlands belastingbeleid kan daardoor een positief volume-
effect hebben op investeringen in ontwikkelingslanden. Tegelijk kunnen verlaagde 
bronbelastingen op betalingen aan Nederlandse bedrijven en crediteuren een negatief 
tariefeffect veroorzaken en daardoor doelbewust de belastingopbrengst verminderen bij 
een gegeven niveau van investeringen. Deze voorziene positieve en negatieve effecten 
worden relatief goed begrepen en daarom hier niet onderzocht. 
 Vanuit het perspectief van ontwikkelingslanden zijn negatieve tariefeffecten van 
doorsluisstructuren meestal onbedoeld. Doorsluisstructuren kunnen leiden tot lagere 
bronbelastingen op betalingen aan entiteiten in derde landen via Nederlandse BFI’s. 
Bovendien kunnen dergelijke structuren en de bijzondere fiscale behandeling van BFI’s 
een prikkel geven om hogere schulden aan te gaan of intellectueel eigendom naar 
Nederland te verplaatsen. Dit kan de samenstelling van de activa en passiva van een 
bedrijf beïnvloeden en de belastingbasis in ontwikkelingslanden verkleinen. Dit 
onderzoek spitst zich toe op deze onbedoelde tarief- en verschuivingseffecten. De balans 
tussen positieve en negatieve effecten verschilt per ontwikkelingsland. 
 
Gebrek aan coherentie tussen Nederlands belasting- en ontwikkelingsbeleid 
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt hoe internationale aspecten van Nederlands belastingbeleid 
voor ondernemingen zich verhouden tot Nederlands ontwikkelingsbeleid. Hierbij wordt 
het concept Beleidscoherentie voor Ontwikkeling (BCO) gebruikt, wat verwijst naar de 
afwezigheid van beleidseffecten die strijdig zijn met ontwikkelingsdoelen en het creëren 
van synergie tussen verschillende ministeries om ontwikkelingsdoelen te bereiken. De 
meeste BCO-initiatieven focussen op de effecten van handelsbeleid. Sinds 2009 gaat de 
BCO-agenda van de EU ook over fiscaal bestuur. Daarbij wordt voornamelijk voorzien 
in technische assistentie om belastingsystemen in ontwikkelingslanden te versterken, 
maar is geen aandacht voor de effecten van belastingbeleid voor ondernemingen van 
EU-lidstaten. 
 In Nederland probeert het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken om BCO te 
bevorderen en erkent daarbij de relevantie van Nederlands belastingbeleid voor 
ondernemingen. Het afgelopen decennium heeft het Ministerie aanzienlijke aandacht 
besteed aan zowel lokale als internationale belemmeringen voor het genereren van 
binnenlandse opbrengsten in ontwikkelingslanden, waaronder onjuiste verrekenprijzen 
en excessief gebruik van belastingvrijstellingen. Deze ontwikkelingsagenda impliceert 
dat onbedoelde effecten van Nederlands belastingbeleid op ontwikkelingslanden 
incoherent zijn met ontwikkelingsbeleid en dus als onwenselijk kunnen worden 
beschouwd. 
 Het gebruik van Nederlandse BFI’s in strategieën van multinationale 
ondernemingen om belasting te ontwijken ontsnapte tot 2007 echter grotendeels aan de 
aandacht van beleidsmakers en het bredere publiek. Als gevolg daarvan bestond een 
gebrek aan coherentie tussen Nederlands belasting- en ontwikkelingsbeleid. De 
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goedkeuring van de groepsrentebox in 2006, die duidelijk gebruikt kon worden om 
winsten uit ontwikkelingslanden naar Nederland te verplaatsen, is een onmiskenbaar 
bewijs van het gebrek aan coherentie. De oorzaken van incoherent beleid zijn zowel 
structureel als politiek, omdat de belangen van ontwikkelingslanden inherent 
conflicteren met bijzondere belangen van sommige grote multinationale ondernemingen 
en Nederlandse dienstverleners. 
 Het Ministerie van Financiën publiceerde in 2011 een nieuwe Notitie Fiscaal 
Verdragsbeleid (NFV) waarin het belang van BCO wordt bevestigd. Beleidscoherentie 
betekent volgens deze notitie dat de naleving van belastingwetgeving en informatie-
uitwisseling met ontwikkelingslanden moet worden verbeterd. De notitie beschrijft ook 
dat Nederland bereid is om in verdragen met ontwikkelingslanden relatief hoge 
bronbelastingen toe te staan en antimisbruikbepalingen op te nemen wanneer daarom 
wordt verzocht. Deze principes weerspiegelen de toenemende aandacht voor coherentie 
tussen Nederlands belasting- en ontwikkelingsbeleid, maar gaan nog niet in op de 
aanpak van bestaande onwenselijke effecten. 
 
Multinationale ondernemingen gebruiken BFI’s voor doorsluisconstructies en 
ontwijken zo bronbelasting op dividend 
Sommige multinationale ondernemingen ontwijken bronbelastingen op dividend door 
FDI om te leiden via een doorsluisland met gunstige belastingverdragen. Deze praktijk 
wordt ook wel tax treaty shopping genoemd. Gastlanden van buitenlandse investeringen 
staan meestal afkeuren tegenover tax treaty shopping, omdat dit afbreuk doet aan het 
principe van wederkerigheid. Jurisprudentie geeft duidelijke voorbeelden van tax treaty 
shopping via Nederlandse BFI’s. Bovendien is het doorsluizen van investeringen in 
eigen vermogen de belangrijkste activiteit van Nederlandse BFI’s, goed voor zo’n 50% 
van hun gezamenlijke balanstotaal. 
 Om na te gaan in hoeverre investeringen via BFI’s verband houden met tax treaty 
shopping, analyseert hoofdstuk 3 het effect van belastingverdragen en andere structurele 
factoren op FDI omgeleid via Nederland. De analyse gebruikt geanonimiseerde 
microdata van grote BFI’s en dekt ongeveer 90% van de totale activa van BFI’s. 
Afgezien van de grote opkomende economieën Brazilië, Rusland, India, China, Zuid-
Afrika en Mexico hadden 37 lage en middeninkomenslanden in 2007 een 
belastingverdrag met Nederland. De totale stand van FDI in deze landen was samen 
€582 miljard, waarvan ongeveer 9% (€53 miljard) eigendom was van een Nederlandse 
BFI. Voor de groep van ontwikkelingslanden zonder belastingverdrag met Nederland 
bedroeg dit aandeel 6%, een derde minder.  
 Econometrische analyse op het niveau van landenparen bevestigt dat het omgeleide 
FDI-gedeelte hoger is als het thuis- en gastland allebei een belastingverdrag met 
Nederland hebben, en lager als er een direct verdrag bestaat tussen het thuis- en 
gastland. Investeringsbeschermingsovereenkomsten (IBO’s) en economische 
verwevenheid verklaren ook een deel van de investeringen via BFI’s. Europese 
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hoofdkantoren of corruptie in het thuis- en gastland hebben geen significant effect. 
Omdat belastingvoordelen verschillen tussen verdragen, houdt de analyse ook rekening 
met bilaterale bronbelastingtarieven voor dividend en met de belastingregimes in thuis- 
en gastlanden. De resultaten laten zien dat omleiding van FDI deels wordt gedreven voor 
specifieke bedrijfsstructuren die de totale belasting op uitgekeerde winst verlagen door 
gebruik te maken van Nederlandse belastingverdragen. Hieruit kan worden 
geconcludeerd dat omgeleide FDI deels het gevolg is van tax treaty shopping. 
 Gemiddeld genomen leidt de mogelijkheid om bronbelasting op dividend te 
ontwijken tot enkele procenten hogere bilaterale investeringsposities via Nederland. 
Hoofdstuk 5, waarin de invloed van verschillende strategieën voor belastingontwijking 
in meer detail wordt onderzocht, laat aan de hand van macrodata zien dat sommige 
individuele gastlanden sterker worden geraakt. De Filippijnen hebben bijvoorbeeld een 
belastingverdrag met Nederland dat voorziet in een bronbelastingtarief van 10% op 
dividend uitgekeerd aan Nederlandse moederbedrijven, terwijl het betreffende tarief 
voor de VS, het VK en diverse andere landen minstens 15% bedraagt. Dit is één van de 
redenen waarom 27% van de totale bestaande FDI in de Filippijnen ultimo 2010 via 
Nederland was geïnvesteerd. Andere ontwikkelingslanden die een speciaal 
belastingverdrag met Nederland en een hoog aandeel omgeleide FDI hebben, zijn Ghana 
(20%), Oekraïne (15%) en Indonesië (10%). 
 In theorie heeft het doorsluizen van FDI zowel een volume- als een tariefeffect op de 
belastingopbrengsten. De resultaten van studies die het volume-effect van 
belastingverdragen op bilaterale FDI analyseren, zijn echter gemengd. Voor alle 
ontwikkelingslanden samen is een significant positief volume-effect nog onzekerder dan 
voor een individueel land vanwege onderlinge concurrentie om buitenlandse 
investeringen. Daarom kan worden geconcludeerd dat het tariefeffect dominant is. In 
2007 ontvingen Nederlandse BFI’s meer dan €5 miljard aan dividenden uit lage en 
middeninkomenslanden, waarvan zij bijna €3 miljard weer doorsluisden naar 
buitenlandse moeders. Deze cijfers impliceren dat zelfs een klein tariefeffect, 
bijvoorbeeld een 3 procentpunt lagere bronbelasting op deze dividendstromen, de 
belastingopbrengsten substantieel kan verminderen. 
 
BFI’s faciliteren ontwijking van bronbelasting op rente, wat schuldratio’s verhoogt 
Sommige multinationale ondernemingen laten ook rentebetalingen via Nederlandse 
BFI’s lopen om bronbelastingen te ontwijken. Met behulp van geanonimiseerde 
microdata laat hoofdstuk 5 zien dat BFI’s in 2007 meer dan €450 miljard hadden 
doorgeleend aan buitenlandse entiteiten binnen hetzelfde concern. De bron van deze 
financieringen bestond voor ruwweg €250 miljard uit schuldpapier (obligaties) 
uitgegeven door de BFI’s, voor €150 miljard uit groepsleningen en voor €50 miljard uit 
leningen van derden. Doorleenactiviteiten vertegenwoordigen ongeveer 25% van het 
gecombineerde balanstotaal van BFI’s en worden vaak gecombineerd met het 
doorsluizen van participaties in dochterbedrijven. 
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 Voor ontwikkelingslanden geven marktdata aan dat bedrijven uit Indonesië en 
Kazachstan veruit het grootste volume aan schuldpapier via Nederland hadden uitstaan. 
In 2010 gaven Nederlandse BFI’s €0,6 miljard aan rentebetalingen van Indonesische 
bedrijven door aan obligatiehouders. Vanwege het belastingverdrag tussen Indonesië en 
Nederland is het grootste deel van deze betalingen vrijgesteld van bronbelasting, terwijl 
een tarief van 10% tot 20% van toepassing is op rente die rechtstreeks vanuit Indonesië 
wordt betaald aan externe schuldeisers in bijna alle andere landen. Voor Kazachstan 
bevat het Nederlandse verdrag geen lager tarief dan andere belastingverdragen. 
Rentebetalingen uit ontwikkelingslanden die worden doorgesluisd binnen de groep zijn 
kleiner dan de rente die wordt doorgegeven aan externe schuldeisers. Het voornaamste 
tariefeffect van het doorsluizen van rente via BFI’s is dus een substantiële verlaging van 
Indonesische bronbelastingopbrengsten.  
 Schuldfinanciering via BFI’s heeft ook een verschuivingseffect. Op groepsniveau 
(voor concerns als geheel) kunnen lagere leenkosten leiden tot relatief meer 
schuldfinanciering. Op het niveau van dochterbedrijven kunnen multinationale 
ondernemingen schuiven met leningen en BFI’s gebruiken om rentebetalingen door te 
geven aan laagbelaste entiteiten, zodat de schuldfinanciering van normale 
dochterbedrijven toeneemt. Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt deze effecten. Voor een analyse van 
verschuivingseffecten op het niveau van dochterbedrijven zijn financiële data nodig die 
niet direct beschikbaar zijn uit ontwikkelingslanden. Daarom kijkt de analyse naar de 
financieringsstructuur van EU-concerns en hun dochterbedrijven in de EU. 
 Econometrische analyse laat zien dat op  groepsniveau schulduitgifte via 
Nederlandse BFI’s is gerelateerd aan significant hogere schulden. Controlerend voor 
relevante groepskarakteristieken hebben EU-concerns met een Nederlandse 
schulduitgevende BFI gemiddeld een tien procentpunt hogere verhouding tussen schuld 
en eigen vermogen plus schuld. Dit grote effect kan het gevolg zijn van verschillen in de 
mate van agressieve belastingplanning; bedrijven met een agressievere belastingstrategie 
gebruiken mogelijk meer schuldfinanciering en zullen meer geneigd zijn om 
bronbelastingen te ontwijken via Nederlandse BFI’s. Andere typen Nederlandse BFI’s 
hebben echter geen significant effect op de financieringsverhouding op groepsniveau. 
Dit bevestigt dat hogere schuldfinanciering wordt faciliteerd door schulduitgifte via 
BFI’s. 
 Op het niveau van dochterbedrijven levert de analyse drie belangrijke resultaten op. 
Ten eerste hebben de dochterbedrijven van grotere concerns relatief meer schulden. Ten 
tweede bestaat er een positief verband tussen het gebruik van een Nederlandse 
groepsleningen-BFI en de schuldhefboom van dochterbedrijven, terwijl dat niet het 
geval is voor andere typen Nederlandse BFI’s. Ten derde is de schuldhefboom van 
dochters van grote multinationale ondernemingen relatief ongevoelig voor het 
belastingtarief in het vestigingsland. Samen suggereren deze resultaten dat grote 
concerns meer geneigd zijn om winsten van dochters in EU-landen te verplaatsen naar 
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speciale laagbelaste entiteiten en dat dit deels wordt gefaciliteerd door Nederlandse 
groepsleningen-BFI’s. 
 Kortom, zowel externe schulden als groepsleningen die worden doorgegeven via 
Nederlandse BFI’s gaan gepaard met verschuivingseffecten. Wat betreft externe 
schulden betekent dit een additioneel verlies aan belastingopbrengsten voor Indonesië 
vanwege de hoge schulduitgifte via Nederland. Het verschuivingseffect voor 
groepsleningen is relatief klein; in 2007 sluisden Nederlandse BFI’s maar €0,2 miljard 
aan rentebetalingen uit ontwikkelingslanden door naar laagbelaste entiteiten.  
 
Royaltystructuren met Nederlandse BFI’s faciliteren winstverschuiving 
Advance pricing agreements tussen BFI’s en de Nederlandse belastingdienst die een 
alternatieve belastinggrondslag bepalen, faciliteren mogelijk winstverschuiving naar 
Nederland via royaltybetalingen of andere soorten transacties. Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft dat 
BFI’s in 2007 ongeveer €0,3 miljard aan royalty-inkomsten uit ontwikkelingslanden 
ontvingen die niet werden doorgesluisd. Bij in ieder geval een deel van deze stromen is 
sprake van winstverschuiving naar Nederland. Royaltybetalingen uit 
ontwikkelingslanden die werden doorgegeven via BFI’s bedroegen maar €0,1 miljard 
en waren dus relatief beperkt. Voor ontwikkelingslanden hebben royaltystructuren met 
Nederlandse BFI’s daarom vooral een verschuivingseffect, dat de belastinggrondslag in 
vestigingslanden vermindert. 
 
Conclusie: Nederlands belastingbeleid heeft onwenselijke effecten op bepaalde 
ontwikkelingslanden 
Hoofdstuk 6 concludeert dat verschillende aspecten van Nederlands belastingbeleid voor 
ondernemingen negatieve effecten kunnen hebben op belastingopbrengsten in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Een cruciaal aspect betreft Nederlandse belastingverdragen met 
ontwikkelingslanden die relatief grote verlagingen van bronbelastingen bewerkstelligen, 
zonder effectieve antimisbruikbepalingen. Vanwege verschillen tussen 
belastingverdragen en tussen bronbelastingregimes van verdragspartners heeft 
Nederlands belastingbeleid op sommige landen een groter effect dan op andere. De 
effecten op belastingopbrengsten zijn als onwenselijk te beschouwen omdat deze 
incoherent zijn met de doelen van Nederlands ontwikkelingsbeleid en strijdig zijn met 
de belangen van ontwikkelingslanden. 
 Strategieën voor belastingontwijking die worden gefaciliteerd door Nederlands 
belastingbeleid voor ondernemingen hebben niet alleen invloed op opbrengsten, maar 
ook op de andere functies van belastingen: herverdeling, vertegenwoordiging en 
prijssturing. Op internationaal niveau leidt belastingontwijking tot herverdeling van 
ontwikkelingslanden naar Nederland en andere hoge inkomenslanden. 
Herverdelingseffecten op nationaal niveau hangen af van de binnenlandse 
belastingsystemen van ontwikkelingslanden. Wat betreft vertegenwoordiging kan 
belastingontwijking door multinationale ondernemingen de algemene belastingmoraal 
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verzwakken en constructieve onderhandelingen over overheidsfinanciën belemmeren. 
Tot slot is een belangrijk prijssturingseffect dat belastingontwijking de concurrentie 
verstoort tussen grote bedrijven die gebruik kunnen maken van internationale 
belastingarbitrage en kleinere bedrijven die dat niet kunnen. Hierdoor neemt de 
marktefficiëntie af. Deze negatieve effecten op bredere economische ontwikkeling zijn 
moeilijk te kwantificeren, maar kunnen minstens zo belangrijk zijn als het rechtstreekse 
effect op belastingopbrengsten. 
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1.1 Motivation	   to	   study	   effects	   of	   Dutch	   tax	   policy	   on	  
developing	  countries	  
Governments of developing countries need sustainable sources of finance for 
development. For some developing countries, foreign aid and debt are substantial 
sources of finance for public expenditures. However, developing countries will also 
need to enhance domestic revenue mobilisation. This implies a need to raise tax 
revenues. 
 Countries are faced with various challenges to raise tax revenues. Some of these 
challenges are domestic, such as insufficient capacity of tax administrations, large 
informal sectors, and ineffective tax policies. Other challenges have an international 
character, such as tax competition with other developing countries to attract Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), evasion of personal income tax on assets held in tax havens, 
and corporate tax avoidance. International tax evasion and avoidance have a particular 
dimension that other challenges do not have. In many cases, these result from strategies 
that involve assets or legal entities in high income donor countries. Therefore these high 
income countries can help to address constraints to domestic revenue mobilisation in 
developing countries. 
 This thesis focuses on international constraints to domestic revenue mobilisation 
that result from the Dutch corporate tax system. The Netherlands is not a secrecy 
jurisdiction and does not facilitate evasion of personal income tax. However, the Dutch 
tax system offers opportunities for firms to avoid taxes in other countries. Multinational 
enterprises make use of these opportunities on a very large scale. As a consequence, 
approximately 9% of the combined inward FDI stock in all developing countries, 
excluding China, is being held via the Netherlands.1 From a policy perspective, this 
makes it relevant to investigate the consequences of Dutch corporate tax policy for 
developing countries. 
 The Dutch tax system affects corporate tax revenues in many other countries, not 
just in developing countries. In absolute terms, by far the largest impact is on tax 
revenues in the United States and some European countries. However, for some 
developing countries, especially those that have a tax treaty with the Netherlands,2 the 
impacts are also material. The impacts on tax revenues in some least developed 
countries may be more limited, as Dutch tax policy will be less relevant to countries 
with insignificant foreign investment. 
                                                        
1  Approximately €170 billion of FDI held via the Netherlands, based on the difference between Dutch 
outward FDI including Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) from IMF (2012a) and excluding SPEs from 
OECD (2012b), divided by approximately €1,900 of total inward FDI based on IMF (2012a) and 
UNCTAD (2011). China is excluded because it is a very large host country and FDI in China passes often 
through other SPEs, in Hong Kong. See Chapters 3 and 5 for more details about FDI in developing 
countries via Dutch SPEs. 
2  See page 208 for a list of all Dutch tax treaties. 
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 This thesis therefore aims to build a bridge between development studies and studies 
on corporate taxation. With a few exceptions, there is little connection between these 
two fields of research so far. Related development research covers the relationship 
between tax and governance (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Everest-Philips, 2008; Moore, 
2007; Prichard, 2010), tax and aid (Bulíř & Hamann, 2006; Moss et al., 2006; Ruben & 
Pop, 2009), and tax systems of in developing countries in general (Bird & Zolt, 2008; 
Cobham, 2005b; IMF, 2011; McKinley & Kyrili, 2009; Tanzi & Zee, 2000). There 
exists also a large body of research on tax systems in particular regions or individual 
developing countries. Most of these studies do not discuss taxation of multinational 
enterprises separately and have little to say about tax treaties or withholding taxes. To a 
large extent, this may be due to a lack of data. Statistics on different types of tax 
revenues in developing countries are difficult to accede and disaggregated data by type 
of business taxation, such as corporate income tax, capital gains tax and withholding tax, 
are hardly available. 
 Earlier studies focussing on international aspects analyse tax incentives and 
competition for FDI (Easson, 2004; Goodspeed et al., 2011; Klemm & Van Parys, 2012; 
Nassar, 2008) and revenue effects of trade liberalisation (Agbeyegbe et al., 2004; 
Braunsgaard & Keen, 2005; Caliari, 2008; Cobham, 2007). There exists also a range of 
empirical studies on the relationship between tax treaties and FDI and some of these 
studies pay special attention to developing countries (Barthel, Busse, & Neumayer, 
2010; Hines, 2001; Neumayer, 2007; Siegmann, 2007). The studies on tax treaties come 
closest to the subject of this thesis. However, unlike this thesis, those studies do not 
consider potentially unintended uses and adverse effects of tax treaties on tax revenues 
in the developing host countries. 
 There also exists a well-established area of economic research regarding corporate 
tax planning. This research includes many empirical studies on international tax 
avoidance strategies, such as debt shifting, using micro data from multinational 
enterprises (Büttner & Wamser, 2007; Desai et al., 2003; Grubert, 1998; Hines, 1999; 
Huizinga et al., 2008; Ruf, 2008). However, these studies mostly do not pay special 
attention to developing countries. Again, data availability is a key constraint. 
Comprehensive micro data are available for corporate entities in Europe and for the 
worldwide subsidiaries of multinationals from a few high income countries, notably 
from the US and Germany. Remarkably, even studies that use a dataset with worldwide 
subsidiaries sometimes struggle to include developing countries in the analysis due to 
unavailability of macroeconomic control variables (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2005). The 
research on corporate tax planning is still largely disconnected from development 
research. Only a case study of Mongolia, in a recent IMF technical assistance report, 
specifically analyses potential adverse impacts of corporate tax planning for a 
developing country (IMF, 2012b). 
 As a consequence, many development scholars may be unfamiliar with the effect of 
tax systems in high income countries on corporate tax revenues in developing countries. 
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Furthermore, taxation of multinational enterprises is a rather specific aspect of the 
overall design and functioning of a developing country’s tax system. The relevance of 
foreign tax systems, and of the Dutch tax system in particular, for development policy 
may therefore not be immediately apparent. Nonetheless, the revenue impacts for 
developing countries can be substantial. This thesis provides further insights into those 
impacts and the underlying mechanisms. 
 The remainder of this introduction addresses the following issues. Section 1.2 
analyses why taxation is essential for development and describes the different purposes 
of taxation. Section 1.3 analyses the level and composition of tax revenues in developing 
countries, with a focus on corporate tax revenues, and discusses the rationale for 
withholding taxes. Section 1.4 reviews the challenges and constraints for raising 
corporate tax revenues in developing countries and discusses coherence of donor 
policies in relation to domestic resource mobilisation. Section 1.5 explains the research 
design and structure of this thesis. 
 
 
1.2 The	  development	  imperative	  for	  taxation	  
1.2.1 Tax	  and	  development	  in	  historical	  perspective	  
Developing country governments require sustainable sources of finance for 
development. Although this may sound obvious, to some extent, this is in fact a 
relatively new perspective on development financing. Historically, development 
assistance has been mainly focussed on foreign grants and public sector loans as sources 
of finance. However, the importance of these sources has declined over time. In 1960, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries, consisting of grants 
and loans on concessional terms, was approximately 0.50% of donor countries’ Gross 
National Product (GNP). In 1970, member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) committed to increase ODA to 0.7% of their 
GNP. However, instead of rising, the share of ODA fell to 0.35% in 1985. Moreover, 
during the cold war, a large part of bilateral aid was provided for political reasons and 
not closely linked to development policies. After the end of the cold war, ODA further 
decreased to 0.25% of donor countries’ GNP by 1996 (Todaro, 2000). In 2002, the 
governmental Financing for Development conference in Monterrey resulted in renewed 
donor commitments and ODA to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) increased 
substantially for one year, but did not rise further and remained volatile, as donors failed 
to fulfil their commitments (United Nations, 2010; Weeks, 2010). Similarly, the 2005 
G8 summit in Gleneagles produced a temporary increase in debt relief, but in 2006 and 
2007 total ODA decreased again in absolute terms (United Nations, 2010). Thus, even 
without considering aid dependency and governance issues, these patterns show that 
ODA is not a reliable or sustainable source of development financing. 
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 The decrease of new concessional loans in the period 1974-1979 went together with 
a strong increase in lending to developing country governments by commercial banks, 
on non-concessional terms and with shorter maturities. The purpose of external 
borrowing changed as well. Before 1974, developing country governments mainly 
obtained official loans to implement development projects or finance capital imports. 
The boom in external borrowing during the late 1970s supported broader government 
spending, as developing countries sought to sustain fast growth in the face of declining 
exports. During this financial boom, sustainability of external borrowing was not 
regarded as a source of concern. However, the second oil shock in 1979 caused a strong 
increase in interest rates and import prices for developing countries, triggering the debt 
crisis of the 1980s. Many developing countries were unable to meet their rising debt 
service obligations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to provide 
stabilisation loans, subject to strict policy conditions. The IMF’s policy prescriptions 
were intended to generate macroeconomic stabilisation and did not have a development 
focus. The standard conditions included exchange rate devaluation, strong curbs on 
government spending, restrictions on bank lending, wage controls, and other anti-
inflation measures. However, these austerity programmes often increased poverty and 
aggravated negative growth (Stewart, 1991). Thus, neither the commercial bank loans 
nor the IMF stability loans were specifically intended as a source of finance for 
development. 
 In addition, during the debt crisis of the early 1980s, foreign borrowing went hand in 
hand with capital flight resulting from economic uncertainty and appropriation of 
government funds by political elites. Already during the 1980s, researchers estimated 
that for several Latin American countries, capital flight equalled up to half the public 
debt (Wiliamson & Lessard, 1987). The World Bank identified overvalued exchange 
rates and high inflation as the main causes of capital flight (World Bank, 1985), 
suggesting that the adjustment programmes were an adequate policy response to this 
problem. Newer studies confirm that weak institutions and macro policies cause capital 
flight and thereby create an external financing need (Cerra et al., 2008), but they also 
show a debt overhang effect (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011). This means that a rising level 
of public debt increases capital flight in later years. Despite the highly problematic 
nature of capital flight, official development policies did not specifically address its 
illicit component or the related tax evasion on foreign assets held abroad. This illustrates 
that attention for increasing development financing through tax revenues has been 
limited. 
  The stabilisation programmes that were linked to IMF support included a tax 
component, which formed part of the Washington consensus. This tax component 
consisted of three main pillars. First, governments should aim to maximise the neutrality 
of the tax system with regard to economic activity. This was translated into a standard 
prescription for a broad-based Value Added Tax (VAT), much lower rates of corporate 
and personal income tax, and reducing tax incentives and exemptions (Bird, 2012). 
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Second, governments had to refrain from using taxes for redistributive goals. Third, 
developing countries should realise tax revenues of approximately 15-20% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Cobham, 2007). As a consequence, countries in Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa hit by the debt crisis on average increased their tax 
revenues from the 1970s to the 1980s, but the progress was limited. Compared to high 
income countries, but also to East Asia and former soviet states, revenues from 
corporate and especially personal income taxes remained very low (Cobham, 2005b). 
 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, launched in 1996, was 
slightly different. To address the still unsustainable debt burden of developing countries 
with high levels of poverty, the IMF, World Bank, and creditor countries united in the 
Paris Club agreed to provide certain amounts of debt cancellation. This debt relief was 
again subject to strict conditions. Each country had to make elaborate policy 
commitments in a national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). These PRSPs 
have been the subject of heavy criticism, because they still focussed too much on 
macroeconomic goals and too little on poverty reduction (Cheru, 2001). Often the 
macroeconomic policies, typically including market liberalisation and privatisation, 
were also inconsistent with social development goals (Cheru, 2001). Nonetheless, the 
PRSPs showed some diversity in tax policy reforms. 
 Some tax-related policy goals continued to reflect the Washington consensus, such 
as limiting the tax burden to a certain share of GDP (Kenya) or introducing a single rate 
VAT (Chad). However, several PRSPs also included tax reforms that were more 
development-oriented or aimed to increase government revenues to finance 
development. Some examples are to shift the tax burden away from the poor (Kenya), 
more progressive taxation (Uganda, Benin), and explicit goals to increase total tax 
revenues (Mozambique, Zambia). Such policies emphasise the role of tax in raising 
revenues and enhancing redistribution, departing form the more one-sided focus on the 
distortionary effects of taxes on economic activity. Thus, they reflect the emergence of a 
new perspective on the role of tax in development. In other programmes and advice, 
such as Article IV consultations and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF), the IMF has continued to promote the standard tax policy prescriptions of the 
Washington consensus (Marshall, 2009). 
 Considering the failure of donors to fulfil their commitments to increase ODA 
levels, other forms of development cooperation beyond ODA are getting increasing 
attention. Some have expressed the view that donor countries should increase political 
support for developing countries by allowing more policy space and not imposing 
standard models, such as the Washington consensus, that may be inappropriate 
(Kalinowski, 2011). Others are exploring complementary mechanisms of public 
financing for development as another way to extend development cooperation beyond 
ODA (Addison et al., 2005; United Nations, 2012). Examples of potential alternative 
mechanisms, commonly referred to as innovative sources of development finance, are 
climate change taxes and currency transaction taxes. These would be new types of 
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international taxes that could generate revenues for development and at the same time 
promote global public goods, or at least provide minimal distortions to economic 
activity (United Nations, 2012). Thus, the link between tax and development could 
extend beyond domestic tax revenues in developing countries. 
 
1.2.2 Public	  and	  private	  sources	  of	  development	  financing	  
Since the 1990s, sources of development finance other than grants, loans and tax 
revenues have received increasing attention. A new phase of economic globalisation 
took off in this period. FDI in low and middle income countries strongly increased, even 
while it was initially highly concentrated in the largest emerging economies (Botchwey, 
2003). In 1997, approximately 60% of FDI inflows to developing countries went to 
China, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and Poland (Todaro, 2000). International trade also 
increased, in part due to economic liberalisation. FDI and international trade were major 
themes in the 2002 Financing for Development conference in Monterrey and the 2008 
conference in Doha. Migrant remittances could be added to this list of alternative 
sources. The volume of registered remittances to developing countries has grown from 
USD 81 billion in 2000 to approximately USD 325 billion in 2010. Taking into account 
unrecorded flows, total remittances are still significantly larger. They have become the 
third largest source of external finance for developing countries, after export earnings 
and FDI, and represent more than twice the amount of official development aid received 
(World Bank, 2011b). Remittances are also strongly concentrated, though. In 2010, over 
50% of recorded migrant remittances to developing countries were sent to India, China, 
Mexico, Nigeria and the Philippines (World Bank, 2011a). 
 Figure 1.1 shows various domestic and external sources of financing for 
development as a proportion of GDP around 1997 and 2007. The figure distinguishes 
three groups of countries on the basis of World Bank income categories.3 
 The first two sources of financing, tax revenues and ODA, are the main funding 
sources for public expenditures and public investments.4 In upper-middle income 
countries, ODA is insignificant. In the group of lower-middle income countries, on 
average the contribution of ODA to public financing dropped from 7% to 5% of GDP, 
but this was compensated by increasing tax revenues. As a consequence, the sum of tax 
revenues and ODA increased slightly from 24% to 25% of GDP. For low income 
countries, net ODA receipts reached a low point in 2000, then peaked in 2003, and by 
                                                        
3  The figure excludes countries with government revenues from natural resources higher than 10% of GDP 
in 2006-2008. In addition, Swaziland and Lesotho are excluded because of their unusually high 
government revenues from Southern African Development Community (SADC) tariff revenue 
allocations. Throughout this chapter, the analysis uses fixed country groups based on World Bank income 
classifications from 2012. Thus, developments over time in the various graphs are not influenced by 
reclassifications of countries. 
4  Other external financing for public goods and services, such as official flows other than ODA and grants 
from private development organisations, are relatively small compared to ODA and tax revenues. See 
OECD (2012a). 
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Figure	  1.1	   Domestic	   and	   external	   sources	   of	   financing	   for	   development	   by	  
country	  group	  
Notes:	   unweighted	   averages	   per	   country	   group	   for	   the	   periods	   1996-­‐1998	   and	   2006-­‐2008;	   exports	  
exclude	  7	  countries	  due	  to	  missing	  data;	  private	  portfolio	  investment	  includes	  bank	  loans.	  Sources:	  tax	  
revenues	  for	  African	  countries	  from	  OECD	  and	  AfDB	  (2010);	  tax	  revenues	  for	  Latin	  American	  countries	  
except	  Nicaragua	   from	  OECD	   (2012d);	   remittances	   from	  World	  Bank	   (2011a)	   if	   available;	   all	  other	  data	  
from	  World	  Bank	  (2012).	  
 
2007 ODA receipts had fallen again to approximately 14% of GDP, the same level as in 
1997. Tax revenues, by contrast, rose steadily from 12% to 15% of GDP. Thus, while 
lower-middle income countries have been gradually replacing external development 
assistance with domestic resources, in low income countries tax revenues increased as 
well but ODA continues to be a highly important source of public financing. 
 The next two sources shown in the figure, export earnings and remittances, are 
private sources of foreign income, resulting from trade and migration. Exports are by far 
the largest source of financing in all country groups and periods and increased 
considerably since 1997. Remittances are especially important for lower-middle income 
countries,5 but remittances to low income countries have also increased strongly. 
 Finally, domestic savings, FDI and portfolio investments are three potential sources 
of financing for private investment. Gross domestic savings differ markedly between the 
country groups. In upper-middle income countries, domestic savings are relatively high 
and much larger than FDI and portfolio investment. Private investment in these 
countries is unlikely to be constrained by savings (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009).6 In 
lower-middle income countries, domestic savings are on average much lower and FDI 
has become an important complementary source of funding. In low income countries, 
                                                        
5  Out of the 22 lower-middle income countries in the figure, seven countries received remittances over 10% 
of GDP in the period 2006-2008. These were Cape Verde, El Salvador, Guatemala, Moldova, Nicaragua, 
the Philippines and Senegal. 
6  FDI and domestic savings are no perfect substitutes, though. FDI can be qualitatively different, for 
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domestic savings are still lower, on average a mere 5% of GDP. In some of these 
countries, notably Burundi and the Kyrgyz Republic, gross domestic savings have been 
substantially negative since at least 2004. FDI to low income countries has strongly 
increased and on average FDI inflows around 2007 were also 5% of GDP, as large as 
domestic savings. Portfolio investments to all three country groups are on average much 
smaller than FDI.7 
 Note that net portfolio investment in developing countries reached an all-time high 
in 2007 and net inward FDI peaked in 2008. After that, both types of foreign investment 
sharply declined. Figure 1.1 therefore shows foreign investment at its peak. Portfolio 
investment to developing countries reached a peak in 1997 as well, just before the Asian 
crisis hit. However, the three-year average data shown in the figure also include flows in 
1998, when portfolio investments to Thailand and Indonesia had turned substantially 
negative due to withdrawals of previous investments. ODA has also been volatile, as 
noted above, but less so than foreign investment. Domestic tax revenues and migrant 
remittances from abroad, by contrast, have been relatively stable over time. 
 There exist important differences between public sector financing and private 
commercial flows. Figure 1.1 shows public as well as private flows. The former can be 
used directly to finance public services, such as education, health care, sanitation, and 
basic infrastructure, which are essential for social development.8 Private flows can 
stimulate investment and economic growth, but they support public services only in an 
indirect way. Moreover, in some cases policies to increase private flows may conflict 
with public revenue generation. Tax incentives for FDI show that a large trade-off can 
exist.9 When such tax incentives do not increase total investment or investors restructure 
their investments to obtain incentives that were not intended for them, tax incentives can 
actually reduce total government revenues. Thus, sources of financing for economic 
development are not quite the same as sources of financing for public services. 
 The experience of the HIPC initiative illustrates that the public and private sector are 
not always accurately distinguished. Many low income African countries are in fact net 
                                                        
7  Data on portfolio investments are not complete, though, and may underestimate the total volume of net 
inward investments. Furthermore, some multinationals based in developing countries issue debt securities 
via foreign subsidiaries located in, for example, the Netherlands or Singapore. The foreign subsidiaries 
often lend the issuance proceeds onwards to their own parent companies. These reverse loans are recorded 
as negative outward FDI instead of positive inward portfolio investment. See chapter 5 for more details. 
8  Some forms of ODA, such as technical assistance and project support, cannot be directed to such public 
services by developing country governments themselves. 
9  In this case, the trade-off is between corporate tax revenues and expenditures to facilitate foreign 
investments on the one hand and FDI inflows on the other hand. The trade-off depends on the importance 
of tax incentives to foreign investors. If taxes are not one of the main factors for location decisions, which 
is usually the case (Bols et al., 2001; Goodspeed et al., 2011; James, 2009; Muller et al., 2004), then a 
government may need to offer relatively large tax incentives to a broad group of foreign investors in order 
to attract additional investments. More generally, at the margin, any tax that generates economic 
disincentives usually involves a trade-off between additional public revenue and additional private 
economic activity. 
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creditors to the rest of the world; their governments are heavily indebted, but the private 
foreign wealth of a small elite exceeds the public debt (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2001). The 
African Economic Outlook 2010 explicitly distinguishes the private and public 
component of development financing and emphasises the importance of equitable and 
efficient tax systems to finance public expenditures (OECD & AfDB, 2010). This thesis 
focuses on the structure of tax systems and hence on the public component of domestic 
resource mobilisation. 
 
1.2.3 Tax,	  aid	  and	  governance	  
Developing countries need to replace foreign grants and loans with domestic tax 
revenues because the former are not a reliable long-term source development financing, 
as argued above. Moreover, many developing countries have made considerable 
progress in reducing poverty over the past decades and have experienced strong 
economic growth. As countries become less poor, they become less eligible for aid. By 
2012, 49 countries are classified as LDCs. By definition, poverty in these countries is 
widespread and severe, they have a low level of economic development and are 
vulnerable to external shocks. In the 1990s, most poor people lived in low income 
countries. However, this has changed and currently most poor people live in lower-
middle income countries. The main reason for this development is that India, China, 
Nigeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan have achieved lower-middle income status between 
1999 and 2008. Over 900 million poor people live in these five countries (Sumner, 
2010). Countries like India and Indonesia have quickly growing economies, high inward 
FDI, and large national firms and home-based multinationals. This means that 
development has increasingly become an issue of inequality, not just at the international 
level, but also and mainly at the national level. Accordingly, development financing is 
shifting from external aid to domestic resource mobilisation and redistribution. 
 However, there exist other and more pervasive reasons why developing countries 
should reduce dependence on foreign aid and increase domestic tax revenues. Tax and 
aid have very different qualities and therefore different impacts on economic growth and 
institutions. 
 First, aid flows are often more volatile and unpredictable. The erratic behaviour of 
aid flows limits their potential positive impact (Bulíř & Hamann, 2006; Lensink & 
Morrissey, 2000; Weeks, 2010). 
 Second, aid may result in rent-seeking behaviour by political elites. As development 
assistance has shifted from project aid to budget support, opportunities for rent seeking 
may have increased. Empirical research therefore finds that foreign aid has a negative 
impact on institutions, similar to the resource curse of natural resource revenues 
(Djankov et al., 2008). 
 Third, development aid fosters accountability to external donors but limits the 
pressure on governments to legitimate their actions to the population (Moss et al., 2006). 
By contrast, taxation is a catalyst for the establishment of governments that are more 
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responsive and accountable towards their own citizens (OECD, 2010). It also stimulates 
the development of civil society organisations that advocate responsible use of public 
funds. This is a very important difference. If a government depends on public support, 
taxation is likely to drive revenue bargaining. Revenue bargaining means that tax payers 
interact with the government to keep taxes at a socially acceptable level and try to hold 
the government to account for the use of public resources and delivery of public goods 
and services. This process is a main element for building a functional state (Moore, 
2008; Prichard, 2010). In most countries, the focus of revenue bargaining is on the 
expenditure side rather than the revenue side, with citizens demanding more efficient 
and responsible use of government funds. 
 Fourth, and linked to the previous point, bilateral and multilateral aid usually 
involves aid conditionality. To some extent, conditionality has shifted from policy 
conditions to institutional reforms that have a broader and more permanent positive 
effect on development (Adam & O'Connell, 1999). However, in many cases aid 
conditionality still limits macroeconomic policy options for developing countries and 
this may hinder sound development policies (Weeks, 2010). 
 Fifth, some aid is diverted directly or indirectly to finance capital flight (Serieux, 
2011). Although this may also apply to government revenues from oil and other natural 
resources, transparent tax revenues do not produce this adverse effect. These five 
reasons make tax revenues a key component of finance for development.  
 Research shows that aid also has an effect on taxation. In theory, the effect can be 
either positive or negative. Regarding positive effects, aid can stimulate economic 
growth and thereby raise tax revenues. Aid may also support domestic resource 
mobilisation if it aims to enhance domestic institutions and strengthen fiscal 
administration (Serieux, 2011). Furthermore, aid can be used to finance imports and 
therefore increase trade tax revenues (Benedek et al., 2012). A positive relationship 
between aid and taxation may also result from other factors, such as good governance, 
that increase both tax revenues and external aid. Aid will not have a positive effect if it 
is captured by political elites and used for unproductive purposes, so it does not generate 
economic activities that yield tax revenues. Moreover, a negative effect can occur if aid 
reduces incentives for domestic revenue mobilisation 
(Andreoni, 1993; Heijdra et al., 1998). 
 Some empirical studies find a positive relationship between aid and taxation 
(Gambaro et al., 2007; Khan & Hishino, 1992); others find that grants reduce the 
revenue effort (Gupta et al., 2003). A newer study, using extended panel data and 
distinguishing between different types of aid and taxes, finds a robust positive effect. 
Bilateral aid and grants have a stronger effect than multilateral aid and loans. The 
positive relationship is also stronger for middle income than for low income countries. 
Moreover, the results suggest that the introduction of budget support in the late 1990s 
stimulated domestic revenue mobilisation (Ruben & Pop, 2009). However, another 
recent study using similar panel data finds a negative effect. This overall effect is small 
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and decreasing over time, but in countries with weak institutions, the study finds that an 
increase in donor grants is associated with a decrease in tax revenues of a similar 
magnitude (Benedek et al., 2012). 
 Thus, tax revenues are to be considered as a more sustainable source of financing for 
development and generally have a more positive impact on developing country 
governance. Well-designed development aid can also help to strengthen taxation, but the 
general effect of aid on tax revenues remains contested. 
 
1.2.4 A	  developmental	  perspective	  for	  analysing	  revenue	  mobilisation	  
Taxation performs several other roles in addition to generating public revenues. 
Traditionally, and especially from a neoclassical economic perspective, academic 
analysis has emphasised the trade-off between revenues on the one hand and economic 
disincentives and market distortions on the other hand. Development studies 
increasingly pay attention the relationship between tax and governance. In 
environmental economics, the focus is on environmental taxes and tax exemptions as 
policy instruments. Combining such different elements yields a broader framework for 
analysis of tax policy. 
 Cobham (2005b) summarizes the different roles or purposes of taxation as Revenue, 
Representation, Redistribution and Re-pricing. Revenues from taxation obviously serve 
to fund government expenditures, but the total level of tax revenues can also be an 
instrument for countercyclical macroeconomic policy. The current financial crisis 
emphasises the importance of stable economic development, which requires sufficient 
policy space for developing countries to adjust their fiscal balance (Weeks, 2010). 
Representation refers to governance; tax can foster representation because citizens will 
demand greater influence on government spending when it is funded by taxes. 
Redistribution can be implemented on purpose through progressive income taxes. 
Especially in lower income countries, a progressive tax system can mitigate income 
inequality. However, it should be recognised that all types of taxes can have 
distributional impacts. Re-pricing refers primarily to incentives resulting from taxes on 
specific goods or activities with negative externalities, such as excises, or fiscal 
incentives for activities with positive spill-over effects. Obviously, in practice tax 
exemptions are not always linked to positive externalities and may also serve special 
interests. For a more complete framework of analysis, it makes sense to include general 
disincentives to economic activity and market distortions due to unintended differences 
in tax treatment under re-pricing as well. 
 The resulting framework is summarised in Table 1.1. Parts of this framework can 
also be found in other studies. For example, Tanzi and Zee (2000) assess tax systems in 
developing countries on three of the above elements: sufficient revenues, equity 
(redistribution), and minimal disincentives to economic activity (re-pricing). This 
analytical framework may be helpful to understand the different properties of various 
types of taxes. 
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Table	  1.1	   Four	  main	  purposes	  of	  taxation	  
Purpose	   Description	  
Revenue	   Generating	   sufficient	   revenues	   for	   the	   government	   to	   fund	   public	   goods	   and	  
services,	  investment,	  administration,	  and	  debt	  service;	  dampening	  economic	  cycles	  
through	  countercyclical	  movements	  in	  the	  tax	  burden	  
Redistribution	   Enhancing	  equality	  through	  progressive	  taxation,	  reducing	  tax	  incidence	  on	  people	  
with	  lower	  ability-­‐to-­‐pay	  
Representation	   Fostering	   inclusion	   of	   citizens	   in	   political	   processes	   and	   good	   governance,	  
supporting	  the	  implicit	  social	  contract	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  
Re-­‐pricing	   Providing	  targeted	  tax	  incentives	  to	  stimulate	  certain	  activities	  (or	  disincentives	  to	  
discourage	   certain	   activities);	   minimising	   market	   distortions	   and	   general	  
disincentives	  to	  economic	  activity	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  Cobham	  (2005b).	  
 
 Tax revenues from natural resources mainly generate public funds. The impact on 
governance is a by-effect and usually negative, although there also exist countries with 
large resource rents and good governance like Botswana. 
 Taxes on personal and corporate income tend to have the strongest positive effect on 
governance because taxpayers are well aware of how much tax they contribute and make 
use of public goods and services, such as infrastructure and education (OECD, 2010). 
The main disadvantage of income taxes is that they provide a relatively strong 
disincentive to economic activity. To some extent, income taxes can easily be made 
progressive and this also mitigates disincentives to work or start a business (in the 
formal sector). 
 Taxes on personal wealth and property, such as real estate and land, have an even 
stronger redistributive impact because the distribution of wealth is generally more 
unequal than the distribution of income. Moreover, these taxes have a limited impact on 
direct economic activity. Property and wealth taxes are less established in low and 
middle income countries, so there is considerable potential for increasing their use. 
Taxes on certain types of property are relatively easy to collect if a domestic registration 
system is in place. This is not the case for taxes on financial wealth, which can be held 
offshore. 
 Indirect taxes, which include consumption and trade taxes, have a weaker impact on 
governance. However, indirect taxes often have strong re-pricing and inflationary 
effects. Excises raise the price of goods on which they are levied compared to other 
goods and import tariffs raise prices of imports compared to domestic production. The 
properties of VAT and sales taxes depend very much on their design. A uniform rate on 
all goods and services is regressive and disproportionally hits poor households that buy 
goods produced in the formal economy, because the poorest households spend the 
largest part of their income on immediate consumption. For this reason, human rights 
groups have been campaigning heavily against a uniform 15% VAT in Bangladesh that 
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was proposed in 2010 to meet policy conditions for IMF support. Such a VAT would 
substantially increase government revenues, but at the expense of higher inequality and 
increased poverty. This illustrates that IMF conditionality for tax policy is still 
questionable from a development perspective. A VAT or sales tax that exempts basic 
food items and other goods that account for a large share of consumption of poor 
households has a very different impact. Although it still affects the poor, the loss in 
purchasing power is smaller and the distributional effect of the tax can be slightly 
progressive (Newhouse & Zakharova, 2007; Refaqat, 2003). 
 Until recently, environmental taxes had been virtually absent from the development 
agenda. One reason is that these taxes are not the easiest ones to administer and require a 
relatively developed tax authority. However, these taxes have two important advantages. 
First, their re-pricing effect is to discourage economic activities that produce relatively 
large negative environmental externalities. Thus, they do not generate undesirable 
disincentives to economic activity. Second, they may have a neutral or progressive 
distributional impact. The German development agency GIZ, which is a key provider of 
technical assistance for tax policy and administration, has started to advise some 
developing countries on the introduction of environmental taxes. In some member 
countries of the European Union (EU), environmental tax revenues are 3-4% of GDP, 
which illustrates that they can be a substantial source of revenues (European 
Commission, 2012). 
 This thesis focuses on corporate taxes for large multinational firms. Corporate taxes 
are an important source of revenues for many developing countries. In general, corporate 
taxes are important for government accountability because they are one of the most 
visible types of tax. For large firms, though, the main institutional effect may result from 
public perceptions about the firms’ tax behaviour. If it is perceived that large taxpayers 
are not paying their fair share, this may lower tax compliance by others (Torgler et al., 
2007) and undermine constructive involvement of citizens in revenue bargaining. 
 
 
1.3 Description	  of	  tax	  systems	  in	  developing	  countries	  
1.3.1 Level	  and	  composition	  of	  tax	  revenues	  
Developing countries differ greatly from high income countries with regard to the level 
and composition of domestic revenues. Total tax revenues in developing countries are 
generally lower, in the range of 10-25% of GDP, compared to 25-40% for high income 
countries. Consumption taxes, which include VAT and excises, have become a major 
component of tax revenues in most countries. In most developing countries, the share of 
import tariffs and export levies in total revenues is still substantial. Personal income 
taxes and social security contributions are typically low, in part because of large 
informal sectors and weak tax administrations. As a consequence, corporate taxes 
account for a relatively large share of total tax revenues as well. For middle income 
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countries, this share is usually between 10% and 30%. By contrast, in high income 
countries, personal income tax and social security contributions are key components and 
corporate taxes form a smaller part of total tax revenues (Cobham, 2005b; IMF, 2011; 
Keen & Simone, 2004; Tanzi & Zee, 2000).  
 However, there exists considerable heterogeneity among developing countries as 
well. Tax systems are typically influenced by the structure of the domestic economy, the 
degree or urbanisation, and the political regime. This section briefly describes general 
developments in tax revenues for broad groups of developing countries. More detailed 
descriptions and analyses of tax systems in Latin America can be found in the Latin 
American Outlook 2009 (OECD, 2008a) and a report about underlying statistics (OECD 
et al., 2011). Bernardi et al. (2007) provide detailed case studies of various Latin 
American countries. Tax systems in Africa are described in the African Economic 
Outlook 2010 (OECD & AfDB, 2010) and Keen and Mansour (2009). More detailed 
country studies include Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2011) and Volkerink (2009). Sources 
for Asia are more limited; Bernardi et al. (2005) provide an analysis of tax systems in 
several Asian countries. 
 General trends show declining total tax revenues in developing countries during the 
1980s and the 1990s, followed by increasing revenues during the past decade (IMF, 
2011). During the 1980s and 1990s, the importance of trade revenues generally fell due 
to trade liberalisation while direct tax revenues increased only marginally. Reliance on 
consumption taxes increased, reflecting the tax consensus (Cobham, 2005b). 
Developments in tax composition since the 1990s have been remarkably similar 
(McKinley & Kyrili, 2009), with increasing pressures on corporate tax revenues because 
of tax competition between developing countries to attract foreign investment 
(Christians, 2010). 
 When describing the level and composition of revenues, it is useful to analyse 
countries with high revenues from natural resources separately. Countries with very 
large government revenues from oil or other natural resources tend to have different tax 
structures. In the analysis below, countries whose governments had revenues of more 
than 10% of GDP from natural resources in the years 2006-2008 are assigned to a 
separate country group.10 Resource-rich countries with government revenues from 
natural resources below this threshold, such as Cameroon and Mauritania, have tax 
structures that are more similar to other countries. 
 Furthermore, it is useful to broadly distinguish between low income, lower-middle 
income, and upper-middle income countries. Despite the heterogeneity within these 
three groups, developments over the past decades differ markedly between the groups. 
The differences between income groups are more pronounced than differences between 
geographical regions. 
 
                                                        
10  These countries are Algeria, Chad, Gabon, Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Botswana, Iran, 
and Mongolia. 
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Figure	  1.2	   Total	  domestic	  revenues	  by	  country	  group	  
Sources:	   data	   for	   African	   countries	   from	   OECD	   and	   AfDB	   (2010);	   data	   for	   Latin	   American	   countries	  
except	  Nicaragua	  from	  OECD	  (2012d);	  data	  for	  other	  countries	  from	  World	  Bank	  (2012).	  
 
 Data on tax revenues are available from different sources, but data consistency is a 
major problem. For example, the World Development Indicators (WDI) database 
includes revenues at the central government level only. This does not properly reflect the 
overall tax systems of countries with substantial revenues at lower government levels, 
such as Nigeria (IMF, 2011). Data are also inconsistent between databases, partly 
because of different definitions but often the reasons for inconsistency are unclear. The 
graphs below combine data from different sources to achieve a better coverage of 
developing countries. However, for total revenues or individual revenue components of 
each country, it uses the same source for different years in order to present 
developments over time more accurately. 
 Figure 1.2 shows total domestic revenues by country group over the period 1996-
2008, excluding grants but including social security contributions and revenues from 
natural resources. Revenues have increased strongly in countries with large resource 
revenues, in part because of rising commodity prices. Domestic revenues in other 
countries have increased slowly, with much lower levels of revenues in low income 
countries than in middle income countries. Tax revenues in low income countries are 
now approximately back at the level of the 1980s (IMF, 2011). Thus, raising tax 
revenues requires continued attention. 
 Figure 1.3 shows the composition of domestic revenues for each country group at 
the beginning and end of the period. Direct taxes consist of taxes on personal and 
corporate income, wealth, and capital gains. Consumption taxes include VAT and sales 
taxes as well as excises. Trade revenues mainly reflect import tariffs and export taxes. 
Other revenues consist of social security contributions, natural resource revenues, and 
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Figure	  1.3	   Revenue	  composition	  in	  developing	  countries	  
Sources:	   data	   for	   African	   countries	   from	   OECD	   and	   AfDB	   (2010);	   data	   for	   Latin	   American	   countries	  
except	  Nicaragua	  from	  OECD	  (2012d);	  data	  for	  other	  countries	  from	  World	  Bank	  (2012).	  Note:	  the	  table	  
shows	  three-­‐year	  averages	  for	  the	  periods	  1996-­‐1998	  and	  2006-­‐2008.	  
 
 For upper- and lower-middle income countries, the increase in total revenues is 
driven by a rise in both direct and consumption taxes. The main difference between 
upper-middle income and lower-middle income countries is that the latter continue to 
depend more strongly on trade taxes. In the low income country group, consumption 
taxes also increased substantially, but direct tax revenues increased only marginally and 
remained below 4% of GDP. Trade taxes were approximately a quarter of total domestic 
revenues in this country group. Thus, further trade liberalisation may be problematic 
unless low income and lower-middle income countries are able to develop alternative 
revenue sources (Braunsgaard & Keen, 2005; Khattry & Mohan Rao, 2002). In countries 
with very high resource revenues, other revenue sources are much less important. 
 
1.3.2 Corporate	  tax	  revenues	  
This thesis focuses on corporate taxes. There is no global database that provides a 
breakdown of direct taxes into corporate and other types (mainly personal income tax) 
before 2007.11 For various Latin American countries, data are available from the OECD. 
For some countries in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe, data are available from a 
comparative IMF study (Abbas & Klemm, 2012), IMF country reports or national 
sources. The graphs below combine data from the OECD and IMF. They show corporate 
taxes and total domestic revenues as a share of GDP for 32 middle income countries and 
3 low income countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). 
 
                                                        
11  From 2007 onwards, corporate tax revenue data are available for many countries worldwide from the 
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Figure	  1.4	   Corporate	  and	  total	  tax	  revenues,	  1997	  
Sources:	  corporate	  tax	  data	  for	  Guatemala	  and	  Venezuela	  from	  OECD	  (2012d),	  for	  other	  countries	  from	  
Abbas	  and	  Klemm	  (2012);	  total	  tax	  revenue	  data	  for	  African	  countries	  from	  OECD	  and	  AfDB	  (2010),	  for	  
Latin	  American	  countries	  from	  OECD	  (2012d),	  for	  Indonesia,	  Malaysia,	  the	  Philippines,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Pakistan	  
and	   India	  from	  World	  Bank	  (2012),	  and	  for	  Thailand,	  Vietnam,	  Turkey,	  Ukraine,	  and	  Russian	  Federation	  
from	  Abbas	  and	  Klemm	  (2012);	  data	  for	  Ecuador	  and	  Russian	  Federation	  are	  for	  1998.	  
 
 Figure 1.4 shows data for 1997, at the beginning of the period that was also analysed 
above. Each country is indicated with its ISO-code.12 A black dot shows the unweighted 
average of the 35 countries. Countries at the right hand side of the graph have relatively 
large total domestic revenues. For example, government revenues in Namibia (NA) and 
Botswana (BW) are 35-40% of GDP, in part due to high revenues form diamond mining. 
Countries on the left have low domestic revenues. In Ecuador (EC), Guatemala (GT), 
India (IN) and Uganda (UG), domestic revenues were near 10% of GDP in 1997, which 
is low by any standard. Many countries in the graph have total domestic revenues in the 
range of 15-20% of GDP.  
 Countries at the top have relatively high corporate tax revenues. In Indonesia (ID), 
Malaysia (MY) and Ukraine (UA), corporate tax revenues were approximately 6% of 
GDP. This is large, also compared to high income countries. Countries at the bottom 
have low corporate tax revenues. In Uganda, Guatemala, Senegal (SN) and Nigeria 
(NG), corporate tax revenues were only 1% of GDP or less. Most countries are in the 
lower part of the graph, with corporate tax revenues of 1-3% of GDP. 
 
                                                        
12  See page 206 for a list of all relevant country codes. This code is also the extension for webpages. 
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Figure	  1.5	   Corporate	  and	  total	  tax	  revenues,	  2007	  
Sources:	  corporate	  tax	  data	  for	  Guatemala	  and	  Venezuela	  from	  OECD	  (2012d),	  for	  other	  countries	  from	  
Abbas	  and	  Klemm	  (2012);	  total	  tax	  revenue	  data	  for	  African	  countries	  from	  OECD	  and	  AfDB	  (2010),	  for	  
Latin	  American	  countries	  from	  OECD	  (2012d),	  for	  Indonesia,	  Malaysia,	  the	  Philippines,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Pakistan	  
and	   India	  from	  World	  Bank	  (2012),	  and	  for	  Thailand,	  Vietnam,	  Turkey,	  Ukraine,	  and	  Russian	  Federation	  
from	  Abbas	  and	  Klemm	  (2012).	  
 
 Combining the two axes, countries closer to the upper left corner have a higher 
proportion of corporate taxes to total domestic revenues.13 Tanzania (TZ), Colombia 
(CO), Mexico (MX) and Indonesia stand out as countries with corporate tax revenues 
around 30% of total domestic revenues. This means that corporate taxes are a very 
important source of revenue for these countries. Countries closer to the bottom right 
corner or near the bottom of the graph have a low proportion of corporate taxes. 
Examples are Uganda, Nigeria and Botswana. In these countries, corporate taxes were a 
relatively minor source of revenue in 1997. 
 As a reference, three lines indicate corporate tax shares of 10%, 20% and 30%. 
Many countries have a proportion of corporate tax revenues to total revenues near 10%. 
This is above the proportion in many high income countries. Thus, for many developing 
countries, corporate tax revenues were a material source of revenues in 1997. 
 Next, Figure 1.5 shows data for 2007, the latest year for which comprehensive data 
were available from the same sources. Three general trends can be observed. First, most 
countries have moved to the right, meaning their total revenues increased. This is not a 
                                                        
13  Note that this graph shows lower proportions of corporate tax than Abbas and Klemm (2012). The reason 
is that it uses other data sources that indicate higher total domestic revenues, probably because these other 
sources include social security contributions and other domestic revenues that are not included in Abbas 
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uniform development, though. The increase has been particularly large in the upper-
middle income countries Argentina (AR) and Brazil (BR). Some lower-middle income 
countries, notably Ghana and Senegal, showed considerable progress as well. On the left 
hand side, domestic revenues in Ecuador, Guatemala, Uganda and India rose to 
approximately 15% of GDP, but the revenue performance of these countries remained 
weak compared to other developing countries and even to the target range of the tax 
consensus of the 1980s. In some countries, such as Indonesia and Zambia (ZM), 
domestic revenues stagnated, and in other countries, notably the Philippines (PH) and 
Sri Lanka (LK), revenues substantially decreased between 1997 and 2007. This means 
that raising tax revenues remains a challenge for many developing countries. 
 Second, most countries have move upward, meaning corporate taxes have also 
increased relative to GDP. Corporate tax revenues rose strongly in Morocco (MA), Peru 
(PE) and South Africa (ZA). However, in some countries, such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, corporate tax revenues declined by approximately 1% of GDP. Overall, there 
exists only a weak correlation (0.24) between the change in corporate tax and total 
revenues over the period 1997-2007.  
 Third, the average proportion of corporate taxes to total revenues increased from 
15% to 18%. This development has also been uneven. The relative importance on 
corporate taxes increased strongly in Peru, India, South Africa, the Philippines and 
Morocco. Countries with a declining share of corporate taxes include Indonesia and 
Tanzania. Nonetheless, the graph clearly shows that in 2007, many countries had a 
proportion in the range of 10-20% (between the first and second line) or 20-30% 
(between the second and the third line). This strongly contrasts with the situation in 
1997. Only in a few countries, corporate taxes remained below 10% of domestic 
revenues. 
 It can be concluded that corporate taxes are an important source of domestic 
revenues for most developing countries. The relative importance of corporate taxes has 
further increased since 1997. This contrasts with high income countries, where corporate 
taxes are generally not a major source of revenue and declining. The importance of 
corporate tax revenues for developing countries implies that potential threats to these 
revenues, such as tax avoidance and evasion by multinational firms, are a relevant 
research subject in the context of financing for development. 
  
1.3.3 Withholding	  taxes	  
Withholding taxes are a specific type of corporate taxes. They are levied on certain 
payments to foreign entities. Some countries impose withholding taxes on dividends, on 
interest payments, or on both. In addition, many countries have withholding taxes on 
royalties for the use of intellectual property, such as trademarks or patents, and a few 
countries levy withholding taxes on management fees. Withholding taxes are hardly 
mentioned in development research. However, they do play an important role in 
corporate taxation and are highly relevant for the impact of the Dutch tax system on 
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developing countries. Therefore this section discusses withholding taxes in more detail, 
with a focus on dividend and interest withholding tax. 
 Withholding taxes can be a substantial source of revenue. Unfortunately, 
comprehensive data on withholding tax revenues are not available from an existing 
dataset and many developing countries do not distinguish withholding tax revenues in 
national revenue statistics publications. However, some examples show that withholding 
tax revenues can be substantial. In 2007, withholding tax revenues were 3.0% of GDP in 
Brazil, 1.1% in Kenya, and 0.7% in Zambia. By comparison, corporate tax revenues 
excluding withholding taxes were 3.7% of GDP in Brazil, 3.3% in Kenya, and 2.7% in 
Zambia (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2011; OECD et al., 2011; Waris et al., 2011).14 Out of 
the 34 countries in the graphs, only Mauritius, South Africa15 and Egypt16 do not have 
withholding taxes on interest or dividends. Eight countries impose withholding taxes on 
interest but not on dividends. The other 23 countries tax both interest and dividend 
payments to foreign entities. In 2010, the standard rates of all 34 countries were on 
average 17% for interest (to foreign affiliates) and 10% on dividends (to foreign 
controlling parents). This shows that withholding taxes are extremely relevant for many 
developing countries. 
 There are several reasons for levying withholding taxes. First, they are relatively 
easy to collect (Faria, 1995) because they involve international transfers, similar to trade 
taxes, and the basis for calculating the tax is straightforward. From a theoretical 
perspective, if a developing country has specific qualities that attract FDI, the 
government has some market power. This generates an incentive to tax profits of foreign 
investors (Sørensen, 2006). 
 Second, historically withholding taxes on payments to both foreign and domestic 
recipients have served to prevent tax evasion (Li, 1995). An investor that receives 
dividend or interest payments on securities could try to hide this income from the tax 
authority. If a tax on this income was already levied at the source and paid by the entity 
distributing the dividend or paying the interest, the tax was more difficult to evade. The 
recipient of the dividends or interest can usually deduct the source tax so the overall tax 
charge remains unaffected. To some extent, this reason still applies at the international 
level for payments to foreign security holders. In case an external shareholder or debt 
security holder is based in a tax haven, for example, withholding taxes can prevent that 
the dividend or interest income remains untaxed. For developing countries, the use of 
                                                        
14  For Brazil, Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 show corporate tax revenues excluding withholding taxes. For 
Kenya and Zambia, the figures show corporate revenue data from Abbas and Klemm (2012), because 
these are available for both 1997 and 2007. For 2007, Abbas and Klemm report corporate tax revenues of 
2.5% of GDP for Kenya and 2.0% for Zambia; Waris et al. (2011) and Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2011) 
report higher figures. 
15  For South Africa, this applies until the introduction of a dividend withholding tax on 1 April 2012. 
16  Egypt has a withholding tax of 20% on interest payments, but this does not apply on loans with a maturity 
of more than three years. 
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withholding taxes also simplifies tax collection at the domestic level (Bird & Zolt, 
2011). 
 Third, withholding taxes allow FDI host countries, referred to as source countries 
(of income) in fiscal terms, to take a larger share of the total tax revenue that can be 
levied on certain income. Developing countries are usually net FDI recipients. Therefore 
withholding taxes can have a redistributive effect at the international level by increasing 
the share of taxes paid by multinational firms in developing countries. This generally 
applies to interest and royalty payments, because most countries tax interest and royalty 
income but grant a tax credit for withholding taxes paid abroad. Similarly, it allows 
developing countries to capture part of the profits distributed to foreign external 
shareholders (Faria, 1995). In many such situations, withholding taxes do not affect the 
total taxes paid by a firm and its shareholders, but they shift some of the tax revenues 
from the home to the host country by allocating more taxing rights to the latter. In 
principle, the total tax charge can increase if the withholding tax rate in the source 
country is higher than the income tax rate in the recipient’s country, or if the recipient is 
a tax-exempt entity, for example a pension fund. For intra-firm interest and royalty 
payments, though, this is unlikely unless the affiliate receiving the income is based in a 
tax haven or operates under a low-tax regime.  
 Historically, the distributional aspect tended to be largely similar for dividends paid 
to foreign parents, because many countries used to tax foreign dividend income, 
allowing for a tax credit to offset corporate income taxes and/or dividend withholding 
taxes paid abroad. However, at present most countries exempt foreign dividend income 
from subsidiaries; the main exception is the United States. If a home country does not 
tax foreign dividend income, it usually does not grant a credit for foreign withholding 
tax paid on this income either. This may result in double taxation of dividends 
distributed by a foreign subsidiary that are paid out of current or retained earnings that 
have already been taxed. Double taxation of distributed profits increases the total tax 
charge in the host country instead of reallocating taxation rights from the home to the 
host country. There is still a distributional effect because inward FDI is much larger than 
outward FDI in most developing countries. However, double taxation also creates a 
disincentive for foreign investors, thus generating a trade-off between revenues and 
international redistribution on the one hand and re-pricing on the other. To mitigate 
double taxation, withholding tax rates for dividend payments within a firm are usually 
lower than rates for dividends distributed to external non-controlling shareholders. 
 Fourth, withholding taxes serve as a backstop measure against tax base erosion and 
profit shifting (Conklin & Robertson, 1999; IMF, 2008, 2012b). In particular, 
withholding taxes on interest, royalties, and management fees form a barrier against 
profit shifting to low-tax affiliates by multinational firms. The operation of one of 
Chile’s largest copper mines by Exxon Mobil is a notorious example of such tax 
avoidance strategies. The mine reported losses for 23 years, but it was in fact highly 
profitable. The losses resulted from high interest payments to a financing subsidiary of 
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Exxon Mobil in Bermuda, where the interest income was not taxed (Riesco et al., 2005). 
At the time, Chile imposed a mere 4% withholding tax on interest. After the profit 
shifting came to light, Chile raised withholding taxes on intra-firm interest payments to 
35%; the 4% now applies for interest paid to foreign banks and financial companies 
only. Similar to Chile, many countries prefer to impose low or zero withholding taxes on 
interest payments to banks and other external creditors to facilitate access to external 
financing for domestic companies. The anti-avoidance reason explains why many 
countries differentiate between interest payments to foreign affiliates and non-affiliated 
creditors and apply higher rates for the former category. The case for dividend 
withholding taxes is somewhat different, because dividends are usually paid out of 
profits that have already been taxed. However, dividend withholding tax may still serve 
to secure minimum government revenues in case a company does not report profits, for 
example due to corporate income tax exemptions or high depreciation of new 
investments.  
 Fifth, in theory withholding taxes on dividend and interest payments have a re-
pricing effect. Dividend withholding taxes make it less attractive for foreign investors to 
repatriate profits. This incentive can be important to stimulate investment (UNCTAD, 
2008). Interest withholding taxes increase the cost of international debt financing for all 
companies. Both types of withholding taxes may therefore increase equity financing of 
investments relative to debt financing. 
 Indeed, some borrowing countries tend to regard taxation of interest payments as a 
mechanism to discourage excessive debt financing (Faria, 1995). Interest and royalty 
withholding taxes also form a key element of a dual income tax system, a normative 
framework for taxation that might be well suited for developing countries. A dual 
income tax system combines a uniform and relatively low17 tax on all capital income (at 
source, thus in the host country) with a progressive tax on labour. To ensure a uniform 
rate on capital income, withholding taxes should be levied on interest, royalties, and 
similar payments that are deductible from the corporate income tax base. Interest 
withholding tax gets particular emphasis in this framework because its re-pricing effect 
prevents distortion of corporate financing decisions (Bird & Zolt, 2011; Fjeldstad & 
Heggstad, 2011; Volkerink, 2009). 
 Regarding dividend withholding taxes, a study on German multinationals confirms 
that these significantly decrease dividend repatriations by foreign subsidiaries (Bellak & 
Leibrecht, 2010). However, empirical research on US-based firms finds that taxes on 
dividend repatriations do not increase retained earnings. The reason is that firms have 
some flexibility with regard to the structuring of internal payments. Different 
withholding tax rates alter the composition of payments from a foreign subsidiary to the 
parent and other affiliates, but do not necessarily affect the total amount of payments 
(Grubert, 1998). This result provides support for the idea of a uniform withholding tax 
rate on all types of capital income. 
                                                        
17  Relatively low might be interpreted as 20-25%. 
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 In summary, many developing countries levy withholding taxes, especially on 
interest payments. These taxes are important as a source of revenue by themselves and 
also as a protection against international tax avoidance structures and tax evasion. 
Withholding taxes are especially relevant for developing countries because most of these 
countries are net FDI recipients and withholding taxes are relatively easy to collect. 
 
 
1.4 Challenges	   and	   constraints	   for	   raising	   corporate	   tax	  
revenues	  
1.4.1 Policy	  challenges	  in	  developing	  countries	  
This section briefly discusses several challenges to raise corporate tax revenues in 
developing countries. The thesis analyses international constraints to domestic revenue 
mobilisation that result from the Dutch tax system. Those constraints relate mainly to 
corporate taxes, hence the focus of this section on corporate tax revenues. It also 
discusses some domestic constraints. 
 A major domestic constraint is weak administrative capacity (IMF, 2011). 
Understaffed and poorly funded tax authorities limit both the amount of corporate 
taxpayers that can be assessed and the quality of the assessments. As a consequence, 
many small taxpayers are not taxed at all and large taxpayers may relatively easy reduce 
their tax burden using international tax planning strategies without being challenged by 
the tax authorities. 
 Most developing countries also have a large shadow economy. Cobham (2005a) 
estimates that tax revenues in developing countries could increase by USD 110 billion 
per year if shadow economies were brought into the formal system to the extent feasible. 
The large size of the shadow economy does not only result from administrative 
constraints. Torgler and Schneider (2007) show that it also depends directly on the tax 
culture and institutions of a country. A larger belief that paying taxes contributes to 
society and to better governance is associated with a smaller shadow economy. 
However, government performance influences the tax culture as well. Strong and 
progressive tax regimes and equitable access to public goods and services strengthen the 
social contract and contribute to a more positive attitude towards taxation (OECD, 
2008a).  
 Another problem, related to globalisation, is the loss of revenues due to tax 
competition and tax incentives granted to foreign investors (CABRI et al., 2010). These 
tax incentives can take many forms, including tax holidays, exemptions from various 
types of taxes, accelerated depreciation of investments, and tax credits.18 It is often 
thought that foreign investment is highly responsive to tax. Various econometric studies 
confirm this and suggest that export-oriented investments are especially sensitive 
                                                        
18  For a detailed discussion of different types of tax incentives, see Tanzi and Zee (2000). 
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(Grubert & Mutti, 2000; Hines, 2005; Mutti & Grubert, 2004). High indirect taxes, such 
as VAT and trade tariffs, are also associated with lower foreign investment (Desai et al., 
2004a). The apparent effect of taxes on location decisions of multinational firms has 
been a reason for lowering tax rates and granting exemptions. 
 This has resulted in tax competition among developing countries to attract FDI 
(Klemm & Van Parys, 2012; Nassar, 2009). In the end, this is detrimental to all 
countries involved, because lowering taxes across a group of countries hardly changes 
their relative attractiveness for foreign investors. In some cases, tax exemptions have 
also been granted to individual firms in secret deals. Taking into account the reductions 
in corporate tax rates and widespread use of incentives, the increase in corporate tax 
revenues in many developing countries since 1997 is a bit puzzling (Keen & Mansour, 
2009). It seems that tax exemptions and declining tax rates have been offset by an 
increasing share of corporate profits in GDP (CABRI et al., 2010). 
 Recent studies show that countries with lower taxes are much less effective in 
attracting FDI than is often thought. High corruption has a negative impact on FDI 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) and may be a larger burden for foreign investors than taxes. 
When controlling for the quality of governance and infrastructure, Goodspeed et al. 
(2011) and James (2009) find that FDI in developing countries is not very sensitive to 
host country taxation. This is consistent with surveys among investors that show that the 
investment climate depends on many factors other than taxation. Klemm and Van Parys 
(2012) find that lower tax rates and tax incentives attract FDI in Latin America, but not 
in Africa. Moreover, tax incentives are often not well targeted and therefore provide 
benefits to investors that would invest anyway. Bols et el. (2001) and Muller et al. 
(2004) conclude that tax incentives are usually not a decisive factor and therefore 
ineffective. Developing countries are therefore generally advised to limit the use of tax 
incentives to specific cases of market failures and focus on improving the overall 
business climate (CABRI et al., 2010; James, 2009; Zee et al., 2002). 
 Tax avoidance due to trade mispricing is also a major constraint to revenue 
mobilisation. When affiliates that belong to the same multinational trade with each 
other, they set internal transfer prices. The current international standard for transfer 
pricing, developed by the OECD, specifies that the trade should be at arm’s length, that 
is, prices should not differ from those charged to unrelated parties. However, transfer 
prices are relatively easy to manipulate, because for many trades there are no 
comparable transactions with unrelated parties. Therefore, the OECD approach has 
become increasingly problematic (Avi-Yonah, 1995). The problem of transfer 
mispricing has been known for a long time and is more severe for developing countries 
because they have weaker tax administrations and face more difficulties collecting data 
on transfer pricing (Lall, 1979; McLure Jr., 2006). Furthermore, trade taxes are still an 
important source of revenue for low income and lower-middle income countries, and 
transfer mispricing can also be used to evade import tariffs or export levies. A survey 
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among tax authorities shows that developing countries are themselves aware of the issue 
and regard it as a serious cause of concern (Borkowski, 1997). 
 Empirical research on transfer pricing has been limited due to data constraints. 
Nearly all studies use US customs data to analyse trade between the US and other 
countries and find substantial trade mispricing (De Boyrie et al., 2005; Pak et al., 2003; 
Zdanowicz et al., 1999). The methods of some of these studies are somewhat 
problematic because they involve strong assumptions about what trades are abnormally 
priced. Studies using a more sophisticated approach confirm that multinationals 
manipulate export prices to shift profits to low-tax countries (Bernard et al., 2006; 
Clausing, 2003), but do not allow to estimate the precise amount of transfer mispricing. 
Moreover, when multinationals shift profits out of developing countries through transfer 
pricing, they probably shift them to low-tax jurisdictions and not to the US. Detailed 
data on these trades are not available. One study using data from Ireland, a low-tax 
jurisdiction, shows that multinationals indeed shift profits into Ireland through transfer 
pricing (Stewart, 1989). In a recent case, two independent audits of the large Mopani 
copper mine in Zambia, commissioned by the revenue authority, found that the Swiss 
firm Glencore operating the mine had engaged in substantial transfer mispricing. In the 
last five years, transfer pricing problems and their impact on domestic revenue 
mobilisation in developing countries have been receiving increasing attention from 
policy makers. 
 Other forms of tax avoidance by multinationals pose a challenge as well. Several 
empirical studies analyse profit shifting in general and find that higher profits are 
reported in jurisdictions with lower tax rates (Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; 
Weichenrieder, 2009). The profit shifting effect is stronger for R&D intensive firms, 
which provides evidence of income shifting through intangibles and royalty payments 
(Grubert, 2003a, pp. 227-229; Stöwhase, 2002). To some extent, this is a special case of 
transfer mispricing. However, even if royalty payments would be at arm’s length prices, 
firms can shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions by locating patents and trademarks there. 
A recent study confirms that the location of intellectual property within multinational 
firms is responsive to tax rate differences (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012). 
 Furthermore, various studies show that multinationals engage in deliberate profit 
shifting by financing their subsidiaries in countries with higher corporate income tax 
rates with a larger proportion of debt (Büttner & Wamser, 2007; Egger et al., 2010; 
Huizinga et al., 2008; Møen et al., 2011). Some of these studies try to account for the 
effect of withholding taxes on debt financing as well, but do not consider other profit 
shifting mechanisms or the use of conduit entities to avoid withholding taxes. A few 
other studies specifically analyse effects of withholding taxes on intra-firm transactions 
and show that multinationals adjust internal dividend, interest, and royalty payments to 
reduce overall withholding taxes (Collins & Shackelford, 1998; Grubert, 1998). 
Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) provide the first direct evidence of FDI diversion via 
third countries in response to bilateral withholding taxes. 
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 The challenges addressed in this thesis, mainly related to avoidance of withholding 
taxes in developing countries, have received very limited attention so far. Withholding 
taxes can be a material source of revenue by themselves and also serve as a backstop 
measure against profit shifting, as noted above. Several case studies on tax law therefore 
show that conduit entities can play a key role in profit shifting schemes (Bender, 2007; 
Kandev, 2009; Kleinbard, 2011; Michielse, 2011). However, broader economic studies 
that analyse profit shifting through interest and royalty payments have not paid special 
attention to the important link between profit shifting and avoidance of withholding 
taxes. This thesis also analyses the problem of withholding tax avoidance in 
combination with international profit shifting through interest and royalty payments.  
 
1.4.2 Promoting	  policy	  coherence	  for	  development	  
Some constraints to domestic revenue mobilisation in developing countries are related to 
tax policies in donor countries (Cobham & McNair, 2012) and this means that policy 
coherence for development (PCD) is relevant. The concept of PCD refers to the absence 
of policy effects contrary to the aims of development policy as well as to the creation of 
synergies between different government departments to achieve development objectives 
(Hoebink, 2004; McLean Hilker, 2004). Debates on the relation between various aspects 
of external policy emerged in the early 1990s and resulted in a clause in the Treaty on 
the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1992, requiring the EU to ensure consistency 
of external relations, security, economic, and development policies. Over the past ten 
years, donor governments started to establish PCD mechanisms, such as coherence units 
and consultation procedures, and attention for PCD is becoming more systemic 
(ECDPM, 2007). Trade policy is most widely included in PCD initiatives. 
 The United Nations included PCD elements in Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) 8 on global partnership. Concrete targets for MDG 8 cover development aid, 
trade policy, debt sustainability, intellectual property regimes, and access to technology. 
However, the emphasis remains on developing country policies and in the monitoring of 
progress on the MDGs, attention for donor country policies remains limited (Picciotto, 
2005). Moreover, monitoring of donor performance largely focuses on development aid 
(including debt relief). The main non-aid area highlighted by the UN is trade and donor 
performance on in this area is rather weak. Since 2004, average donor country tariffs on 
imports from LDCs have remained above 3% for textiles and 6% for clothing (United 
Nations, 2010). This suggests that policy incoherence remains a major challenge even in 
the area where it is broadly recognised. The UN conferences on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, 2002, and Doha, 2008, have not contributed much to PCD. 
They generated little attention for aggressive tax avoidance by multinationals or other 
globalisation-related tax issues (Lesage et al., 2010). 
 The most comprehensive monitoring effort of PCD performance by donor countries 
has not been set up by the UN, but by the non-governmental Center for Global 
Development in the form of the Commitment to Development Index. The investment 
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component of this index includes an item on avoidance of double taxation for investors 
in developing countries (Roodman, 2012), but it does not cover policy incoherence due 
donor policies than may undermine domestic revenue mobilisation. 
 International Financial Institutions have supported the idea of PCD, but they have 
hardly incorporated this in their technical assistance programmes and evaluations of aid 
effectiveness (Picciotto, 2005). Regarding taxation, various institutions have come under 
attack for financing investments in developing countries via tax havens. These include 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (Danwatch, 2011), which is part of the 
World Bank Group, the Belgian Development Bank (BOI), and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). In addition, the EIB has been criticised for financing the 
Mopani copper mine in Zambia, which has become the subject of a recent tax scandal 
(Simpere, 2010). It is also remarkable that various investments in developing countries 
that were diverted via Dutch SPEs received loans from the IFC or guarantees from the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which is also part of the World 
Bank Group. These examples illustrate that IFIs do apparently not have policies to 
ensure coherence with respect to domestic resource mobilisation in developing 
countries. 
 The OECD identified a need to address aggressive corporate tax planning, including 
the use of tax havens and transfer mispricing, as part of a PCD agenda (OECD, 2005). 
However, this issue was hardly included in the development agendas of OECD 
members. Remarkably, the OECD has also referred to tax policy in developing countries 
as an area of PCD (OECD, 2008a). The OECD’s development assistance committee has 
been paying considerable attention to the need to raise tax revenues in developing 
countries in recent years (OECD, 2012c; OECD & AfDB, 2010). The focus of the 
OECD’s work in this area is mainly on domestic constraints and technical assistance, 
though, and not on development impacts of tax policies in OECD countries themselves. 
The OECD also has a committee on fiscal affairs, which started an initiative against 
Harmful Tax Competition in 1998. Although this programme does not have an 
international development angle, it did initially target aggressive corporate tax planning 
in way that would have benefitted developing countries too. However, the corporate tax 
element of the programme has gradually disappeared (Kurdle, 2008). The focus shifted 
to bilateral exchange of information between secrecy jurisdictions and OECD countries 
as a way to address evasion of personal income tax. This approach has not helped 
developing countries. 
 Of all bilateral and multilateral donors, the EU has arguably the most ambitious 
PCD agenda. Since 2009, the European Commission focuses on five policy areas for 
PCD: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration, and security. The 
trade and finance area includes tax governance, which is mainly focussed on technical 
assistance. This is somewhat odd, because providing development aid to strengthen tax 
systems in developing countries relates to aid policy and not to donor policy in non-aid 
areas, which PCD usually refers to. The technical assistance programme includes 
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various initiatives to help developing countries deal with transfer pricing problems 
(European Commission, 2011). Regarding EU policies, the European Commission 
highlights the emergent country-by-country reporting requirements that would help to 
identify tax avoidance by multinationals, but the proposed EU directive has been 
weakened by the European Council since then. The European Commission initiative 
against aggressive tax planning launched in 2012 is mainly focussed on safeguarding tax 
revenues in EU countries. It does include a reference to developing countries, but again 
emphasises support in the form of technical assistance. The many actors involved in EU 
policy making, conflicting interests, and different levels of member state commitment to 
international development lead some to conclude that PCD in the EU is in fact a 
“mission impossible” (Carbone, 2008). 
 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also paid relatively strong attention to 
PCD and put in place explicit policies and structure to enhance policy coherence. From 
2001 to 2004, the Ministry commissioned several studies on corporate tax issues as input 
for development policy. Regarding domestic policy in developing countries, the studies 
concluded that tax incentives are usually ineffective to attract foreign investment (Bols 
et al., 2001; Muller et al., 2004). Two studies also analysed effects of the Dutch tax 
system on revenue mobilisation in developing countries. One of these studies found that 
transfer mispricing in trade with the Netherlands was not a major issue (Muller et al., 
2004). The other study focussed on tax treaties. Due to lack of data, it could not assess 
the costs and benefits for developing countries of concluding tax treaties in a 
quantitative manner (IBFD, 2004). 
 After 2004, coherence between tax and development policy apparently disappeared 
from the agenda for some time, perhaps because the studies commissioned by the 
Ministry did not provide evidence of incoherence. In December 2006, a report by the 
Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) highlighted several aspects 
of the Dutch tax system that had substantial negative consequences for other countries, 
including developing countries (Van Dijk et al., 2006). The report showed that the 
combination of the Dutch tax treaty network, a special tax regime for group financing 
companies, and the absence of Dutch withholding taxes on interest and royalties allow 
foreign multinationals to avoid taxes in other countries. Since 2007, the Ministry has 
again been paying increasing attention to PCD in relation to the Dutch tax system. At the 
same time, the Ministry of finance continued to push for a new special tax regime that 
would have facilitated aggressive tax avoidance structures. The special regime never 
entered into force and the project was dropped in 2009 because it was incompatible with 
EU legislation. There are no indications that the Ministry of Finance took into account 
the potential effects of the special tax regime on tax revenues in developing countries. 
Thus, policy incoherence remained highly problematic in this area. 
 Since 2009, there has been more regular and more constructive interaction on tax 
and development policies between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and several development organisations united in Tax Justice NL. The 
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involvement of the Ministry of Finance in development cooperation partly consists of 
technical assistance. This is in line with the EU (European Commission, 2011) and 
OECD focus (OECD, 2012c), but it is hardly relevant for addressing incoherence in 
donor country policies. 
 In February 2011, the Dutch Ministry of Finance published a new policy on tax 
treaties. This policy mentions the importance of policy coherence for development 
cooperation, but interprets policy coherence as an imperative to strengthen tax 
compliance in and information sharing with developing countries. Thus, similar to the 
OECD (OECD, 2008a), the ministry of finance emphasises the need for development-
friendly policies in developing countries rather than in donor countries. The new tax 
treaty policy nonetheless includes a few specific principles on Dutch tax treaties that are 
relevant to developing countries. These include allowing for relatively high withholding 
taxes in treaties with developing countries and a commitment to include anti-abuse 
provisions in tax treaties if requested. Tax treaties and anti-abuse provisions will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. The principles might reflect increasing attention 
for coherence between Dutch tax and development policy as well. However, it remains 
to be seen how these principles will be implemented. The new tax treaty negotiated with 
Ethiopia in 2012 does not include anti-abuse provisions, for example. The slow progress 
in this area and the focus on technical assistance by the Netherlands and multilateral 
institutions suggest that coherence between development objectives and corporate tax 
policy in donor countries themselves still remains a major challenge. 
 
 
1.5 Research	  objective	  and	  research	  approach	  
1.5.1 Research	  objective	  and	  research	  questions	  
The general objective of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of international 
constraints to domestic revenue mobilisation in developing countries. The focus of this 
thesis is on constraints to corporate taxation that result from Dutch corporate tax policy. 
This leads to the following main research question. 
 
What are the adverse effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on developing countries? 
 
To answer this question, the thesis mainly analyses effects of corporate tax policy 
through the use of Dutch SPEs by foreign multinationals. The analysis is guided by the 
following four sub-questions. 
 
1. How do international aspects of Dutch corporate tax policy relate to Dutch 
development policy? 
2. How do tax treaties influence the diversion of FDI through Dutch SPEs? 
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3. What is the relation between Dutch SPEs and the financing structure of 
multinationals? 
4. How do specific tax avoidance strategies facilitated by Dutch SPEs affect 
developing countries? 
 
The key elements of these questions will be briefly clarified. 
§ Dutch corporate tax policy covers Dutch tax law as well as bilateral tax treaties 
negotiated between the Netherlands and other countries.19 The policy analysed in 
this thesis also include past measures, in particular the Dutch group financing 
activities regime that was phased out by 2011, and proposed measures, notably the 
group interest box that was adopted in 2006 but never entered into force. 
§ Adverse effects are defined as effects that are contrary to the interests of developing 
countries. Moreover, effects can be considered adverse if they are incoherent with 
Dutch development policy. The effects do not refer to a specific interest group in 
developing countries but to the public interest in general. Although the analysis in 
this thesis focuses on revenue effects, it also covers effects on redistribution and 
market functioning (re-pricing) and the conclusions briefly discuss implications for 
the relationship between taxpayers and the government (representation). 
§ Effects of Dutch corporate tax policy include all effects of corporate structures 
that are facilitated by Dutch tax policy. Such structures may involve corporate 
entities in various other countries as well. Furthermore, in some cases multinationals 
could in principle achieve the same benefits by routing investments through another 
country instead of the Netherlands. Thus, some effects of Dutch tax policy as 
defined here cannot be fully attributed to the Dutch corporate tax system alone but 
relate to the international tax system of which the Dutch tax system is a crucial part. 
§ Developing countries should be interpreted in a broad sense and sometimes refer to 
all low and middle income countries outside the EU. Some parts of the analysis 
distinguish major emerging economies as a separate group, but due to data 
limitations and confidentiality requirements, in other parts of the analysis this is not 
possible. In principle, though, the main research question also asks for the analysis 
of effects for individual developing countries, because of the large heterogeneity 
among countries. 
§ Dutch Special Purpose entities (SPEs) refer to Dutch entities that have an 
international financial role in a foreign multinational. It has become very difficult 
nowadays to define the home country of a multinational in a precise and meaningful 
way, though. The reason is that a multinational’s historical origins, main place of 
management, financial headquarters, ultimate parent company, stock exchange 
listings, controlling shareholder, main production sites, and largest sales can be in 
different countries. Foreign multinationals should be generally interpreted as firms 
of non-Dutch origin, with a foreign place of corporate control, or without substantial 
                                                        
19  See page 208 for a list of all Dutch tax treaties. 
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real business activities in the Netherlands. They can have a Dutch parent company, 
though. The vast majority of Dutch SPEs do not conduct real business operations, 
mainly hold foreign financial assets or intellectual property, are mainly funded with 
foreign equity and liabilities, and do not have a physical presence in the 
Netherlands. However, these characteristics do not apply to all SPEs. It is difficult to 
draw a line between SPEs with mainly financial activities or separate international 
financial activities on the one hand and entities with integrated international 
financial activities, domestic financial operations, and real business operations on 
the other hand. Therefore the identification of SPEs is not fully based on pre-defined 
rules and occasionally involves subjective judgements.20 
§ Diversion of FDI is defined as FDI into an intermediate country that is then 
reinvested as FDI in another country. The investment may pass through various 
entities in the intermediate country and undergo transformations, for example from 
an intra-group loan into an equity investment. This definition excludes investments 
that entities in the intermediate country finance by issuing bonds or obtaining other 
external funding themselves. 
§ Specific tax avoidance strategies are distinguished on the basis of the specific type 
of tax that is avoided, such as withholding tax on intra-group interest payments or 
host country corporate income tax, and the SPE structure that is used to avoid this 
tax. 
 
This thesis does not contain a complete assessment of all effects of Dutch corporate tax 
policy. Intended positive effects, such as higher investment with a positive development 
impact by Dutch multinationals, are relatively well understood. FDI can have a positive 
impact on host country development through positive externalities and enhanced 
productivity, provided that adequate domestic institutions are in place. These institutions 
include sufficient competition in the domestic market and a sufficiently developed 
financial system (Alfaro et al., 2009; Cipollina et al., 2012; Hermes & Lensink, 2003; 
Moran et al., 2005; Nunnenkamp, 2004). The analysis in this thesis focuses on negative 
and unintended effects, which have so far received less attention in academic analysis. 
The main research question refers to adverse effects to indicate this focus. Thus, the 
analysis starts from the assumption that such effects exist and that they deserve further 
analysis. 
 The reference to adverse effects indicates a focus of the research, not a bias. The 
main research question does not imply that all effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on 
developing countries are adverse. To the contrary, it recognises that positive effects exist 
                                                        
20  Balance of Payments Reporting Instructions 2003, having regard to section 7 of the External Financial 
Relations Act 1994, formally define Special Financial Institutions, or SPEs, as “resident enterprises or 
institutions, irrespective of their legal form, in which non-residents hold a direct or indirect participating 
interest through a shareholding or otherwise and whose objective is or whose business consists to a major 
extent of receiving funds from non-residents and channelling them to non-residents”. This definition is 
basically the same and requires subjective judgments as well.  
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as well and refers to adverse effects in order to distinguish these from other, potentially 
positive effects. Furthermore, the main research question does not presume that adverse 
effects are necessarily large or dominant. The balance between positive and negative 
effects probably differs per country and it is very well possible that for some developing 
countries, adverse effects are insignificant. 
 Figure 1.6 shows potential positive and negative effects of the Dutch tax system on 
corporate tax revenues in a developing country. The effects materialise through different 
pathways. A tax treaty between the Netherlands and a developing country may generate 
additional FDI in the developing country (boxes 1 and 2), thus changing the total 
volume of inward FDI (box A).21 Effect 1A is intended; effect 2A is usually unintended, 
but positive. In addition, if withholding tax reductions lower the cost of external 
borrowing, a tax treaty can increase investment by domestic multinationals in the 
developing country (box 3). This contributes to the change in total volume of 
investments. Effect 3A is intended with regard to borrowing from the Netherlands; 
borrowing via the Netherlands may not be intended, but stimulates investments as well. 
The volume effect is likely to be positive and increases total tax revenues from 
multinationals in the developing country.22 
 For investments that already exist or would take place anyway (boxes 4 and 5), there 
is a tax rate effect (box B) if the tax treaty limits the host country’s withholding tax rates 
on interest or dividend payments. The treaty can then also affect the financing structure 
of investments (box C), because withholding taxes influence the relative costs of debt 
and equity. Note that investments via the Netherlands (box 5) include FDI that is 
diverted for other reasons, for example to enhance investment protection. They also 
include intra-group loans from subsidiaries in other countries. The rate and composition 
effects exist for domestic multinationals that raise funding in international capital 
markets as well (box 6) and mainly reflect debt funding via the Netherlands. The 
pathway effects 4B and 4C are taken into account as known by-effects. The effects 5A, 
5B, 6A, and 6B are unintended by-effects that may not be fully taken into account when 
a treaty is concluded. The tax rate effect is always negative and can substantially reduce 
withholding tax revenues; the composition effect is likely to be negative or neutral. 
 At the bottom, Figure 1.6 shows potential negative effects resulting from other 
aspects of the Dutch corporate tax system, related to royalty payments for the use of 
trademarks and intellectual property. Apparently, some SPEs have concluded 
agreements with the Dutch tax authority, called advance pricing agreements (APAs), 
that provide for a low effective tax rate on royalty income. Between 1997 and 2010, 
certain Dutch SPEs also benefitted from a low effective tax rate on royalty income under  
                                                        
21  A tax treaty can have negative effects on incremental investments by foreign multinationals as well if 
withholding tax reductions lower the costs of repatriating income, as discussed above. Thus, the effects 
1A and 2A may also include repatriations to the Netherlands and via the Netherlands that would otherwise 
not occur. 
22  It does not necessarily raise total corporate tax revenues from multinationals and smaller domestic 
enterprises combined, for example if foreign investment crowds out domestic investment. 
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Figure	  1.6	   Potential	  pathway	  effects	  of	  Dutch	  corporate	  tax	  policy	  
 
the Dutch Group Financing Activities (GFA) regime.23 Multinationals may move 
trademarks or intellectual property to the Netherlands to take advantage of such special 
tax treatment (box 7). These intangible assets can originate from the home country of the 
multinational, but also from developing countries. Furthermore, the Netherlands does 
not have a withholding tax on outgoing royalty payments. In combination with a tax 
                                                        
23  Chapters 2 and 4 briefly describe the GFA regime; Chapter 5 provides examples of APAs that result in 
low effective tax rates. Special tax treatment of Dutch SPEs may also result in a low effective tax rate for 
other types of foreign income, notably interest income. This thesis focusses on special tax treatment of 
royalties.  
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treaty that limits withholding tax on royalty payments to the Netherlands, this can result 
in royalty conduits (box 8). The treatment of royalty payments is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on the total volume of investments. Therefore the bottom part of the 
figure shows rate and composition effects only. Pathway effects 7A, 7B, 8A and 8B are 
unintended. The rate effect may be negative or neutral; the composition effect is always 
negative and probably larger, because firms have considerable flexibility in determining 
license fees. 
 Note that Figure 1.6 does not show all possible effects of the Dutch corporate tax 
system. It does not consider effects of FDI on the broader economy and externalities of 
foreign investments that have an indirect impact on tax revenues. Effects on the broader 
economy include crowding in or crowding out of domestic investment, for example due 
to changes in market structure, exchange rate effects, or acquisitions of domestic firms 
by foreign investors. Positive and negative externalities range from forward and 
backward linkages and transfer of skills and technology to impacts on the environment 
and on local communities. This thesis focuses mainly on direct effects on corporate tax 
revenues and on market functioning. It does not analyse indirect impacts of investments 
by multinational firms on domestic revenue mobilisation. 
 Furthermore, Figure 1.6 shows potential pathway effects for an individual country. 
The volume effects for individual countries do not add up to the total volume effect for 
all developing countries combined. A tax treaty between the Netherlands and a 
developing country may cause some firms to invest in this country instead of in another 
developing country. Such investment decisions generate a positive volume effect for this 
specific country only and not for developing countries as a group. By contrast, rate and 
composition effects for individual countries do usually add up to the total effect on all 
developing countries combined. 
 Regarding the effects shown in the figure, this thesis covers negative tax rate effects 
for FDI via the Netherlands (5B), external debt of domestic multinationals (6B), and 
royalty payments (7B and 8B). Furthermore, it analyses potential negative composition 
effects resulting from lower interest withholding taxes (5C, and 6C) and royalty 
structures (7C and 8C). The thesis does not investigate FDI originating from the 
Netherlands (1A, 4B and 4C). Furthermore, it does not analyse potentially positive 
volume effects of FDI via the Netherlands (2A). It would have been useful to study this 
effect separately and determine what part of FDI diverted via the Netherlands is 
additional (box 2) and what part merely follows a different route (box 5). However, data 
limitations form a major obstacle. Time series data on bilateral FDI originating from the 
Netherlands are available, for example from the OECD. However, time series data on 
total bilateral FDI from the Netherlands, including FDI via the Netherlands, are 
available for a few developing countries only. The reason is that data on FDI via the 
Netherlands for years before 2009 must be obtained from statistics reported by the host 
countries themselves, and for many developing countries such statistics are not available 
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or inconsistent. Finally, the thesis does not cover potentially positive effects of tax 
treaties on the volume of investments by domestic multinationals (3A). 
 
1.5.2 Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
This thesis contains four empirical chapters, which have been written as separate papers. 
Each empirical chapter address one of the four sub-questions mentioned above and 
includes its own literature review and description of data and methods. There is some 
limited overlap between the literature sections and data descriptions in the different 
chapters. 
 The first empirical chapter provides a general overview of relevant aspects of Dutch 
corporate tax policy and their effects on developing countries. It discusses both positive 
and negative effects and includes a rough estimate of missed tax revenues in developing 
countries as a consequence of Dutch tax policy. After that, it analyses to what extent the 
negative effects are adverse in the sense that they are incoherent with Dutch 
development policy. 
 The second empirical chapter focuses on the reduction of dividend withholding 
taxes under bilateral tax treaties, a key aspect of Dutch tax policy. The chapter analyses 
in detail to what extent the Dutch tax treaty network results in treaty shopping, that is, 
FDI diversion due to avoidance of withholding taxes by multinational firms. It includes 
a qualitative discussion of the negative effects for host countries that have a tax treaty 
with the Netherlands. 
 The third empirical chapter focuses on the absence of interest withholding tax on 
outgoing interest payments, another key aspect of Dutch tax policy. The chapter aims to 
provide a better understanding of how this affects the external and internal financing 
structures of multinationals. Because of data limitations, the analysis is limited to 
European multinationals and their European subsidiaries. However, the general insights 
from this chapter can be extended to developing countries that have particular tax 
treaties with the Netherlands. 
 The fourth empirical chapter assesses the relevance of various corporate tax 
avoidance strategies facilitated by Dutch tax policy, including the strategies analysed in 
the previous two chapters, for developing countries. It provides a quantitative 
description of the investment positions and income flows associated with different types 
of SPE structures. Using additional data sources, this fourth chapter identifies individual 
developing countries (and some EU countries) that are relatively strongly affected by 
avoidance of dividend and interest withholding taxes. It also analyses corporate tax 
avoidance via royalty structures. Although this last part of the analysis is less 
comprehensive as a result of data limitations, it identifies some affected developing 
countries as well. 
 Together, the four empirical chapters analyse some of the most important adverse 
effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on developing countries. The results allow to focus 
efforts for policy coherence between Dutch tax and development policy on specific 
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aspects of Dutch tax policy and on a few countries that are relatively strongly affected. 
The final chapter summarizes the results for the sub-questions, answers the main 
research question, discusses the findings, and presents policy implications for donor 
countries. 
 
1.5.3 Methods	  and	  data	  
In addition to the complete description of methods, data and sources in each of the 
empirical chapters, Table 1.2 on pages 64-65 presents a general overview.24 The first 
empirical chapter analyses government policies and is therefore mainly qualitative in 
nature. It includes a brief quantitative description of Dutch SPE investments to show the 
relevance and potential negative impact of Dutch corporate tax policy for developing 
countries.25 The second and third empirical chapter analyse treaty shopping and the role 
of SPEs in debt financing structures using econometric methods. Treaty shopping is 
analysed at the macro level, using data on bilateral diverted and non-diverted FDI 
stocks, and pays special attention to developing countries. Debt shifting can only be 
analysed at the micro level and research on internal financing structures requires 
financial data at the level of individual subsidiaries. Because such data are not available 
for developing countries, the third chapter studies the general role of Dutch SPEs in debt 
financing using data from EU-based firms and their EU subsidiaries. The fourth chapter 
mainly presents a quantitative analysis of different SPE structures and specific tax 
avoidance strategies. This last empirical chapter uses the most diverse data sources and 
contains the most recent and detailed information on how the Dutch corporate tax 





                                                        
24  Throughout this thesis, most financial amounts are expressed in euro (€), because this is the original 
currency of DNB data and the Reach and Amadeus databases, key sources for this thesis. All other 
currencies have been converted at official rates published by DNB. Investment positions and balance 
sheet items have been converted at the final exchange rate for the corresponding period or fiscal year. 
Capital and income flows have been converted at average rates for the nearest calendar year. 
25  After this first empirical chapter was finished and accepted for publication, additional data on Dutch SPE 
investments became available and several companies admitted to the Dutch GFA regime could be 
identified. The insights from this newly available information are reflected in the third and fourth 
empirical chapter. 
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Table	  1.2	   Overview	  of	  research	  methods,	  data,	  and	  sources	  
Chapter	   Sub-­‐question	   	   Methods	  
2	   How	   do	   international	   aspects	   of	   Dutch	  
corporate	   tax	   policy	   relate	   to	   Dutch	  
development	  policy?	  
	  
	   § Qualitative	   analysis	   of	   Dutch	   government	  
policies	  
§ Aggregate	  estimates	  of	  Dutch	  SPE	  investments	  
and	   missed	   tax	   revenues	   in	   developing	  
countries	  
3	   How	   do	   tax	   treaties	   influence	   the	  







	   § Quantitative	   description	   of	   geographical	  
patterns	  of	  SPE	  investments	  
§ Econometric	   analysis	   of	   FDI	   diversion	   through	  
Dutch	  SPEs	  
4	   What	   is	   the	   relation	   between	   Dutch	  





	   § Econometric	   analysis	   of	   debt	   financing	   at	   the	  
firm	  and	  subsidiary	  level	  
5	   How	   do	   specific	   tax	   avoidance	  
strategies	   facilitated	   by	   Dutch	   SPEs	  










	   § Quantitative	  description	  of	  assets	  and	  liabilities,	  
income	   flows,	   and	   other	   characteristics	   of	  
Dutch	  SPEs	  
§ Quantitative	   and	   qualitative	   description	   of	   FDI	  
diversion	  and	  debt	  issuance	  via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  (for	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Data	   	   Sources	  
a) Policy	   documents,	   research	   reports	  
commissioned	  by	  the	  Dutch	  government	  
b) Limited	  macro	  data	  on	  Dutch	  SPE	  investments	  
c) Macro	  data	  on	  FDI	  stocks	  and	  royalty	  flows	  
	  
	   a) Dutch	  government	  
	  
b) DNB	  
c) DNB,	  UNCTAD	  
a) Anonymised	  micro	  data	  on	  FDI	  via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  
and	  Dutch	  SPE	  ownership	  
b) Macro	  data	   on	  bilateral	   FDI	   stocks	   (excluding	  
Dutch	  SPEs)	  and	  total	  FDI	  stocks	  
c) Data	  on	  bilateral	  tax	  and	  investment	  treaties	  
d) Data	  on	  bilateral	  dividend	  WHT	  and	  corporate	  
income	  tax	  rates	  
e) Corruption	  perception	  index	  
	   a) DNB,	  Reach	  database	  
	  
b) OECD,	  UNCTAD	  
	  
c) IBFD,	  UNCTAD,	  Dutch	  government	  
d) E&Y,	  Deloitte,	  PwC,	  national	  sources	  
	  
e) Transparency	  International	  
a) Consolidated	  financial	  data	  of	  EU-­‐based	  firms	  
b) Unconsolidated	   financial	   and	   ownership	   data	  
of	  Dutch	  SPEs	  and	  subsidiaries	  in	  EU	  countries	  
c) Supplementary	   data	   on	   industry	   peer	   groups,	  
outstanding	   debt	   securities,	   and	   corporate	  
income	  tax	  rates	  
	   a) Amadeus	  database,	  annual	  reports	  
b) Amadeus	   and	   Reach	   databases,	   Dutch	  
Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  
c) Hoovers,	   annual	   reports,	   company	   websites,	  
credit	  rating	  agencies,	  European	  Commission	  
a) Anonymised	   micro	   data	   on	   Dutch	   SPEs	   and	  
Dutch	  SPE	  ownership	  
b) Macro	   data	   on	   bilateral	   FDI	   stocks	   (including	  
and	  excluding	  Dutch	  SPEs)	  and	  total	  FDI	  stocks	  
c) Macro	  data	  on	  foreign	  private	  debt	  securities	  
d) Micro	  data	  on	  outstanding	  debt	  securities	  
	  




f) Bilateral	  WHT	  data	  
	   a) DNB,	  Reach	  database	  
	  
b) OECD,	  IMF,	  UNCTAD	  
	  
c) BIS	  
d) Security	   exchanges,	   credit	   rating	   agencies,	  
investment	  funds,	  annual	  reports	  
e) Dutch	   Chamber	   of	   Commerce,	   IFC,	   MIGA,	  
UNCTAD,	   national	   investment	   promotion	  
agencies,	   national	   company	   registers,	   annual	  
reports,	  Reach	  database	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Abstract  This chapter discusses incoherence between tax and development 
policies, a relatively new area in the debate on policy coherence for development, 
using a case study of the Netherlands. Dutch special purpose entities play a key 
role in tax avoidance structures of multinational corporations. This chapter argues 
that the Dutch tax regime facilitates the avoidance of substantial amounts of tax 
revenues in developing countries when compared to the Dutch aid budget. As 
domestic tax revenues are an important source of financing for development, this 
suggests the Dutch tax policy is incoherent with the Dutch policy on development 
cooperation. The lack of policy coherence is largely unintended but it has structural 
and political causes. 
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2.1 Introduction	  
Traditionally, discussions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) have centred on 
policy areas such as agriculture and trade. This chapter focuses on a relative new area: 
incoherence between tax policy and development policy – with a case study of the 
Netherlands.  
 A key element of sustainable development is developing countries’ ability to raise 
sufficient tax revenue to finance infrastructure, education, and health, as well as their 
ability to reduce dependency on foreign development assistance. In addition, it has been 
argued that apart from raising revenue, taxes also play a “central role in building and 
sustaining the power of states, and shaping their ties to society” by enhancing the 
accountability between the state and its citizens (Bräutigam et al., 2008). There are, 
however, signs that multinational firms and wealthy individuals are increasingly using 
complex fiscal structures to avoid taxes in the countries where they operate26 or reside 
and to shift income tax havens. As a consequence, both poor and rich countries fail to 
collect important tax revenues that could have been used to finance public goods and 
services. 
 A few studies estimating forgone tax revenues suggest that the effects for 
developing countries are severe. Oxfam estimated that developing countries miss out on 
USD 50 billion in tax revenue each year as a consequence of tax evasion and tax 
avoidance strategies of multinationals (Oxfam, 2000). According to the African Union, 
more than USD 150 billion is “looted from Africa through tax avoidance by giant 
corporations and capital flight using 'a pinstripe infrastructure' of western banks, 
lawyers and accountants”.27 
 The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the consequences of the tax haven 
features of the Netherlands for developing countries and to investigate incoherence 
between Dutch tax and development policies. The chapter starts with a broader 
discussion on PCD, followed by a discussion on harmful effects of tax havens in 
general. Next, it briefly describes the Dutch tax regime in relation to international 
corporate tax planning and discusses positive and negative effects for developing 
countries. It includes a rough estimate of the amount of tax avoidance in developing 
countries facilitated by Dutch financing companies. After that, it discusses relevant 
aspects of Dutch development policy and consider the causes of policy incoherence. The 
chapter ends with conclusions. 
 	  
                                                        
26  Some fiscal structures are intended to avoid double taxation on foreign income in the host and the home 
country. These structures typically do not reduce corporate income taxes in the host country (although 
they may reduce withholding taxes). In this chapter, tax avoidance mainly refers to more aggressive types 
of fiscal planning that do reduce taxation in the host country. 
27  N. Mathiason, “Western bankers and lawyers ‘rob Africa of $150bn every year’”, The Observer 
(England), 21 Jan 2007. 
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2.2 Policy	  coherence	  for	  development	  
The concept of PCD can refer to the absence of policy effects contrary to the aims of 
development policy as well as to the creation of synergies between different government 
departments to achieve development objectives (Hoebink, 2004; OECD, 2001). There 
exists no universally agreed definition, though (ECDPM, 2007; Hoebink, 2005; McLean 
Hilker, 2004). For the purpose of this thesis, a definition from a previous study will be 
used: “PCD means working to ensure that the objectives of a government’s development 
policy are not undermined by other policies of that government, which impact on 
developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives where 
feasible” (McLean Hilker, 2004, p. 5). 
 Debates on the relation between various aspects of external policy emerged in the 
early 1990s and resulted in a clause in the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht 
Treaty) in 1992, requiring the European Union (EU) to ensure consistency of external 
relations, security, economic, and development policies. Over the past ten years, donor 
governments started to establish PCD mechanisms, such as coherence units and 
consultation procedures, and attention for PCD is becoming more systemic (ECDPM, 
2007). Apart from incoherence within development cooperation itself and internal 
coherence between development and other external policies, PCD has been extended to 
cover the effects of other policy areas as well (Hoebink, 2005). 
 Trade policy is by far the most widely included in PCD initiatives (European 
Commission, 2007a). In a recent working paper, the European Commission identified 
eleven other relevant policy areas: environment, climate change, security, agriculture, 
fisheries, the social dimension of globalisation, migration, research, the information 
society, transport, and energy (European Commission, 2007b). Note that this list does 
not include taxation or other financial aspects of globalisation. By contrast, a list of six 
key policy areas identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) includes foreign investment, and mentions that OECD efforts to 
tackle tax evasion contribute to PCD (OECD, 2003). In a more comprehensive study, the 
OECD emphasises that double taxation can be a serious barrier to trade and investment, 
but also identifies a need to raise awareness “on topics such as bribery, aggressive use 
of tax havens or transfer pricing schemes” (OECD, 2005). Still, tax issues are rarely 
included in PCD initiatives of donor countries. 
 This chapter explores coherence between corporate taxation and development 
policies, including decisions on the location of real business activities as well as on the 
location of profits within a multinational. The focus will be on the occurrence of 
inconsistencies, which is referred to in the first part of the definition of PCD cited above, 
rather than synergies between development policy and other policy areas.  
 Causes of incoherence can be classified along three dimensions (Hoebink, 2004, 
2005). First, policy incoherence can be intended, if a government deliberately prioritises 
other interests, or unintended, if a government does not notice the conflicting outcomes. 
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Second, incoherence can be structural, in case different interests are inherently 
conflicting, or temporary, in case different interest groups need time to adjust to a new 
situation. Third, the nature of the causes can be institutional, for instance due to the 
compartmentalisation of government departments, or political, due to conflicting 
interests and ideologies. This classification will be used as a framework for analysis of 
the Netherlands case study. 
 
 
2.3 Tax	  havens	  and	  development	  
Tax havens undermine the interests of poor countries in a number of ways (Kohonen & 
Mestrum, 2009). First, tax havens offer multinationals and rich individuals the 
possibility to avoid or even evade paying taxes in developing countries by diverting 
capital and income to shell companies in tax havens. Due to the combination of high 
capital mobility, differences in national tax systems, and the secrecy offered by many 
tax havens, multinationals have considerable flexibility to shift profits from countries 
where economic activities take place to tax havens, often without violating national 
laws. The main strategies to shift profits within multinationals are the manipulation of 
prices of goods that are traded internally, called transfer mispricing, and the 
manipulation of internal financial flows such as interest, royalties, and dividend 
payments.  
 Second, apart from missed tax revenue, the use of tax havens to escape taxation also 
provides multinationals with unfair competitive advantages vis-à-vis smaller companies 
that do not have the capacity to organise this type of fiscal structures and domestic 
companies that cannot exploit international arbitration opportunities. As companies in 
developing countries are generally smaller and typically more domestically focussed, the 
use of tax havens tends to favour companies from developed countries over developing 
country competitors.  
 Third, banking secrecy and offshore trusts facilitate the laundering of proceeds from 
political corruption, illicit arms deals, embezzlement, drugs trade, and other criminal 
activities.  
 Finally, the lack of transparency and weak financial oversight has also facilitated the 
use of off-balance sheet investment vehicles and other risky financial constructions. This 
has contributed to the global financial crisis (Murphy, 2008) that started in 2007 and is 
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2.4 The	  Netherlands:	  A	  tax	  haven?	  
2.4.1 Definition	  of	  tax	  havens	  
‘Tax haven’ is a controversial term that can have different meanings and is used for 
different purposes. There does not exist consensus on a single set of tax haven criteria or 
list of tax havens.28 The official list published by the OECD (OECD, 2009), for 
example, is partly the outcome of a political negotiation process and is exclusively based 
on standards of information exchange, even though the OECD itself previously 
established a broader set of criteria (OECD, 1998). For the purpose of this thesis, it is 
important to distinguish between pure tax havens and countries that exhibit harmful 
preferential tax regimes. Both types of tax havens have in common that their regulations 
facilitate evasion or avoidance of tax that may be due in another country under that other 
country’s laws. 
 Pure tax havens, sometimes referred to as offshore financial centres, are jurisdictions 
generally characterised by zero or very low tax rates, lack of transparency, secrecy laws 
that prevent information exchange, and ring-fencing of regimes (insulating preferential 
tax regimes from domestic markets). Financial services typically constitute a major part 
of their economy. Examples of pure tax havens are the British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Bermuda, and Jersey. 
 The second group of tax havens consists of countries with a diversified economy 
and a normal tax system for most of the economy but with certain exceptions or low-tax 
facilities, often for specific business activities. In addition, such countries are commonly 
characterised by the presence of specialised advisors, lawyers, and accountants, who 
assist multinationals with their tax planning and by a large number of bilateral tax 
treaties that reduce withholding taxes on international income flows. They also typically 
host large numbers of corporate entities without commercial presence, such as mailbox 
or shell companies, that are established in the country purely for tax reasons. 
 The Netherlands is clearly not a pure tax haven. However, as will be explained in 
more detail below, the Netherlands does have a tax regime that facilitates aggressive 
corporate tax avoidance abroad and as such could be considered a tax haven for large 
multinationals. Other examples of countries with such a regime are Ireland, Switzerland, 
and Luxembourg. 
 
2.4.2 The	  Dutch	  fiscal	  regime	  and	  Special	  Financial	  Institutions	  
For more than 30 years, the Netherlands has been known as an international tax planning 
centre for multinationals (Van Dijk et al., 2006). It is attractive for multinationals to 
channel Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as interest, royalties, and dividend 
payments from one country to another via entities in the Netherlands. Such 
                                                        
28  For an overview of definitions and country lists, see for example Booijink and Weyzig (2007) . 
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arrangements are called conduit structures. Key underlying elements of the Dutch tax 
regime that facilitate conduit structures are the large network of favourable tax treaties, 
zero withholding taxes on outgoing interest and royalty payments, and exemption of 
foreign dividend income and capital gains. 
 Conduit arrangements can be harmful because they can facilitate income shifting 
within a multinational, resulting in tax avoidance in the countries where the income was 
generated, including developing countries. Moreover, by acting as conduit country, the 
Netherlands plays an important role in routing financial flows to pure tax havens, where 
many licensing and financing subsidiaries of multinationals are located and little or no 
tax is paid. Often outsiders cannot easily identify the ultimate parent companies of these 
tax haven entities because of a lack of transparency.  
 The Netherlands hosts a large number of conduit entities. The Dutch Central Bank 
(DNB) maintains a special register for this type of entities (DNB, 2003), which may also 
be referred to as Special Purpose Entities (SPEs).29 SPEs include both mailbox 
companies and other tax planning entities. Most mailbox companies have only one 
employee or none at all and merely perform an administrative function.30 They are 
administrated by trust offices, which incorporate and manage the companies on behalf of 
the multinationals that the mailbox companies belong to. Other SPEs are not managed 
by a trust office. Most of these are part of very large multinationals that, given the scale 
and complexity of their transactions, probably prefer not to contract out the management 
of their SPEs. These entities vary from small units that employ a handful of 
administrative staff to large regional or financial head offices of foreign multinationals. 
According to DNB, almost 75% of SPEs are represented by trust offices (DNB, 2007b). 
 In conformance with their purpose, DNB identifies three types of SPEs. The first are 
financing companies. They take up and on-lend funds obtained from international capital 
markets, from the parent company, or from other financing affiliates. Examples of 
multinationals with Dutch financing companies are SABMiller and (now bankrupt) 
Lehman Brothers. The second are holding companies. These manage foreign 
participations, act as dividend conduits, and perform acquisitions on behalf of the parent 
company. Some examples are Mittal Steel, EADS, ENI, Trafigura, Premier Oil, BHP 
Billiton, and Pirelli.31 It is likely that most of these companies also perform financing 
activities. The third type are royalty and film right companies that exploit licences, 
patents and film rights. Diageo and SABMiller have transferred some of their trademark 
rights to the Netherlands, for example. There are no public data on transactions 
associated which each type of SPEs, but DNB states that “considering the magnitude of 
                                                        
29  DNB, Dutch legislation, and the article version of this chapter refer to these entities as Special Financial 
Institutions. This thesis uses the more common term Special Purpose Entities, in line with OECD 
terminology (OECD, 2008b). 
30  Occasionally mailbox companies are established in the Netherlands to benefit from foreign investment 
protection under Dutch Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as well. 
31  The examples mentioned in this section are based on research by the authors. They do not represent data 
of DNB and it is therefore unknown whether these companies are included in the DNB SPE register. 
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their cross-border transactions, the financing companies are the largest type of [SPEs], 
followed by holding companies” (DNB, 2004). 
 In 2007, DNB recorded approximately 10,000 individual entities. The number of 
SPEs and the value of their gross financial transactions have substantially grown since 
the mid-1990s, indicating that SPE activity has been increasing. For the period 2003-
2007, the average net income received by SPEs from affiliates in low and lower-middle 
income countries was almost €6.4 billion per year (DNB, 2008).32 The value of SPE 
transactions that may be related to aggressive tax avoidance in developing countries is 
therefore potentially very large. 
  
2.4.3 Foreign	  direct	  investment	  via	  SPEs	  
SPEs mainly serve to route capital and income through the Netherlands and are therefore 
largely unrelated to the Dutch economy. Hence, in order to present figures on FDI 
related to real business activity in the Netherlands, DNB publishes annual FDI statistics 
excluding SPEs. In order to obtain a better understanding of the scope of SPE 
transactions in the global economy, Figure 2.1 compares the Dutch outward FDI stock 
including SPEs to the FDI data of some other high income OECD countries.  
 
 
Figure	  2.1	   Outward	  FDI	  Stock,	  selected	  OECD	  countries,	  2005	  
Sources:	  Normal	  FDI	  stocks	  from	  UNCTAD	  (2006),	  FDI	  stocks	  of	  SPEs	  from	  DNB	  Tables	  T12.10	  and	  T12.14	  
(previously	   T5.11	   and	   T5.15),	   http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=uk&todo=Balans	   (accessed	   26	  
Sep	   2008),	   and	   Luxembourg	   Central	   Bank,	   Table	   9.2,	  
http://www.bcl.lu/fr/statistiques/series_statistiques,	  (accessed	  17	  Jan	  2012).	  Outward	  FDI	  stocks	  of	  SPEs	  
for	  other	  countries,	  such	  as	  Switzerland	  and	  Ireland,	  are	  not	  shown	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  data.	  
                                                        
32  On the basis of the trust office register of DNB, it can be estimated that there are about 20,000 mailbox 
companies in the Netherlands. It seems that a considerable part of mailbox companies falls outside the 
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 The figure shows that the outward FDI stock of SPEs by far exceeds the outward 
FDI stock of normal Dutch companies. When SPE transactions are not taken into 
account, the Netherlands comes fifth in terms of the size of outward FDI stock in 2005. 
However when SPE investments are included, the Netherlands is the second largest 
foreign investor in the world, just behind the USA and far ahead of the UK, the number 
three largest investor. The figure for inward FDI stock (not presented) shows the same 
pattern as that for outward investment stock.33 
 
 
2.5 Consequences	  for	  developing	  countries	  
The Dutch tax regime has important consequences for developing countries. These are 
discussed below. 
 
2.5.1 Negative	  effects	  
First, the intra-group income and capital flows channelled through Dutch SPEs to take 
advantage of the beneficial Dutch tax regime suggest that tax is avoided in other 
countries. This tax would have been paid if the Netherlands had not been used as a 
conduit country. Through conduit constructions, income is sometimes shifted from a 
subsidiary in a developing country to a subsidiary in a pure tax haven in the form of 
royalties or interest payments. The direct result is a lower total tax burden for the 
multinational corporation, no or very low tax revenues on the income shifted to the pure 
tax haven, and some tax revenue on the operational margin in the Netherlands, at the 
expense of the developing country. The use of such constructions is indicated by 
promotional materials from tax advisors and supported by data on the aggregate 
financial flows between SPEs and developing countries as well as anecdotal evidence on 
tax avoidance by specific multinationals.34  
 Second, apart from conduit structures, SPEs may also use special Dutch tax facilities 
to reduce their total tax burden. In 1997, the Netherlands introduced a special regime for 
Group Financing Activities (GFA). This regime offers an effective tax rate of 6-10% on 
the balance of interest received minus interest paid on loans to and from foreign 
                                                        
33  Ireland and Cyprus are frequently mentioned as European countries with a favourable tax regime for 
conduit arrangements similar to those offered by the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Outside Europe, Hong 
Kong is known for being used for round-tripping investments from and to China. See e.g. ECB (2004) and 
UNCTAD (2006). If data on special entities comparable with SPEs on such countries (not available) were 
also included in the figure, their total outward FDI stock might also have been substantially higher. 
34  An example of profit shifting using a royalty conduit structure is the case of SAB Miller, an Anglo-South 
African brewery. For over 25 years, the multinational paid millions in royalties to its Dutch mailbox 
subsidiary that owned the trademarks of several of its beer brands. By means of this arrangement, during 
the apartheid years, SAB avoided the exchange controls that were imposed in South Africa and 
successfully avoided paying any taxes in South Africa on the royalty payments. SAB’s dirty secret, 
Noseweek, 51, November 2003; SAB’s lying Dutchmen, Noseweek, 52, December 2003. 
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affiliates.35 In 2003, the GFA regime was found to violate EU competition law and it is 
now being phased out. Approximately ninety companies were admitted to the GFA 
scheme, including large multinationals such as BHP Billiton and SAB Miller,36 and for 
most companies the scheme has expired in 2007 or 2008. As of April 2009, a new law, 
replacing the GFA regime and offering similar benefits, still awaits approval from the 
European Commission. 
 Multinational corporations using the scheme can increase loans from a Dutch group 
financing company to a subsidiary in a developing country to avoid taxation. The direct 
result would be a lower total tax burden for the multinational corporation and a higher 
tax revenue in the Netherlands at the expense of the developing country. There is some 
evidence from academic studies that multinational corporations indeed use intra-group 
financing strategies to reduce their total tax burden (Grubert, 2003a; Mintz & 
Weichenrieder, 2005; Riesco et al., 2005). These studies are based on detailed financial 
data from individual subsidiary and parent companies. 
 As a consequence of the opportunities for multinational corporations to reduce their 
tax burden, the Dutch tax regime provides them with a competitive advantage over 
smaller and less internationalised companies, including domestic competitors in 
developing countries. This competitive advantage from tax avoidance is unrelated to 
operational performance and is therefore likely to distort market efficiency. The market 
distortions from tax advantages of large multinationals could also harm the economies of 
developing countries. 
 
2.5.2 Positive	  effects	  
Apart from the negative effects mentioned above, the Dutch tax policy also has some 
positive effects for developing countries. Dividend income and capital gains arising 
from foreign subsidiaries are exempted from tax in the Netherlands. This encourages 
investment in developing countries with a lower corporate tax rate. Furthermore, treaties 
concluded between the Netherlands and developing countries are based on the UN 
model convention for tax treaties. In contrast to the OECD model treaty, the UN model 
does not completely eliminate withholding taxes on royalties and interest but reduces 
these to some 10%. This is relatively favourable for developing countries. Dutch tax 
treaties also include tax sparing clauses. This allows Dutch companies to benefit from 
tax holidays in developing countries without residual taxes applying in the Netherlands 
and therefore encourages investment in developing countries offering tax holidays. 
 
                                                        
35  In practice, the effective tax rate on intra-group interest income is 15% on average. Commission Decision 
of 17 March 2003 (2003/515/EC), Official Journal of the European Union L 180, pp. 52-66. 
36  Reports filed at the Chamber of Commerce mention the use of the GFA regime by these companies. 
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2.5.3 Discussion	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  effects	  
There have been questions as to whether the tax avoidance strategies mentioned above 
would make sense for operations in developing countries, because many multinationals 
obtain tax holidays or other tax incentives when they invest in these countries. As a 
consequence, subsidiaries in developing countries are exempt from corporate tax and 
sometimes also from withholding taxes, so there would be no tax charge to avoid in the 
first place. However, even though many foreign investors do enjoy generous tax 
incentives in developing countries, this does not mean that all FDI is completely exempt 
from corporate tax for an indefinite period. Academic studies using micro data show that 
some multinational corporations do pay corporate taxes in developing countries (Desai 
et al., 2003; Grubert, 1998). A loss of corporate tax revenues is therefore still possible. It 
should also be recognised that corporate income taxes constitute a much larger 
proportion of total tax revenues in developing countries than in developed countries 
(Tanzi & Zee, 2000). 
 If tax avoidance strategies lower the tax burden on the operations of multinational 
firms in developing countries, this could make it more attractive to invest in these 
countries. Thus, apart from income shifting effects, there may also be an effect on real 
business operations, and there is some evidence for this effect from actual behaviour of 
multinational firms (Grubert, 2003a). Higher levels of investment would mitigate the 
negative consequences of tax avoidance. It is unlikely that this would fully compensate 
for the loss of tax revenues, though, because tax avoidance would have a similar effect 
as tax incentives offered by host country governments. That effect is generally limited 
because tax incentives are rarely a decisive factor for location decisions (Bols et al., 
2001). 
 Regarding the effect of tax treaties, it is not clear whether they actually encourage 
FDI to developing countries. Although there are some studies that demonstrate a 
positive impact of tax treaties on FDI in high income countries, only very limited 
research on this topic has been undertaken with respect to developing countries. A recent 
study did find a positive relation between signing a tax treaty and FDI in developing 
countries, but noted that this finding only applied to middle income countries and not to 
lower income countries (Neumayer, 2007). Hence, there is no conclusive evidence that 
the overall effect of concluding a tax treaty with the Netherlands is positive for a 
developing country. 
 
2.5.4 Estimate	  of	  missed	  tax	  revenues	  
In order to illustrate the magnitude of consequences for developing countries, a rough 
estimate can be made of the missed tax revenues in those countries due to tax avoidance 
constructions involving Dutch SPEs. Data made available by DNB on the geographical 
composition of SPE inward and outward investment stocks and flows confirms that 
SPEs are also used as vehicles for investment in developing regions. Estimates of missed 
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tax revenues still involve many assumptions, however, because the calculations require 
other data as well, for example about the composition of SPE income, that is not yet 
available. The estimates are therefore necessarily imprecise. Furthermore, the DNB data 
group countries by geographical region and this requires several corrections to exclude 
high income countries in each region. The regions below include large developing 
economies, such as South Africa, Brazil, China, and India. Only high income countries 
are excluded from the regional data only, using a series of corrections. 
 The first three data columns in Table 2.1, labelled ‘FDI via SPEs’, present 
investment positions of SPEs in the main developing regions of Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia, for the years 2003 to 2005. These investment positions are the total outward 
FDI stocks of SPEs, including equity investment and loans to subsidiaries, parents, and 
other related companies that are part of the same multinational. SPE investments in 
Central America have been corrected to exclude tax havens in the Caribbean.37 SPE 
investments in Asia, excluding the Middle East and Japan, have been corrected to 
exclude Singapore, Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Inward FDI stocks in 
these four countries account for 59% of global investment of the region and for 68% of 
xxxxxxxxxxx 
Table	  2.1	   Inward	  FDI	  stocks	  via	  SPEs	  and	  estimates	  of	  missed	  tax	  revenues	  
Region	   FDI	  via	  SPEs	  
(€	  bn)	  
	   Total	  FDI	  
(€	  bn)	  
	   SPE	  
share	  
	   Tax	  missed	  
(€	  bn)	  
	   	   	   Est.	  1c)	   	   Est.	  2d)	  
	   2003	   2004	   2005	   	   2005	   	   2005	   	   2005	   	   2005	  
Africa	   10	   10	   13	   	   213	   	   	   6%	   	   	   0.098	   	   ..	  g)	  
Latin	  America	  excl.	  Caribbean	   32	   40	   46	   	   555	   	   	   8%	   	   	   0.342	   	   0.039	  
	   o/w	  Central	  America	  excl.	  Caribbeana)	   13	   18	   21	   	   192	   	   	   11%	   	   	   0.155	   	   0.009	  
	  	  	   o/w	  South	  America	   19	   23	   25	   	   363	   	   	   7%	   	   	   0.186	   	   0.030	  
Asia	  excl.	  Middle	  East,	  JP,	  SG,	  KR,	  TW,	  
	  	  and	  HKb)	  
28	   28	   30	   	   462	   	   	   7%	   	   	   0.199	   	   0.062	  
Total	  developing	  regions	   ~70	   ~80	   ~90	   	   ~1,200	   	   	   7%	   	   	   ~0.64	   	   ~0.11	  
Total	  all	  countriese)	   919	   946	   1,033	   	   ~7,800	   	   	   13%	   	   	   ~6.8f)	   	   ~1.8	  
	  
Sources:	  DNB	  (unpublished	  data),	  UNCTAD	  (2006),	  authors’	   calculations.	  Notes:	   a)	   20%	  of	   total	  Central	  
America	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  Caribbean;	  b)	  35%	  of	  total	  Asia	  excluding	  Middle	  East	  and	  Japan	  (JP)	  to	  correct	  
for	  Singapore	  (SG),	  Rep.	  of	  Korea	  (KR),	  Taiwan	  (TW),	  and	  Hong	  Kong	  (HK);	  c)	  Estimate	  1:	  assuming	  5%-­‐
point	  of	  taxes	  missed	  on	  15%	  return	  on	   investment	  on	   inward	  FDI	  stocks;	   d)	  Estimate	  2:	  assuming	  €1	  bn	  
missed	   through	   financing	   constructions,	   proportional	   to	   non-­‐equity	   stocks	   per	   region,	   and	   €0.8	   bn	  
through	  royalties,	  proportional	  to	  total	  royalty	  payments	  per	  region;	  e)	  excluding	  SPEs	  and	  other	  FDI	  in	  
the	  Netherlands;	  f)	  based	  on	  all	  countries	  excluding	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  Luxembourg;	  g)	  estimate	  cannot	  
be	  calculated	  due	  to	  data	  problems.	  	  
 
                                                        
37  Total inward FDI stocks in mainland Central America and in the Caribbean, from all origins worldwide, 
are roughly of the same size. However, it may be expected that SPEs have relatively large investments in 
tax havens, and therefore it has been conservatively assumed that only 20% of SPE investment in the 
region is in mainland Central America, where it is strongly concentrated in Mexico. 
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Dutch investments by non-SPE companies.38 Using these benchmarks, it has been 
conservatively assumed that the other countries in the region, including China and India, 
receive only 35% of total SPE investment in the region. 
 It is interesting to compare the investments of SPEs in developing countries with the 
total inward FDI stocks in these countries. The total stocks are shown in the column 
‘Total FDI 2005’ and the proportion of total investment for each region that is 
channelled through SPEs is shown in the column ‘Share SPEs’. This proportion ranges 
from 6% for Africa to 11% for Central America. On average, some 7% of all foreign 
investments in the main developing regions is held through Dutch SPEs. As a point of 
reference, the bottom row of the table shows the total for all countries worldwide 
excluding the Netherlands itself. 
 Estimating missed tax revenues requires a few further assumptions. For a relatively 
simple estimate, it is assumed that the pre-tax return on investment on operations in 
developing countries is 15%. This is in line with historical data (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 
18).39 It is further assumed that missed tax revenues amount to 5% of this pre-tax return, 
which is the same as assuming that on average the effective corporate tax rate abroad is 
lowered by 5 percentage points. This percentage can only be estimated. In some cases, 
missed tax revenues may be lower for example because certain arrangements involving 
SPEs are not that effective or because tax avoidance may be unevenly distributed among 
regions. Multinationals may also benefit from local tax breaks that should not be 
attributed to the SPEs, they may use other tax avoidance mechanisms (such as transfer 
mispricing) that do not involve Dutch SPEs, or they may use SPEs to avoid tax in the 
home rather than the host country. However, as the main purpose of SPEs is to reduce 
the total tax burden of multinational corporations, it is expected that as a consequence of 
conduit structures multinationals are able to lower the effective corporate tax rate paid in 
developing countries by 15 to 25 percentage points (equal to full tax avoidance). An 
average of 5% missed tax revenue seems a reasonable assumption. 
 The net gain to multinationals is always lower than the taxes missed in developing 
countries, due to the costs of tax planning and the lower tax charges that arise in other 
countries to which income is shifted. The latter include more than €1 billion of tax on 
the operational margins of SPEs in the Netherlands. The total missed tax revenues in all 
other countries worldwide must therefore be at least €1 billion and probably several 
times more. The simple estimate described above implies total missed tax revenues 
worldwide of €6.8 billion, of which some €640 million in developing regions. The 
estimate is shown in the table as ‘Tax missed, Est. 1’. The table also includes a second 
estimate, based on more complex assumptions and calculations that are explained in 
                                                        
38  DNB statistics, Table 12.6.4 (previously Table 5.6d), Direct investment abroad (stocks), accessed 12 Oct 
2006; UNCTAD (2006). 
39  Total income on FDI received by SPEs was approximately 5%. The income reported by SPEs does not 
consist of pre-tax profits, however, but of interest and royalty payments and of dividends and capital gains 
from after-tax profits. 
	  ·∙	  80	  ·∙	  
2	   Incoherence	  between	  tax	  and	  development	  policies	  
Annex 2.1, shown as ‘Tax missed, Est. 2’. This estimate only takes into account tax 
avoidance strategies that involve royalty and interest payments and yields a more 
conservative figure of €110 million of missed tax revenues in developing regions. 
Taking into account that total missed taxes worldwide must be well over €1 billion, it is 
in fact a minimum estimate. Both estimates assume that the revenue effect of lower 
effective taxes is not substantially offset by increased foreign investment, as discussed 
above. 
 Only part of the missed tax revenues would be recovered were the Netherlands to 
take effective measures to eliminate possibilities for aggressive international tax 
avoidance. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is sometimes argued that without the 
international tax avoidance opportunities offered by the Netherlands, the investments in 
developing countries would not have taken place in the first place. However, it can be 
expected that this only has a marginal effect because tax considerations are usually of 
secondary importance in international investment decisions. Secondly, and more 
importantly, if harmful conduit and group financing structures would no longer be 
possible via the Netherlands, multinationals would change their tax planning strategies 
and use entities in other countries, such as Luxembourg, to achieve the same effect. 
 
 
2.6 Coherence	  with	  development	  policy	  
2.6.1 Dutch	   development	   policy	   and	   previous	   studies	   on	   tax	   and	  
development	  
The Netherlands aims to enhance coherence of government policy in other areas with its 
policy on development cooperation. Tax policy is highly relevant in this respect. The 
Dutch government is committed to providing high levels of donor financing, and its 
ODA expenditures have been fixed at 0.8% of GNP. Part of this sum is directly provided 
to governments of developing countries as bilateral budget support and as debt relief. 
Enabling multinationals to avoid taxes in developing countries, which lowers 
government revenues in these countries, therefore seems inconsistent with high levels of 
ODA to raise these budgets. There is also a more direct link between tax policy and the 
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), aimed at halving extreme poverty by 
2015. Tax issues related to MDG 8 and more specifically to two of the seven more 
concrete targets that have been set for MDG 8, on the financial system and on debt 
problems.40 Almost by definition, international tax issues form an integral part of a 
financial system that is supportive of development and of a comprehensive solution for 
the debt problems of developing countries.  
 In the past, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already paid some attention to 
tax issues in development policy, especially from 2001 to 2004. In 2001, the Erasmus 
                                                        
40  These are MDG Target 12 and Target 15. 
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University Rotterdam prepared a position paper on tax competition among developing 
countries for the Ministry (Bols et al., 2001). The main conclusion of the paper is that 
tax incentives are not usually a decisive factor for multinationals when deciding whether 
or not to invest in a certain developing country, so they are usually ineffective. In 
January 2002, two months before the Financing for Development Conference in 
Monterrey, Mexico, former Minister for Development Cooperation Herfkens referred to 
this in a speech: 
 
“More state financing – ODA – cannot be the only response. We also need to work out 
more incentives for the middle income countries [MICs]. (…) But the MICs also have to 
do their own homework and revise present practices. I recently learned from an Oxfam 
report that development countries lose large amounts of income because of the so-called 
fiscal measures (tax holiday). (…) The developing countries should realize that foreign 
investors first of all consider the enabling environment before deciding on investment. 
They will not deny the fiscal advantages but this is not what will attract them” 
(Herfkens, 2002). 
 
A major initiative on taxation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came in 2003, when 
it commissioned two major studies on tax policy and Dutch relations with developing 
countries. One study was conducted by the International Bureau on Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD) and focussed on tax treaties and tax administrations in 
developing countries (IBFD, 2004). The conclusions of the study included the 
following: 
§ “Generally the attribution of taxing rights in a tax treaty will limit the taxing rights 
of developing countries (…) and may thus lead to (…) a short-term budgetary 
loss.(…) 
§ A tax treaty can be viewed by the developing country as an important tool to 
promote its investment climate by providing foreign investors with more certainty 
about the tax consequences of their investment (…). Such improvements may 
generate additional foreign investment and employment and thus lead to increased 
tax revenue by way of additional corporate taxes, wage taxes, and sales taxes; 
§ Tax treaties are important instruments for tax administrations to counter tax 
avoidance and evasion through exchange of information and mutual assistance in 
the collection of taxes; 
§ Finally, it may be important from a political point of view for developing countries 
to conclude tax treaties (…) to strengthen international co-operation.” 
 
The study also notes that in view of the lack of quantitative data, it is difficult to draw a 
definitive conclusion from the qualitative analysis, but it can safely be assumed that the 
hundreds of tax treaties that developing countries have concluded with developed 
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countries indicate that many developing countries on balance attribute positive effects to 
these treaties. 
 The other study was again conducted by the Erasmus University, and focussed on 
tax incentives offered by developing countries and income shifting through transfer 
pricing in trade with the Netherlands. With regard to tax competition, the study 
concludes that tax incentives might in theory be effective in attracting certain types of 
valuable FDI that are relatively tax sensitive, but in practice such considerations are not 
taken into account by developing countries when granting tax incentives, which makes 
them largely ineffective (Muller et al., 2004). The research finds little evidence of 
transfer pricing manipulation in trade with the Netherlands at the expense of developing 
countries. Although at the global level transfer mispricing is one of most important 
mechanisms for tax avoidance and evasion, this result might have been expected, 
because the relatively small differences in statutory tax rates do not allow large gains 
from transfer mispricing in trade with the Netherlands.  
 With hindsight, it is striking that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned 
elaborate studies on all main tax issues relevant to developing countries, except tax 
avoidance through financing and royalty constructions. It is remarkable that even the 
IBFD study on tax treaties left out these issues, while they may be the single largest 
source of concern with regard to the coherence of Dutch government policy on tax and 
development. Other studies on tax and financing for development (e.g. Martens, 2007) 
tend to overlook these particular issues as well. 
 It seems that after 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not consider Dutch tax 
policy and international tax issues in general as highly important policy areas for 
development. Apparently, this is partly a result of the findings from the studies 
conducted by the IBFD and Erasmus University, which did not indicate any 
inconsistency between tax and development policy. In its MDG 8 progress reports of 
2004 and 2006, the Ministry did not mention Dutch policy on tax issues (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004, 2006).  
 Since 2007, though, the Ministry has again been paying increasing attention to 
coherence between tax and development policies. At the global level, the importance of 
tax revenues for development financing and the need for international cooperation in tax 
matters have been highlighted at the follow-up conference on Financing for 
Development, which took place end 2008. After the conference, the Dutch Ministry 
participated in the launch of the International Tax Compact (ITC), for example. The ITC 
is an initiative to strengthen international cooperation with developing countries to 
combat tax evasion and avoidance. In April 2009, the Ministry also joined the Task 
Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, which advocates transparency 
of tax-relevant information in the global financial system. 
 At the national level, policy coherence remains a challenge. In the first half of 2009, 
the Netherlands is preparing new legislation regarding the taxation of interest payments 
of multinationals. The new legislation may have substantial effects on the international 
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tax planning of multinationals and the Ministry of Finance announced it would take into 
account ‘consequences for the relations’ with countries that have a tax treaty with the 
Netherlands (Ministry of Finance, 2008), which include several developing countries. 
However, so far there are no indications that the Ministry of Finance will also consider 
the effects on tax revenues for those countries themselves. 
 
2.6.2 Causes	  of	  policy	  incoherence	  
Although no specific written policy of the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation 
on tax revenues in developing countries could be found, the facilitation of aggressive 
corporate tax avoidance can be considered incoherent with bilateral budget support and 
the general commitment of the Dutch government to MDG 8. The causes for this policy 
incoherence will now be analysed, applying the three dimensions of the analytical 
framework presented in the section on PCD. 
 First, the lack of PCD appears to be largely unintended. Many typical aspects of the 
Dutch international tax regime, including the participation exemption and the relatively 
large network of tax treaties, result from historical and country-specific factors. The 
Netherlands is a small country and its economy has always had a strong international 
focus. Tax policies have been supportive of international investment, especially outward 
investment by Dutch multinationals. Furthermore, many aspects are not harmful by 
themselves, but in combination they allow for international arbitration opportunities. 
The Dutch group financing regime and the proposed new measure to replace it are 
important exceptions. These tax facilities are intentionally attracting interest income that 
would otherwise be taxed abroad and policy makers must be aware of consequences for 
other countries. 
 Apart from tax revenues, attracting conduit entities and financing operations 
generates economic activity. The Netherlands is actively competing for such operations 
with Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the UK. Recent studies show that 
trust services and related financial and legal services generate approximately 3,000 jobs 
and a turnover of nearly €500 million in the Netherlands. Compared to other types of 
headquarters, though, this is relatively low (Gostelie et al., 2008; Van den Berg et al., 
2008). 
 More explicitly, in a debate in the Dutch Senate and in meetings with the Ministry 
of Finance, it was emphasised that Dutch tax policies were never intended to harm 
developing countries. Any harmful effects for those countries are generally referred to as 
unintended, unwanted side effects. 
 Second, the incoherence is structural in nature rather that temporary. The interest of 
large multinationals to minimise their global tax burden through profit shifting is 
inherently conflicting with the interest of developing countries to increase their tax 
revenues. The Ministry of Finance is mainly concerned about the Dutch investment 
climate and has a track record of actively attracting financing activities of large 
multinationals. 
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 Third, the lack of PCD appears to have both institutional and political causes. 
Currently institutional shortcomings are dominant, because neither the Ministry of 
Finance nor the Ministry of Development Cooperation systematically assesses the 
impact of Dutch tax policies on developing countries. However, if institutional 
arrangements to compare policy goals and impacts were present, this would expose the 
inherently conflicting policy priorities of the development and finance departments and 
could therefore reinforce the political barriers to PCD. 
 
2.6.3 Other	  donor	  countries	  
For various other donor countries, there are comparable challenges regarding coherence 
between tax and development policy. However, while relevant development objectives 
are largely the same, the nature of the tax policies that are conflicting with these 
development objectives differs per country. Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Ireland host 
many conduit entities similar to Dutch SPEs that may facilitate corporate tax avoidance 
in developing countries. Belgium and Switzerland also offer low effective tax rates for 
financing companies. The effects are similar to those of the Dutch special tax facilities 
for financing operations. 
 Furthermore, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, and Switzerland provide banking 
secrecy, a traditional tax haven practice that does not exist in the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands serves as a tax haven for large multinationals only, facilitating tax 
avoidance without assisting illegal practices. In contrast, countries providing banking 
secrecy facilitate tax evasion and corruption, both of which are illegal, by rich 
individuals as well multinational firms. The related areas of policy incoherence would 
therefore be broader than for the Netherlands. 
 Finally, the US, UK, Canada, and Norway have allegedly intervened to undermine 
efforts of African host countries to raise tax revenues from foreign mining operations 
(Open Society Institute et al., 2009). From the donor country perspective, the donors’ 
economic interests rather than their tax policies are conflicting with development goals 
in this case. However, the impact on tax revenues in developing countries is 
immediately apparent and the lack of PCD is clearly intended, which highlights the need 
for stronger political commitment and better institutional arrangements to address policy 
incoherence. 
 
2.7 Conclusions	  and	  discussion	  
This chapter described the tax haven characteristics of the Netherlands and the 
operations of Dutch conduit and financing entities of multinational corporations. It can 
be concluded that the negative effects of Dutch tax policy for developing countries are 
potentially very large. On the basis of limited data, it is roughly estimated that SPEs 
assist in avoiding €640 million of tax revenues per year in developing regions. A more 
	  ·∙	  85	  ·∙	  
conservative estimate arrives at €100 million per year. More precise estimations would 
require more detailed SPE data. The positive effects of Dutch tax policy, mainly 
consisting of increased investment in developing countries, are relatively small because 
tax considerations play a secondary role only in investment decisions. 
 Apart from being a tax haven for large multinationals, the Netherlands is also a 
donor country for international development. As such, it supports Millennium 
Development Goal 8 to develop an international financial system that is supportive of 
poverty reduction. In 2006, the Dutch government provided €4.3 billion in Official 
Development Assistance. Compared to this aid budget, the estimated amount of tax 
avoidance facilitated by the Netherlands is substantial. 
 It can be concluded that Dutch tax policy is incoherent with Dutch policy on 
development cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs already recognised the 
coherence aspect of tax policy and development policy in the past. However, it appears 
that the large role of SPEs in tax avoidance and the associated amount of missed tax 
revenues in developing countries have largely escaped attention until recently. The lack 
of policy coherence is therefore unintended, which is related to the lack of institutional 
arrangements to align tax and development policies. However, the causes of policy 
incoherence are also structural and political in nature.  
 Finally, it should be recognised that tax avoidance is an international problem. If the 
Netherlands were to eliminate opportunities for harmful tax avoidance while other 
countries, such as Luxembourg and Switzerland, continue to offer similar possibilities, a 
large part of the missed tax revenues would not be recovered. Furthermore, various other 
donor countries have domestic tax laws or allegedly advocated tax policies in 
developing countries that are incoherent with development goals as well. It would 
therefore be desirable that initiatives promoting policy coherence for development pay 
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Annex	  2.1	   Estimate	  of	  missed	  tax	  revenues	  
The second estimate of missed tax revenues shown in Table 2.1 is taken from Weyzig 
and Van Dijk (2007). It distinguishes different tax avoidance strategies and their relation 
to the financing structure of subsidiaries. 
 One tax avoidance strategy is the use of royalties and license fees to shift income to 
tax havens. In 2005, total receipts of SPEs for exports of services were €9.5 billion and 
total expenditures for imports of services were €10.2 billion.41 It may be assumed that 
some €8 billion, the largest part of these flows, reflects conduit activities for royalties 
and license fees. It is further assumed that some €4 billion of these flows are paid 
onwards to pure tax havens and the rest to non-havens. If royalties are paid to a foreign 
affiliate to shift income out of a country, the payment is tax deductible, but additional 
withholding taxes may arise. Assuming a statutory corporate tax rate of 30% and a 
withholding tax of 10%, missed tax revenues would amount to 20 per cent of the flows 
to pure tax havens. This results in an estimate of missed tax revenues of €0.8 billion. 
The use of Dutch royalty conduits need not be related to investment positions of Dutch 
SPEs, because payments for the use of intangible property can also be collected from 
companies that are not owned or financed by Dutch SPEs. Therefore it would be more 
appropriate to assume that missed taxes per country due to royalty conduit structures are 
proportional to a country’s total payments of royalties and license fees to abroad. To 
calculate these proportions, statistics on national payments for royalties and license fees 
in 2003 are used. These are taken from the balance of payment data in the UNCTAD 
Handbook of Statistics (2005). 2003 was the latest year for which more or less 
comprehensive data were available. 
 There will be further missed taxes due to financing constructions. The size of flows 
associated with financing conduits may be derived from the loans from tax havens to 
Dutch SPEs, which are then onlent to subsidiaries worldwide. Direct data on interest 
income of SPEs are not available, because they are included in the same item on the 
balance of payments with SPEs as dividends and capital gains. Debt financing from 
companies in Central America and the Caribbean to Dutch SPEs was €59 billion in 
2005. However, part of these stocks may reflect investments from mainland Central 
America. This share is unlikely to be large, given the size of total outward FDI stocks 
from Mexico and Panama and the negligible outward FDI stocks of other mainland 
countries (UNCTAD, 2006). Therefore it can be conservatively assumed that loans from 
Caribbean tax havens to Dutch SPEs were €50 billion. Assuming six per cent interest on 
these loans when they are lent onwards, and missed tax revenues amounting to 20 per 
cent of these flows (similar to royalty flows), the missed tax revenues due to financing 
conduits would be €0.6 billion. 
 There will be similar financing effects from other tax havens, such as the Channel 
Islands that are grouped together with Russia and Eastern Europe in ‘other Europe’ in 
                                                        
41  Data from DNB Tables T12.1 and T12.13 (previously T5.1 and T5.14), 
http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=uk&todo=Balans (Accessed 4 May 2007). 
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the DNB data, and from the Dutch GFA regime. Together these are estimated at €0.4 
billion. This is again rather conservative. According to the Dutch government, the 
additional government revenues from the GFA regime were €225 million per year.42 
These are the revenues from tax on the interest income of group financing companies 
using the GFA regime that would otherwise not be present in the Netherlands. The 
effective tax rate on this income is probably between 5% and 10%, depending on the use 
of certain reserves. Thus, if the additional tax revenue for the Dutch government is €225 
million per year, the interest income must be at least €2.25 billion per year. The missed 
tax revenues elsewhere due to the GFA regime alone might therefore well be higher than 
the conservative estimate of €0.4 billion mentioned above. It is assumed that missed tax 
due to financing constructions is proportional to SPE debt financing stocks in a region 
instead of total SPE investment stocks.  
 Adding up these royalty and financing constructions yields the second estimate 
shown in the table. This estimate is more conservative with total tax avoidance of €1.8 
billion, and taking into account that total missed taxes worldwide must be well over €1 
billion, it is in fact a minimum estimate. It also yields a more conservative distribution 
over regions, with developing regions carrying a smaller proportion of the burden. Thus, 
developing regions are missing at least €100 million of tax revenues per year due to tax 
avoidance strategies of multinationals involving Dutch SPEs. 
                                                        
42  Parliamentary record 30 107 No. 2, Fiscaal Vestigingsklimaat, Nota Werken aan winst: Naar een laag 
tarief en een brede grondslag [Fiscal business climate, Memorandum Working on profit: Towards a low 
rate and a broad base], 29 Apr 2005, p. 22. 
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Abstract  Many multinationals divert Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through 
conduit countries that have a favourable tax treaty network, to avoid host country 
withholding taxes. This is referred to as tax treaty shopping. The Netherlands is the 
world’s largest conduit country; in 2009, multinationals held approximately 
€1,600 billion of FDI via the Netherlands. This chapter uses micro data from 
Dutch Special Purpose Entities to analyse geographical patterns and structural 
determinants of FDI diversion. Regression analysis confirms that tax treaties are a 
key determinant of FDI routed through the Netherlands. The effect of tax treaties on 
FDI diversion partly arises from the reduction of dividend withholding tax rates, 
which provides strong evidence for tax treaty shopping. 
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3.1 Introduction	  
Tax treaty shopping is a particular form of tax avoidance by multinational corporations. 
It involves the diversion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through a third country to 
achieve reduction of withholding taxes under favourable tax treaties (Kingson, 1981). 
Most countries levy withholding taxes on outgoing dividends and interest payments to 
foreign affiliates. Tax treaties reduce or eliminate these withholding taxes on a bilateral 
basis, thus providing an advantage to foreign investors from the partner country. When 
multinationals engage in treaty shopping, they may obtain benefits that a host country 
would otherwise not provide to them. 
 This chapter analyses how tax treaties and other structural determinants influence 
the diversion of FDI. Only a few other articles have analysed treaty shopping before, 
using micro data from a single home or host country (Collins & Shackelford, 1998; 
Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008). This study contributes to existing literature by 
presenting the first empirical analysis of worldwide FDI routed through a specific third 
country. It is also the first academic study that uses micro data from Dutch Special 
Purpose Entities (SPEs). The results provide strong evidence for tax treaty shopping via 
the Netherlands, which is relevant for international tax policies. The findings have major 
implications for further research on tax treaties and other research using bilateral FDI 
data as well. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 provides background on treaty 
shopping and discusses related research. Next, Section 3.3 describes the Dutch micro 
data and geographical patterns of FDI routed through the Netherlands. Section 3.4 uses 
regression analysis to identify determinants of FDI diversion. Section 3.5 presents 
conclusions, policy implications and a discussion of limitations to this study. 
 
 
3.2 Background	  on	  treaty	  shopping	  and	  FDI	  diversion	  
3.2.1 Tax	  treaties	  and	  treaty	  shopping	  
In theory, the main purpose of tax treaties is to remove tax barriers to international 
economic activity. Tax treaties prevent double taxation by allocating taxing rights 
between the host country, where the income arises, and the home country, where the 
beneficiary of the income resides. This provides legal certainty to foreign investors. 
Withholding tax reductions limit the taxing rights of the host country and are a core 
element of tax treaties. 
 In practice, many countries have also adopted unilateral measures to prevent double 
taxation, such as a tax credit or exemption for income that has been taxed abroad. Where 
such unilateral measures exist, tax treaties merely confirm these. Some argue that 
treaties may still signal that the host country is committed to international investment 
rules (Barthel, Busse, Krever, et al., 2010). This is especially relevant for developing 
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countries. However, the reputation of a country’s tax administration may be more 
important than the number of treaties in place and the value of legal certainty should not 
be exaggerated (Thuronyi, 2010). Some treaties also serve specific purposes other than 
attracting FDI (Pistone, 2010). Nonetheless, tax treaties do offer benefits to foreign 
investors. An example is a reduced withholding tax on dividends paid to a parent in a 
country that exempts these dividends from tax. In this case, the withholding tax cannot 
be recovered by the company and the reduced rate is a real benefit. 
 Tax treaties themselves do not provide a formal definition of treaty shopping. 
However, Article 22 of the 2006 US model treaty, on anti-treaty shopping provisions, 
provides an implicit description: ‘residents of third countries […] benefiting from what 
is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries’.43 For the purpose of 
this research, tax treaty shopping is defined more specifically as the diversion of FDI 
through an intermediate country to achieve reduction of withholding taxes under 
favourable tax treaties (Kingson, 1981). To this effect, a tax treaty must exist between 
the host and intermediate country (Kandev, 2009; OECD, 1986). Diverted FDI is 
defined as FDI into an intermediate country that is then reinvested as FDI in another 
country.44 The investment may pass through various entities in the intermediate country 
and undergo transformations, for example from an intra-group loan into an equity 
investment.45 This definition excludes investments that entities in the intermediate 
country finance by issuing bonds or obtaining other external funding themselves. 
 Tax treaty shopping has received substantial attention in legal analyses since the 
early 1980s. Many of these focus on the use of Dutch conduit entities and on attempts of 
the US to limit tax avoidance via conduit structures. They generally regard the 
Netherlands as a key intermediate country, mainly due to its extensive and favourable 
tax treaty network (Avi-Yonah, 2009; Dolan & Walsh Weil, 1995; Kingson, 1981; 
Wacker, 1993). 
 Certain clauses in tax treaties can inhibit treaty shopping. One type, limitation on 
benefits (LOB), specifies detailed objective criteria that an investor must meet to qualify 
for treaty benefits. These criteria exclude conduit entities. Before 2007, the only Dutch 
tax treaty with LOB was the Netherlands-US treaty. A second type, a main purpose test, 
is subjective and denies treaty benefits if an investment relation is established or 
maintained mainly for the purpose of securing these benefits. This clause is more 
common, but may be difficult to apply, because the host country tax authority would 
need to assess the operations of foreign entities to determine their purpose. Before 2007, 
                                                        
43  The Dutch Ministry of Finance provides a similar description in its 2011 memorandum on tax treaty 
policy: “a resident of a third country gains access to a treaty benefit that is not intended for this person”. 
44  Between the ultimate home and host countries, FDI may be diverted several times. 
45  This is similar to the definition of a “conduit arrangement” in the 2008 amendment to the UK-
Switzerland tax treaty. 
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a main purpose test for dividends was included in 17 Dutch tax treaties.46 Since 2007, 
the Netherlands includes a main purpose test or LOB in new and amended tax treaties 
more often.47 
 Host countries generally disapprove of treaty shopping, because it breaches the 
principle of reciprocity and treaty benefits are not intended for investors from third 
countries (Kandev, 2009; Lee, 2009; OECD, 1986). Indeed, some developing countries 
regard treaty shopping as a major challenge for the taxation of multinational firms 
(Heggstad, 2011). This raises the question why many countries, including most Dutch 
treaty partners, conclude treaties without anti-treaty shopping provisions. Legal cases 
illustrate that these countries, too, find treaty shopping abusive. Examples are the 
Prévost case in Canada, involving a Dutch conduit (Kandev, 2009), and the Andolan 
case in India, involving a Mauritian conduit (Baistrocchi, 2008). However, these cases 
do confirm that a tax treaty allows treaty shopping unless it contains explicit 
countermeasures. 
 To date, there exist only a few empirical economic studies on treaty shopping. 
Collins and Shackelford (1998) examine the effect of withholding and home country 
taxes on cross border payments between foreign affiliates of US firms. They find that 
internal dividend and interest flows are structured in such a way as to mitigate taxes and 
conclude that the results are consistent with treaty shopping. A key difference with this 
study is that Collins and Shackelford use income flow data instead of data on diverted 
capital stock. The different methodologies make the results difficult to compare. 
Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) provide the only direct evidence of treaty shopping so 
far. They show that higher bilateral withholding taxes to and from Germany 
substantially increase the probability that outward and inward FDI is diverted via a third 
country. A key difference with this study is that Weichenrieder and Mintz analyse the 
probability that multinationals use a conduit entity rather than the proportion of diverted 
FDI stock. 
 
3.2.2 Tax	  treaties	  and	  FDI	  
Other studies have analysed the effect of tax treaties on bilateral FDI without accounting 
for the possibility of treaty shopping. All these studies use gravity models with dummy 
variables for the existence of tax treaties. From a development perspective, the main 
question behind these studies is whether developing countries gain from concluding tax 
                                                        
46  These include the treaties with Croatia, Egypt, Estonia, Jordan, Lithuania, Malta, and Tunisia. In these 
treaties, the main purpose test apparently serves to prevent avoidance of Dutch withholding tax, because 
the partner countries do not levy any withholding tax on dividends. 
47  The new or amended treaties with Panama, Hong Kong (HK), Japan, and Barbados (BB) include a LOB 
clause. Those with the United Arab Emirates (AE), Bahrain (BH), Qatar (QA), the UK, Mexico, and 
South Africa contain a main purpose test. In some cases, notably AE, BB, BH, HK, and QA, this targets 
treaty shopping of foreign investment in the Netherlands rather than treaty shopping of foreign investment 
in other countries via Dutch conduit entities. The new or amended treaties with Ghana, Azerbaijan, and 
Saudi Arabia do not include anti-treaty shopping provisions. 
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treaties due to higher inward FDI that more than compensates for the tax benefits 
granted to foreign investors, such as the lowering of withholding tax rates. 
 A few studies use micro data. One study using US firm data finds that tax treaties do 
not make investments in a country more attractive (Louie & Rousslang, 2008). By 
contrast, a study using Swedish firm data finds that the probability of establishing a 
foreign subsidiary is higher in countries that have a tax treaty with Sweden. However, it 
finds no effect on the total sales of all Swedish firms in a country, suggesting that tax 
treaties do not increase overall economic activity (Davies et al., 2009). 
 Several other studies use macro data from the US, which cover a wide range of 
partner countries. Early studies found that US outbound FDI does not increase because 
of tax treaties (Blonigen & Davies, 2004) or renegotiations of existing treaties (Davies, 
2003). However, newer studies find some heterogeneous effects. Neumayer (2007) finds 
that tax treaties increase FDI to middle income countries, but not to low income 
countries. Millimet and Kumas (2008) find positive effects for country pairs that initially 
have relatively low bilateral investment and negative effects for country pairs that 
already have relatively high investment. 
 Some other studies use bilateral FDI data from the OECD or UNCTAD. These data 
sets cover a range of home as well as host countries, but data quality is generally poor 
(Zhan, 2006), which may affect results. Broader data sets facilitate methods that control 
for the endogeneity of concluding a tax treaty. This is an important issue to the gravity 
models: two countries may decide to conclude a tax treaty because they have close 
economic relations, rather than bilateral FDI following the conclusion of a treaty. 
However, even if FDI grows faster after a treaty has been signed, this does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship. Broad economic reforms of low and middle 
income countries that opened up to foreign investors may explain both the increasing 
number of tax treaties and the rise in FDI (Barthel, Busse, Krever, et al., 2010). Even the 
more advanced studies, using broad data sets and controlling for endogeneity, may 
therefore not provide conclusive evidence that certain FDI patterns are the result of tax 
treaties. 
 Blonigen and Davies (2008) distinguish between old and new treaties. Old treaties 
were mainly concluded between economies with strong historical ties and therefore 
largely endogenous. The authors find that old treaties are associated with higher and new 
treaties with lower FDI. This result seems consistent with the heterogeneous results 
mentioned above, because old treaties were probably concluded between countries with 
relatively high existing investments and with middle rather than low income countries. 
Newer studies with broad data sets use more advanced methods to control for 
endogeneity, producing mixed results. Egger et al. (2006) find negative effects of tax 
treaties on FDI, whereas Coupé et al. (2008) find no significant effects. Barthel et al. 
(2010), who use a dataset with extended coverage of developing countries, find positive 
effects, including for FDI into low income countries when controlling for endogeneity. 
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Siegman (2007) also finds positive effects. Thus, results regarding the effect of tax 
treaties on bilateral FDI have been mixed. 
 Researchers that found insignificant or negative effects have attributed these to FDI-
reducing aspects of tax treaties, such as enhanced transfer pricing regulation, exchange 
of information between tax authorities, and anti-treaty shopping provisions (Blonigen & 
Davies, 2008; Davies et al., 2009). However, this explanation seems inconsistent with 
the diversion of FDI through third countries to take advantage of tax treaties. Leaving 
aside data flaws, an alternative explanation would be that tax treaties facilitate 
repatriation of income from foreign subsidiaries. These transactions are recorded as 
negative FDI inflows, because they reduce the capital of subsidiaries, offsetting positive 
FDI inflows related to new investments. Thus, tax treaties may increase FDI flows 
between parents and subsidiaries in both directions, and it is not self-evident whether the 
balance will be positive, neutral, or negative.  
 If tax treaties increase bilateral FDI, this may to some extent result from treaty 
shopping (Thuronyi, 2010). The diversion of inward FDI from non-treaty countries 
through treaty countries affects the apparent origin of investments. The UK Office for 
National Statistics calls this the ‘Netherlands effect’, although it occurs for other 
countries as well (Wilkie, 2010). FDI diversion via a treaty country leads to 
overestimation of the effect of the treaty on bilateral FDI originating from that country 
itself. Furthermore, after a host country concludes additional treaties, new investments 
might no longer be diverted. This increases the apparent effect of new treaties. However, 
changes in investment route do not affect total inward FDI from all countries combined. 
Only Neumayer (2007) has analysed the effect of tax and investment treaties on total 
FDI. He finds that tax treaties increase FDI to middle income countries, but not to low 
income countries. Most studies are not robust to treaty shopping, though, which makes 
empirical results on treaty shopping highly relevant. 
 
3.2.3 Alternative	  reasons	  for	  FDI	  diversion	  
For the analysis of FDI diversion, it is important to distinguish conduit entities from so-
called base companies and mixing companies. The last two are used by multinationals 
from home countries that tax the income of foreign subsidiaries, such as the US.48 The 
tax on this income is usually offset by a tax credit equal to the tax already paid abroad 
and thus arises only if the foreign tax rate is lower. Furthermore, the tax is normally 
deferred until the income is repatriated in the form of dividends. If a multinational 
invests abroad via a base company in an intermediate country, it can reinvest the income 
of subsidiaries via the base company and avoid the home country tax (Desai et al., 
2003). A multinational can also use an intermediate holding to mix dividends from low-
tax and high-tax countries. This allows to offset taxes paid in different countries against 
                                                        
48  The UK and Japan recently switched from credit to exemption systems for foreign dividend income, but 
many structures set up in response to past tax rules are still in place. 
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each other when the dividends are paid onwards to the ultimate parent, which may not 
be possible if the ultimate parent holds the subsidiaries directly (Dolan & Walsh Weil, 
1995). 
 Thus, dividend conduits aim to avoid withholding taxes levied by host countries, 
whereas base and mixing companies take withholding taxes into account as well but 
primarily aim to avoid home country taxes. Base and mixing companies are established 
in countries that exempt foreign dividend income and have a favourable treaty network, 
such as the Netherlands. They can be difficult to distinguish from conduits, because they 
involve similar holding structures. 
 Analogous to tax treaties, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) can also be a reason 
for FDI diversion.49 Investment treaties enhance protection of foreign investors in 
developing or emerging countries against expropriation and unfavourable policy 
changes (Fortanier & Van Tulder, 2007). The Netherlands has a relatively large network 
of almost 100 investment treaties and these contain a broad definition of investors that 
facilitates treaty shopping. As of June 2011, out of approximately 400 claims under 
BITs worldwide, at least 29 cases involved Dutch intermediate holdings with a foreign 
parent or controlling shareholder that sought protection through a Dutch BIT (Van Os & 
Knottnerus, 2011). 
 
3.2.4 Potential	  determinants	  of	  FDI	  diversion	  
On the basis of the literature discussed above, some potential determinants of FDI 
diversion can be identified. First, normal FDI is largely explained by gravity factors and 
this may also apply to diverted FDI. To put it differently, FDI diversion through the 
Netherlands may partly follow the same pattern as normal FDI to and from the 
Netherlands, regardless of treaty benefits. Second, due to tax treaty shopping, one would 
expect that FDI diversion is higher via tax treaty routes that reduce withholding taxes. In 
addition, home country taxation of foreign dividend income probably increases FDI 
diversion because of deferral and mixing strategies. Third, one might expect that FDI 
diversion is higher via investment treaty routes. Fourth, due to signalling effects, a high 
number of tax and investment treaties may reduce the need for protection under a 
specific bilateral treaty and therefore reduce FDI diversion. These potential determinants 
form the basis for the empirical analysis in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                        
49  Investment treaties can also be an important secondary consideration when fiscal reasons are the main 
driver for FDI diversion and various conduit countries offer similar tax benefits. 
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3.3 Description	  of	  FDI	  routed	  through	  the	  Netherlands50	  
3.3.1 Dutch	  conduit	  entities	  
Before presenting the analysis of treaty shopping, this section describes the Dutch micro 
data and geographical patterns of FDI routed through the Netherlands. 
 The Netherlands is the world’s largest conduit country for FDI. At the end of 2009, 
FDI diverted via the Netherlands amounted to approximately €1,600 billion.51 This 
corresponds to 13% of global inward FDI stock. US micro data show that the 
Netherlands hosts more intermediate holdings for outward investments of large US firms 
than any other country (Desai et al., 2003). In addition, German micro data show that the 
Netherlands ranks first in number of intermediate holdings, and second in value of pass-
through investment stock, for FDI to and from Germany (Weichenrieder & Mintz, 
2008). 
 This chapter uses Dutch micro data on conduit entities. These entities are identified 
by the central bank (DNB). By definition, they hold mainly financial or intangible assets 
and most or all of their assets and liabilities are foreign.52 Usually they do not conduct 
real business activities. At the end of 2009, there were approximately 11,500 such 
entities (DNB, 2009b, 2010). The central bank collects detailed survey data on annual 
investment positions and monthly transactions of some 1,000 entities that account for 
approximately 90% of total conduit entity assets. Participation to the surveys is 
obligatory under Dutch law. The analysis mainly uses micro data from 2006 and 2007. 
 Activity codes, establishment dates, and data on ultimate parents of conduit entities 
were not available from the central bank and were obtained from the Reach database of 
Bureau van Dijk.53 Over 60% of conduit entities is a financial holding, according to their 
national activity classification. This corresponds to activities of holding companies 
(activity code 6420) under the European NACE Rev. 2 classification system. 
Furthermore, 30% is registered as not commercially active, meaning that they do not 
conduct business outside the group. Most entities are not just located in the Netherlands 
for historical reasons: 50% was established after 1995 and 95% after 1970. These 
characteristics are consistent with treaty shopping purposes. 
                                                        
50  Access to the anonymised micro data used for this research was obtained from De Nederlandsche Bank in 
cooperation with Statistics Netherlands, subject to DNB's disclosure policies, see 
http://www.dnb.nl/en/statistics/statistische-microdata/index.jsp. The interpretation of the data is solely the 
responsibility of the author. 
51  Calculated as €1,918 bn of conduit entity FDI assets minus €327 bn of securities issued to finance FDI; 
the latter follows from €435 bn of total securities issued by conduit entities minus €108 of debt securities 
issued to finance portfolio assets. This is consistent with the reported €1,650 bn of conduit entity FDI 
liabilities. Source: DNB, http://statistics.dnb.nl, tables 9.1, 12.10 and 12.14 (accessed 19 Sep 2011). 
52  For conduit entities with the same ultimate parent, these criteria apply to the cluster as a whole. 
53  This is a commercial database that integrates data from national company registers. Ultimate parents are 
defined as companies that own an SPE through shareholdings of more than 50% at each step in the 
ownership chain and that are not known to be majority owned by another company. 
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 Some entities belong to the same ultimate parent. Within these clusters, balance 
sheets are consolidated as much as possible by netting out Dutch intra-group equity and 
loan positions. Each cluster or individual conduit entity not belonging to a cluster will be 
referred to as a Special Purpose Entity (SPE), in line with OECD terminology (OECD, 
2008b). After removing some 100 SPEs that hold portfolio investments only, the dataset 
has approximately 525 to 575 SPEs per month. 
 
3.3.2 Parent	  companies	  and	  home	  countries	  
Table 3.1 shows the main individual origin countries for all SPEs in the dataset. The top 
seven countries are the same for direct and ultimate parents and include the largest 
economies. They also include the Netherlands Antilles and Luxembourg, two other 
countries with many intermediate holdings.54 It is remarkable that over 40% of US 
ultimate parents hold their Dutch SPEs indirectly via another country. This figure is 
consistent with Desai et al. (2003). The average proportion for all Dutch SPEs is 
approximately 25%. 
 
3.3.3 Destinations	  of	  diverted	  FDI	  
To analyse diverted FDI stocks, the SPE data require additional processing. 
Approximately 50 SPEs, representing 10% of total assets, belong to a banking group. In 
international investment statistics, cross border loans between SPEs and foreign banks 
are always regarded as external loans, even if the counterparty is affiliated. Yet due to 
the nature of SPE operations, most of these loans are probably intra-group. All loans 
xxxxxxx 
Table	  3.1	   Geographical	  distribution	  of	  parent	  companies	  of	  Dutch	  SPEs	  
Country	   Direct	  parents	   Ultimate	  parents	  
United	  States	   10%	   	   17%	  	  
United	  Kingdom	   13%	   	   13%	  	  
Netherlands	  Antilles	  	   9%	   	   7%	  	  
Luxembourg	   9%	   	   6%	  	  
France	   5%	   	   6%	  	  
Germany	   7%	   	   5%	  	  
Japan	   6%	   	   5%	  	  
Other	  countries	   40%	   	   41%	  	  
Number	  of	  SPEs	   822	   	   680	  	  
Source:	   DNB	   (2009c),	   author’s	   calculations.	   Note:	   the	   table	   includes	   all	   SPEs	   in	   any	   of	   the	   reporting	  
populations	  from	  April	  2003	  to	  December	  2007	  for	  which	  ownership	  data	  were	  available.	  
                                                        
54  The large share of direct parents in the Netherlands Antilles is partly due to historical reasons. The 
number of ultimate parents in these countries is overstated due to incomplete ownership data. 
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Table	  3.2	   Country	  groups	  for	  the	  description	  of	  geographical	  patterns	  
Country	  group	   Description	  
(1)	   Developing	  
without	  treaty	  
38	   low	  and	  67	  middle	   income	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  have	  a	  tax	  treaty	  with	  the	  
Netherlands.	  
(2)	   Developing	  with	  
treaty	  
11	   low	   and	   25	   middle	   income	   countries	   (other	   than	   the	   emerging	   economies	  
below)	   that	   have	   a	   tax	   treaty	   with	   the	   Netherlands.	   These	   countries	   are	  
probably	   most	   vulnerable	   to	   treaty	   shopping,	   because	   they	   have	   limited	  
capacity	  to	  implement	  anti-­‐avoidance	  measures	  and	  a	  relatively	  weak	  position	  in	  
tax	   treaty	   negotiations	   (Pistone	   2010),	   which	   are	   highly	   complex	   (Thuronyi	  
2010).	  
(3)	   BRICSM	   The	  six	  major	  emerging	  economies	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China,	  South	  Africa	  and	  
Mexico.	  All	   six	  have	  a	   tax	   treaty	  with	   the	  Netherlands	  and	   receive	   substantial	  
FDI	   via	   Dutch	   SPEs.	   In	   contrast	   to	   developing	   countries,	   they	   can	   implement	  
advanced	  anti-­‐avoidance	  measures	  and	  negotiate	  tax	  treaties	  with	  high	  income	  
countries	  on	  an	  equal	  basis.	  
(4)	   EU	   All	  EU-­‐27	  countries	  except	  Luxembourg,	  Belgium,	  Ireland,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  
itself.	  Within	   the	  EU,	  no	  withholding	   taxes	  apply	  on	  cross	  border	   transactions	  
with	   affiliated	   entities,	   except	   in	   a	   few	   host	   countries	   with	   transitory	  
arrangements.	  
(5)	   Other	  high	  income	   30	   non-­‐EU	   high	   income	   countries,	   including	   the	   US,	   Japan,	   Hong	   Kong,	   and	  
Singapore.	  17	  of	  these	  had	  a	  tax	  treaty	  with	  the	  Netherlands.	  Hong	  Kong	  singed	  
one	  in	  2010;	  as	  of	  2007,	  it	  was	  the	  only	  high	  income	  territory	  outside	  the	  Dutch	  
tax	  treaty	  network	  where	  Dutch	  SPEs	  had	  substantial	  positions.	  
(6)	   Tax	  haven	  islands	   The	  eight	  tax	  havens	  that	  are	  no	  OECD	  members	  where	  liabilities	  of	  Dutch	  SPEs	  
are	  largest.	  These	  are	  the	  Netherlands	  Antillesa),	  Aruba,	  Bermuda,	  British	  Virgin	  
Islands,	   Cayman	   Islands,	   Guernsey,	   Jersey,	   and	   Puerto	   Rico.b)	   They	   are	   high	  
income	  countries	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  autonomy,	  belonging	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  
the	  Netherlands,	  the	  UK,	  and	  the	  US.	  All	  have	  zero	  corporate	  tax	  regimes.c)	  Only	  
the	  Netherlands	  Antilles	  and	  Aruba	  have	  tax	  treaties	  with	  the	  Netherlands.	  Tax	  
treaties	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  their	  tax	  haven	  dependencies.	  	  
(7)	   OECD	  tax	  havens	   The	   four	   OECD	   member	   countries	   Luxembourg,	   Ireland,	   Belgium	   and	  
Switzerland,	   which	   can	   also	   be	   regarded	   as	   tax	   havens	   for	   multinationals	  
because	   of	   their	   special	   tax	   regimes.d)	   In	   contrast	   to	   tax	   haven	   islands,	   these	  
four	  countries	  have	  many	  tax	  treaties.	  
	  
Notes:	   a)	   In	  2007,	   the	  Netherlands	  Antilles	  consisted	  of	  Curacao,	  where	  most	   financing	  companies	  are	  
located,	   and	   four	   smaller	   islands.	   In	   2010,	   Curacao	   became	   a	   separate	   jurisdiction	   and	   inherited	   the	  
Netherlands	  Antilles’	   tax	   treaty.	   b)	   In	  2007,	  Cyprus	   fell	   just	  outside	   this	  group,	  while	   investments	   from	  
Cyprus	  via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  were	  strongly	   increasing.	   c)	  Bermuda	  and	  Cayman	  Islands	  do	  not	   levy	  corporate	  
income	  tax.	  Puerto	  Rico	  exempted	  US	  manufacturing	  companies	   (Grubert	  &	  Slemrod,	  1998);	   it	  phased	  
out	   this	   regime	  by	   2006	   and	   introduced	   special	   tax	   allowances	   instead.	   In	   2007,	   the	   other	   five	   island	  
havens	   exempted	   international	   financing	   companies.	   d)	   Belgium	   has	   a	   notional	   interest	   deduction	  
scheme	  resulting	   in	   low	  tax	  rates	  for	  equity-­‐funded	  corporations	  that	   lend	  to	  affiliates.	   In	  Switzerland,	  
some	  cantons	  offer	  a	   low-­‐tax	  environment.	  For	  special	   tax	  characteristics	  of	   Ireland	  and	  Luxembourg,	  
see	  Mutti	  and	  Grubert	  (2009).	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between banking group SPEs and foreign banks are therefore reclassified as intra-group 
loans.55 Furthermore, the assets of some SPEs are substantially larger than total 
liabilities plus equity. To make both sides of the balance sheet match, a liability item 
with unknown origin is created where necessary.  
 The description of geographical patterns distinguishes seven country groups on the 
basis of tax, economic and political criteria. The classification also takes into account 
the amount of detail that is allowed by confidentiality requirements. Table 3.2 presents a 
description of the different country groups, which are mutually exclusive. 
 Table 3.3 shows some tax system characteristics of the seven country groups. Note 
that non-EU high income countries on average have a relatively low number of tax 
treaties, but this is because the group includes minor countries with no tax treaties at all, 
such as Equatorial Guinea, Gibraltar, and the Bahamas. The data on average withholding 
taxes56 (WHT) confirm that the standard rates for dividend (div.) and interest (int.) 
payments are substantially higher than the rates for payments to the Netherlands. 
 xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Table	  3.3	   Tax	  system	  characteristics	  and	  inward	  FDI	  positions	  (€	  bn)	  
Country	  group	   Country	  average	  (unweighted)	   	   Total	  for	  country	  group	  




























(1)	  Developing	  without	  treaty	   6	   	   11%	   	   11%	   	   14%	   	   14%	   	   	   309	   19	   	   6%	  
(2)	  Developing	  with	  treaty	   37	   	   11%	   	   5%	   	   14%	   	   7%	   	   	   582	   53	   	   9%	  
(3)	  BRICSM	   63	   	   4%	   	   3%	   	   16%	   	   9%	   	   	   929	   54	   	   6%	  
(4)	  EUa,b)	   64	   	   12%	   	   0%	   	   11%	   	   2%	   	   	   3,420	   710	   	   21%	  
(5)	  Other	  high	  incomea)	   27	   	   12%	   	   4%	   	   11%	   	   7%	   	   	   3,322	   243	   	   7%	  
(6)	  Tax	  haven	  islands	   1	   	   3%	   	   3%	   	   6%	   	   6%	   	   	   91c)	   103	   	   ..c)	  
(7)	  OECD	  tax	  havens	   66	   	   24%	   	   0%	   	   9%	   	   0%	   	   	   831d)	   351	   	   42%e)	  
	   All	  countriesb)	   23	   	   11%	   	   7%	   	   13%	   	   10%	   	   	   9,481	   1,533	   	   16%	  
Sources:	  see	  Table	  3.6.	  Notes:	  Tax	  treaty	  and	  withholding	  tax	  data	  as	  of	  end	  2007,	  average	  of	  end-­‐2006	  
and	   end-­‐2007	   for	   total	   inward	   FDI,	   and	   SPE	   positions	   as	   of	   30	   June	   2007;	   a)	   excluding	   tax	   havens;	   b)	  
excluding	  the	  Netherlands;	  c)	  total	  inward	  FDI	  excluding	  Jersey,	  Guernsey,	  and	  Puerto	  Rico	  because	  data	  
are	  unavailable;	  d)	  €1,501	  bn	  if	  Luxembourg	  SPEs	  are	  included;	  e)	  23%	  if	  Luxembourg	  SPEs	  are	  included.	  
                                                        
55  Also in contrast to investment statistics, capital or loans provided by Dutch SPEs to their foreign parents 
are counted as positive assets, because this describes SPE positions in the most useful way. 
56  WHT data based on 170 countries for which data were available. Most countries and tax treaties define 
various rates. This study uses the maximum rate for large non-financial parent companies that hold a 
controlling stake in the host country entity, are not owned by a government, and are not subject to anti-
avoidance provisions or based in a tax haven. Furthermore, for normal host countries, it disregards special 
rates for companies operating in a particular zone or industry. For tax haven host countries, in contrast, it 
uses the special rates for international financing companies, if applicable. 
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 The last columns show total inward FDI stocks for each country group and 
investments held via Dutch SPEs. In absolute terms, the EU is by far the largest 
destination of Dutch SPE investments. However, diverted FDI in developing countries is 
also substantial, over €70 billion in total. It accounts for 9% of all inward FDI for Dutch 
treaty partners and 6% for other developing countries. The relatively small difference 
between these shares is remarkable, because the tax advantages that can be obtained in 
the absence of a tax treaty are more limited. SPE investments in the second country 
group may still benefit from relatively generous unilateral tax relief or protection under 
investment treaties, though. Dutch SPE investments in BRICSM countries are relatively 
modest, partly due to the well-known use of other conduit countries, notably Hong Kong 
for China and Mauritius for India. 
 
3.3.4 Origin	  and	  destination	  combinations	  
For further analysis, an origin and destination matrix is generated for each SPE by 
proportionally attributing the various country group destinations to the country group 
origins. Next, all matrices are added up to a total matrix for all SPEs combined. The 
general methodology for constructing origin and destination matrices is described in 
Annex 7 to the OECD Benchmark Definition on FDI (OECD, 2008b).57 
 Table 3.4 presents an origin and destination matrix for Dutch SPEs as of 30 June 
2007. The destination dimension includes FDI assets only and distinguishes the seven 
country groups mentioned above. The origin dimension includes all types of financing, 
thus also securities, liabilities to domestic non-SPE affiliates, and obligations to non-
affiliated companies. On the origin side, all developing and emerging economies are 
combined into a single group for confidentiality reasons. Furthermore, there are two 
additional categories: the Netherlands itself, in case of domestic non-SPE affiliates or 
shares issued in the Netherlands; and capital of unknown origin, as explained in the 
previous section. Various cells have been merged for confidentiality reasons.  
 The matrix shows that the EU is by far the largest origin of investments via Dutch 
SPEs. OECD member tax havens are also a large source of SPE funding, partly because 
of debt securities issued by SPEs listed in Luxembourg and Switzerland. Developing 
and emerging economies are mostly net FDI importers and a relatively minor origin of 
Dutch SPE financing. SPE liabilities to and direct investments in non-EU countries that 
do not have a tax treaty with the Netherlands are only 5-10% of the total. The main 
origins and destinations of this kind are British tax haven islands, Puerto Rico, Hong 
Kong, and some developing countries. On the liability side, these positions consist partly 
of loans from tax haven affiliates. The Netherlands does not impose a withholding tax 
on interest payments, so these loans do not require a tax treaty to reduce withholding 
                                                        
57  Some SPEs have negative balance sheet positions. These reflect a negative valuation of investments on 
the assets side or negative net worth reported as negative equity on the liabilities side, for example. The 
matrix calculations include rules to prevent attribution of positive assets to negative liabilities (as a 
negative proportion) and vice versa. 
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Table	  3.4	   Dutch	  SPE	  investments	  by	  direct	  origin	  and	  destination	  (€	  bn)	  
	   	   Direct	  origin	  of	  capital	   	  





















32	   7	   1	   53	  
(3)	   BRICSM	   23	   4	   17	   54	  














	   	  
Total	   32	   636	   220	   120	   344	   96	   85	   1,533	  
Source:	  DNB	  (2009c),	  author’s	  calculations.	  Note:	  Investment	  positions	  as	  of	  30	  June	  2007.	  
 
taxes. On the asset side, SPE investments in non-treaty countries could be motivated by 
unilateral tax relief or investment protection, as explained above. 
 Approximately a quarter of the SPE investments are intra-EU. At present, there are 
no withholding taxes inside the EU that SPE structures may help to avoid. However, 
historical reasons may play a role and some companies may find it convenient to use a 
single structure for investments inside and outside the EU. Finally, a substantial share of 
investments is routed from tax havens via Dutch SPEs into other tax havens. This 
suggests that some Dutch SPEs are part of SPE chains and serve other purposes than tax 
treaty shopping. 
 Table 3.5 presents a different origin and destination matrix that shows the ultimate 
ownership of SPE investments. In this matrix, all SPE assets are attributed to the origin 
of the ultimate parent instead of the origins of direct counterparties. On several points, 
the origin of ultimate parents differs markedly from the direct origin of SPE capital. 
 Investments of unknown origin are much higher, because ultimate parents could not 
always be identified. This problem occurs most often in the case of direct parents in tax 
havens, which tend to be highly secretive. Tax haven islands are a minor ultimate origin, 
because most SPE liabilities in these countries are to affiliated financing entities and 
ultimate parents that could be identified are usually located elsewhere. Ultimate parent 
positions from OECD tax havens are also much smaller than direct counterparty 
positions, partly because of ownership chains and partly because of debt securities listed 
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Table	  3.5	   Dutch	  SPE	  investments	  by	  ultimate	  home	  and	  destination	  (€	  bn)	  
	   	   Origin	  of	  ultimate	  parent	   	  




















(3)	   BRICSM	   30	   4	  
69	  
54	  














	   	  
Total	   60	   770	   293	   11	   130	   69	   200	   1,533	  
Sources:	  DNB	   (2009c)	  and	  Reach	  database,	   author’s	   calculations.	  Note:	   Investment	  positions	  as	  of	  30	  
June	  2007.	  
 
in these countries. Other country groups have larger share in ultimate ownership of SPEs 
than in the direct origin of SPE capital. Focussing on entities whose ultimate parents 
could be identified, the EU and other high income countries (other than tax havens) are 




3.4 Empirical	  analysis	  of	  treaty	  shopping	  
3.4.1 Empirical	  specification	  
The previous section showed that the main origins and destinations of SPE investments 
are countries that have a tax treaty with the Netherlands. This section analyses if treaty 
shopping is a reason for that geographical pattern, by identifying structural determinants 
of FDI diversion. Using regression analysis, at the level of country pairs, it tests which 
variables influence the proportion of bilateral FDI stock that is diverted through the 
Netherlands. 
 On the basis of existing literature, various potential determinants were identified: 
gravity factors, tax variables, investment treaties, and variables reflecting the general 
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treatment of foreign investors. The analysis uses two alternative types of tax variables: 
general tax system indicators and more detailed measures modelling the benefits of 
specific tax strategies. 
 The general tax indicators are dummy variables for the existence of a Dutch tax 
treaty route, for a direct tax treaty between the home and host country, and for the 
taxation (non-exemption) of foreign profits by the home country. One would expect that 
a Dutch treaty route increases FDI diversion because of potential treaty benefits, 
whereas a direct treaty decreases it because the reduction of withholding taxes under a 
direct treaty lowers the potential benefits of FDI diversion. Furthermore, non-exemption 
of foreign profits might increase FDI diversion due to potential dividend deferral and 
mixing benefits. 
 The strategy-specific tax benefits reflect the reduction of the total tax on income 
generated in the host country, taking into account bilateral withholding taxes and the 
home and host country tax systems. The analysis focuses on distributed profits, because 
almost 80% of diverted FDI consists of equity investments.58 Regressions with strategy-
specific variables include a measure for dividend conduit benefits and for either base or 
mixing company benefits.59 These variables distinguish Dutch tax treaties that provide 
large withholding tax reductions from others that provide smaller reductions or none at 
all. It is expected that all strategy-specific benefits increase FDI diversion. 
 All regressions include separate gravity variables for the home and host country. It 
is expected that stronger gravity factors are associated with higher FDI diversion. 
Furthermore, the regressions include two investment treaty dummies. Similar to the 
general tax variables, it is expected that a Dutch BIT treaty route increases FDI 
diversion and a direct BIT decreases it. The regressions use the host country’s total 
numbers of tax and investment treaties as proxies for its general commitment to protect 
investors. If treaties have a signalling role, one would expect a negative effect on FDI 
diversion. 
 The analysis controls for two alternative reasons for FDI diversion. First, firms from 
outside Europe may establish European headquarters in the Netherlands and these 
headquarters may also qualify as SPEs. Second, investors may use a conduit country to 
reduce exposure to corruption in home or host countries.60 It is expected that the 
possibility of European headquarters and higher corruption in the home or host country 
increase FDI diversion. 
 Treaty shopping benefits probably have a decreasing marginal effect on the share of 
diverted FDI. The reason is that most large multinationals, which account for a 
substantial share of total FDI, may divert investments even if this yields only a small 
                                                        
58  Avoidance of capital gains tax on the potential future sale of a foreign subsidiary can also be a reason for 
diversion of equity investments. 
59  If both measures would be included simultaneously, the effect for country pairs where the host country 
has the lowest tax rate would be modeled largely independently from pairs where the home country has 
the highest rate. This would not provide useful information about overall tax strategies.  
60  This is especially relevant for joint ventures between companies from different countries. 
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reduction in effective tax rates, because they can obtain large absolute gains. Some large 
multinationals may face specific barriers, though, such as historical internal ownership 
structures or minority shareholders that make it costly to restructure existing operations. 
Others may prefer less complex holding structures or may simply be more focussed on 
maximizing operational rather than fiscal performance. Therefore some multinationals 
may only divert investments if treaty shopping reduces effective tax rates by a much 
larger amount. To model decreasing marginal effects, most regressions use the square 
root of the diverted FDI share as the dependent variable. This simple transformation 
substantially enhances the model fit. 
 The empirical analysis uses Tobit estimation because the share of diverted FDI is 
zero for approximately 9% of observations.61 All regressions are estimated with robust 
standard errors.  
 
3.4.2 Regression	  variables	  
Table 3.6 provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables. By default, the 
regressions use data from 2007. The dependent variable, the share of FDI from an origin 
country to a destination country diverted via the Netherlands, is calculated as follows. 
First, diverted FDI is obtained from an origin and destination matrix with FDI assets and 
liabilities that distinguishes all individual countries and territories.62 This matrix 
excludes assets financed with external debt or other non-FDI funding. Next, the diverted 
FDI stock is divided by the sum of the diverted and the non-diverted bilateral FDI stock. 
The latter is obtained from the OECD Statistics database, using inward FDI data if 
available.  
 The home country gravity variable is calculated as the ratio of non-diverted home 
country FDI in the Netherlands to total home country outward FDI stock. The host 
country gravity variable is the ratio of non-diverted FDI from the Netherlands to total 
host country inward FDI stock.63 By default, data on total inward and outward FDI 
stocks are taken from UNCTAD statistics. However, for a few countries, UNCTAD 
severely underestimates total FDI stocks, so the sum of bilateral FDI stocks reported by 
OECD partner countries is used instead.64 
 The general tax system dummies are defined as follows. The Dutch tax treaties 
dummy takes the value one for pairs of countries that both have a tax treaty with the 
Netherlands and the direct tax treaty dummy for pairs that have a tax treaty with each 
                                                        
61  The main results of OLS regressions are not materially different, though. 
62  As far as possible, these matrices attribute equity assets to equity liabilities and loan assets to loan 
liabilities to reflect SPE structures more accurately. Most SPEs have one main origin country for each 
type of liabilities. 
63  Most regressions use the square roots of these shares to match the transformation of the dependent 
variable. 
64  Examples are total outward FDI stocks of Bermuda and the Netherlands Antilles as of end-2007, for 
which UNCTAD reports €0.1 billion and €0.7 billion, respectively, whereas the sum of bilateral inward 
FDI stocks reported by OECD partner countries is €14 billion and €68 billion, respectively. 
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Table	  3.6	   Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  regression	  variables	  
Variable	   Mean	   Sda)	   Min.	   Max.	   Unit	  of	  measurement	   Underlying	  sources	  
Dependent	  variable	  
Diverted	  FDI	  share	   0.11	   0.23	   0.000	   1.000	   Ratio	  of	  FDI	  stocks	   DNB,	  OECD	  
Diverted	  FDI	  share	  (root)	   0.20	   0.26	   0.000	   1.000	   (Ratio	  of	  FDI	  stocks)½	   DNB,	  OECD	  
Gravity	  variables	  
Home	  gravity	  variable	  
	  	  (root)	  
0.17	   0.12	   0.000	   0.997	   (Ratio	  of	  FDI	  stocks)½	   OECD,	  UNCTAD	  
Host	  gravity	  variable	  	  
	  (root)	  
0.18	   0.09	   0.000	   0.498	   (Ratio	  of	  FDI	  stocks)½	   OECD,	  UNCTAD	  
General	  tax	  variables	  
Dutch	  tax	  treaties	  dummy	   0.80	   0.41	   0	   1	   Dummy	   Dutch	  government	  
Direct	  tax	  treaty	  dummy	   0.72	   0.45	   0	   1	   Dummy	   IBFD	  
Non-­‐exemption	  dummy	   0.52	   0.50	   0	   1	   Dummy	   E&Y,	  Deloitte,	  PwC,	  
	  	  national	  sources	  
Developing	  host	  x	  
	  	  Dutch	  tax	  treaties	  
0.15	   0.36	   0	   1	   See	  interacted	  variables	   	  
Developing	  host	  x	  
	  	  direct	  tax	  treaty	  
0.17	   0.37	   0	   1	   See	  interacted	  variables	   	  
Strategy-­‐specific	  tax	  variables	  
Dividend	  conduit	  benefit	   0	   5	   -­‐25	   20	   %-­‐point	  change	  in	  tax	  
	  	  on	  distributed	  profitb)	  
E&Y,	  Deloitte,	  PwC,	  
	  	  national	  sources	  
Base	  company	  benefit	   3	   6	   -­‐18	   35	   %-­‐point	  change	  in	  tax	  
	  	  on	  distributed	  profitb)	  
E&Y,	  Deloitte,	  PwC,	  
	  	  national	  sources	  
Mixing	  company	  benefit	   2	   3	   0	   8	   %-­‐point	  change	  in	  tax	  
	  	  on	  distributed	  profitb)	  
E&Y,	  Deloitte,	  PwC,	  
	  	  national	  sources	  
Developing	  host	  x	  
	  	  dividend	  conduit	  benefit	  
0	   3	   -­‐25	   12	   See	  interacted	  variables	   	  
Developing	  host	  x	  
	  	  base	  company	  benefit	  
0	   3	   -­‐18	   27	   See	  interacted	  variables	   	  
Investment	  treaty	  variables	  
Dutch	  BITs	  dummy	   0.54	   0.50	   0	   1	   Dummy	   Dutch	  government	  
Direct	  BIT	  dummy	   0.60	   0.49	   0	   1	   Dummy	   UNCTAD	  
Other	  control	  variables	  
European	  HQ	  dummy	   0.20	   0.40	   0	   1	   Dummy	   -­‐	  
Developing	  host	  dummy	   0.29	   0.45	   0	   1	   Dummy	   World	  Bank	  
Home	  corruption	   3.1	   2.0	   0.0	   8.0	   Reversed	  CPI,	  0-­‐9	  scale	   TI	  
Host	  corruption	   4.5	   2.3	   0.6	   8.6	   Reversed	  CPI,	  0-­‐9	  scale	   TI	  
Host	  tax	  treaties	   0.54	   0.28	   0	   1.08	   No.	  of	  treaties	  /	  100	   IBFD	  
Host	  BITs	   0.46	   0.30	   0	   1.14	   No.	  of	  treaties	  /	  100	   UNCTAD	  
Note:	  data	  for	  end	  of	  2007;	  the	  statistics	  are	  shown	  for	  the	  observations	  in	  the	  baseline	  regression.	  n	  =	  
1,730	  for	  mixing	  company	  benefit,	  n	  =	  1,742	  for	  other	  strategy-­‐specific	  tax	  variables,	  and	  n	  =	  1,757	  for	  all	  
other	  variables.	  a)	  Standard	  deviation;	  b)	  see	  Annex	  3.1.	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other. If two countries are EU members, this is regarded as equivalent to having a tax 
treaty between them. The non-exemption dummy takes the value one if the home 
country does not exempt foreign dividend income for at least 95%. The investment 
treaty dummies are defined in the same way as the tax treaty dummies. 
 Note that a Dutch tax treaty route does not exist for only 20% of country pairs. The 
majority of these observations, 14% of all country pairs, concern developing host 
countries. Similarly, only 28% of country pairs do not have a direct tax treaty and almost 
half of these observations also involve a developing host country. The correlation 
between the Dutch and direct tax treaty dummies is less than 0.5, though, so the full data 
set contains sufficient variation to analyse the effect of treaty routes. Annex 3.2 provides 
a correlation matrix. 
 The calculation of strategy-specific tax benefits involves tax data from all individual 
home and host countries as well as data on dividend withholding tax rates from Dutch 
tax treaties and over 1,200 tax treaties between home and host countries.65 International 
tax data were obtained from annual corporate tax surveys, overviews of withholding tax 
rates, and country profiles by Ernst & Young, Deloitte and PwC. A few data gaps were 
filled using national sources, mainly official websites from national tax authorities and 
ministries of finance, and original texts of tax treaties. 
 The dividend conduit benefit is defined as the total tax on profits generated in the 
host country that are distributed directly to the home country, minus the total tax that 
arises if the profits are distributed to the home country via a Dutch intermediate holding. 
The calculation takes into account the treatment of foreign profits in the home country. 
The benefit can be positive if a Dutch SPE reduces withholding taxes.66 It can be 
negative if the Dutch route increases withholding taxes, even if the host and home 
country both have a tax treaty with the Netherlands. The average benefit is near zero, 
mainly because withholding tax reductions for observations with a Dutch treaty route are 
offset by compounded withholding taxes for observations without a Dutch treaty route,  
 The base company benefit is calculated in a similar manner, assuming a profit is 
distributed to a Dutch intermediate holding only and not onwards to the home country.67 
This benefit reflects the payoff of a deferral strategy. The mixing company benefit is 
defined as half of the absolute difference between the home and host country tax rates.68 
This benefit reflects the payoff of mixing dividends from low-tax and high-tax sources: 
                                                        
65  For the selection of applicable tax rates, see note 56. 
66  For example, consider a host country with 20% WHT on dividends paid to non-treaty countries, which 
include the home country. The Netherlands has a tax treaty with the host country, which reduces this 20% 
rate to 10%, and also with the home country, which reduces the standard Dutch dividend WHT from 15% 
to 5%. This reduces total WHT from 20% to 1-(1-0.10)(1-0.05) = 14.5%. 
67  The base company benefit may also capture structures involving a Dutch cooperative or a direct US parent 
that uses so-called tick-the-box regulations to create hybrid entities. Such structures can avoid Dutch 
WHT and home country taxation even if profits are distributed upwards. 
68  This is an approximation only, which disregards WHT and assumes that a multinational repatriates equal 
pre-tax profits from host countries with lower and higher tax rates than the home country. Half of the 
benefit is attributed to each type of host country. 
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it increases if the home and host country tax rates are further apart and is always 
positive. For home countries that exempt foreign dividend income, the base and mixing 
company benefits are set to zero. Annex 3.1 contains the formulas for the strategy-
specific tax benefits. 
 The possibility of European headquarters (HQ) is captured by a dummy variable.69 
Corruption is measured using the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) for 2007, which reflects perception of corruption by foreign investors.70 
Finally, the regression variables include a dummy identifying developing host countries 
(excluding BRICSM) and interactions between this dummy and tax variables, to test 
whether FDI into developing countries is more likely to be diverted via Dutch SPEs. 
 The analysis focuses on diversion of FDI via the Netherlands directly into normal 
economies. Therefore it excludes tax haven host countries and round-tripping 
observations with the same home and host country. It also excludes observations with 
total FDI below €10 million. For such small positions, the diverted FDI share is 
relatively sensitive to potentially relevant non-reporting SPEs and to inaccuracies 
resulting from the proportional attribution of assets to liabilities. The baseline 
specification includes 100 home countries and 146 host countries. It covers a combined 
€563 billion of diverted FDI stocks71 and €6,237 billion of non-diverted FDI stocks, 
representing roughly 75% of global FDI stocks. 
 
3.4.3 Results	  for	  general	  tax	  variables	  
Table 3.7 shows the results of regressions with general tax variables. In the baseline 
specification, the home and host country gravity factors are positive and highly 
significant, as expected. This confirms that in part, FDI diverted via the Netherlands 
simply follows the same pattern as regular FDI and this need not be related to treaty 
benefits. If an additional 10% of a home country’s total outward FDI stock is invested in 
the Netherlands, then the share of the country’s FDI to other destinations that is routed 
through the Netherlands is, on average, also approximately 10 percentage points 
                                                        
69  Europe is defined here as all EU-27 countries plus Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Croatia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia. 
70  The 2007 CPI covers 179 countries, but none of the eight major tax haven islands. For these jurisdictions, 
corruption is set to zero, because it is very unlikely that protection against corruption is a reason to divert 
tax haven investments through the Netherlands. 
71  At the end of 2007, total FDI diverted via Dutch SPEs was approximately €1,400 billion. The 
observations in the dataset add up to €864 billion, or roughly 60% of the total, because they exclude FDI 
assets attributed to unknown liabilities, round-tripping FDI, and smaller SPEs. Total diverted FDI 
included in the regressions is further reduced to €563 billion, because FDI into tax havens is disregarded, 
for €110 billion of diverted FDI corresponding data on non-diverted FDI are unavailable, and tax or 
control variables are missing for some minor countries. 
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higher.72 This is a large effect, compared to the mean diverted FDI share of 11%. The 
host country gravity effect is slightly smaller. 
 Tax treaty effects are also significant and have the expected signs. On average, the 
existence of a Dutch treaty route is associated with approximately 6 percentage points 
more bilateral FDI being held via the Netherlands, whereas a direct bilateral tax treaty is 
associated with 3 percentage points less. Compared to the mean diverted FDI share of 
11%, these effects are substantial as well. The tax treaty effects are additional to gravity 
effects and it is difficult to think of another explanation than tax treaty shopping. The 
effect of foreign income taxation by the home country, indicated by the non-exemption 
dummy, is insignificant. 
 The BIT effects are significant and also have the expected signs. The effects are 
similar in size to the tax treaty effects. This suggests that investment treaty shopping is 
another reason for investment diversion. An alternative explanation could be that FDI 
diversion is mainly driven by tax planning and the resulting structures also benefit from 
investment protection, or the other way around. However, there is only some 50% 
overlap between the Dutch tax and investment treaty networks. Therefore it is likely that 
tax treaties and investment treaties are both determinants of FDI diversion. 
 The results indicate that avoidance of home or host country corruption does not play 
a significant role. Furthermore, FDI diversion is not significantly reduced if host 
countries have more treaties. This finding does not support the idea that treaties have a 
signalling role. 
 The second regression tests whether FDI diversion via the Netherlands can be 
explained by European headquarters of non-European firms. The coefficient of the 
European headquarters dummy is significant, but negative, so this does not help to 
explain investment via Dutch SPEs. 
 The third regression excludes FDI via the Netherlands into the EU altogether. FDI in 
the EU accounts for a large number of observations but may follow different patterns, 
especially in the case of intra-EU investments, due to the high degree of economic 
integration. In this specification, the Dutch tax treaties coefficient becomes insignificant. 
That may suggest the significant effect in the first regression is due to tax treaties 
between the Netherlands and home countries that increase FDI diversion from non-EU 
countries into the EU. However, the large FDI diversion within the EU, which showed 
up in the description of origins and destinations, also influences the results. For non-EU 
host countries, FDI diversion still depends on the existence of a direct tax treaty between 
the home and host country. For BITs, the effect of a direct treaty becomes insignificant, 
but the diversion still depends on Dutch treaties. Thus, for FDI in non-EU countries, the 
xxxxx  
                                                        
72  All estimated effects reported in the text are evaluated at mean values of the regression variables, taking 
into account the Tobit estimation method and the transformation of the dependent variable. The effects 
refer to the expected share of diverted FDI unconditional on this expected share being greater than zero. 
The difference with conditional effects is not substantial. 
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Table	  3.7	   Overall	  effect	  of	  tax	  treaties	  on	  FDI	  diversion	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  








































Developing	  host	  x	  Dutch	  tax	  treaties	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.12**	  
(0.06)	  
Developing	  host	  x	  direct	  tax	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-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
-­‐0.13***	  
(0.05)	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  host	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-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.04	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n	   1,757	   1,757	   987	   987	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.11	   0.11	   0.12	   0.13	  
Notes:	   Dependent	   variable	   is	   the	   share	   of	   bilateral	   FDI	   stock	   diverted	   via	   the	   Netherlands.	   All	  
specifications	  use	  Tobit	  estimation.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  denotes	  p	  <	  0.10;	  **	  p	  <	  
0.05;	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01.	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results seem only partially consistent with treaty shopping. The next section will discuss 
this finding in more detail. 
 The fourth regression uses the same observations and analyses whether the effects of 
tax treaties differ between developing host countries and other non-EU host countries. 
The general effects of tax treaties on FDI diversion are now insignificant. Thus, the mere 
existence of tax treaties does not affect the routes of investment in non-EU high income 
and BRICSM countries. In contrast, the interaction variables show significant effects of 
tax treaties on FDI in developing countries. These effects have the expected signs, 
consistent with tax treaty shopping, and are relatively large. The effect of a Dutch tax 
treaty route is therefore not limited to EU host countries. 
 So far, the regressions show that FDI diversion depends on three types of structural 
determinants. First, gravity effects confirm that FDI diversion partly follows the same 
pattern as FDI in general. This suggests that a Dutch investment route offers some 
generic benefits, regardless of tax or investment treaties. Second, tax treaties have an 
additional effect on FDI diversion, except for FDI in non-EU high income and BRICSM 
countries. For other host countries, a Dutch treaty route increases diversion, while a 
direct treaty with the home country reduces it. This provides some evidence of tax treaty 
shopping. Third, investment treaties have a similar effect. This provides some evidence 
of investment treaty shopping as well. 
 Other potential determinants included in the regressions do not help to explain the 
pattern of FDI diversion. The limited role of European headquarters is consistent with 
the finding of Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) that Dutch SPEs also hold large 
American and Asian investments. The insignificance of the home country tax system is 
unexpected and not in line with other studies. Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) find that 
companies from countries that do not exempt foreign profits are more likely to invest in 
Germany via a third country, for example. The most likely explanation is that the 
analysis does not properly reflect tax strategies of Dutch SPEs with a direct parent in a 
tax haven or in a country that exempts foreign dividend income and an ultimate parent in 
a country that does not. 
 Four alternative specifications, presented in Annex 3.3, confirm that the effects of 
tax treaties on FDI diversion are sufficiently robust. First, apparent gravity effects may 
result from other factors and in that case the gravity variables could distort the analysis. 
In a specification without gravity effects, though, tax determinants are similar. Second, a 
specification with home country fixed effects captures relevant characteristics of home 
countries that may accidentally have been omitted from the regressions. The tax treaty 
affects are not affected. The third specification includes host country fixed effects 
instead, capturing differences in domestic anti-avoidance rules. This reduces the 
significance, but not the size, of the estimated effect of a Dutch tax treaty route. The 
fourth specification uses a linear dependent variable, without the transformation to 
model decreasing marginal effects. The corresponding model fit is much lower, but 
otherwise the results are similar. 
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3.4.4 Results	  for	  strategy-­‐specific	  tax	  variables	  
The next series of regressions uses strategy-specific tax variables to test whether the 
effect of tax treaties is related to reduced withholding taxes. Table 3.8 shows the 
regression results. 
 In the first specification, gravity forces are similar to above and the coefficients for 
corruption and numbers of treaties are again insignificant. The dividend conduit benefit 
has a significantly positive effect. On average, a 10 percentage points reduction in total 
taxes on distributed profits is associated with an additional 3% of bilateral FDI being 
diverted via the Netherlands, again over and above the diversion explained by gravity 
forces. Considering that a 10 percentage point reduction is twice the standard deviation 
and the mean diverted FDI share is 11%, the effect is not large but it is material. Thus, 
reduced dividend withholding taxes are a structural determinant of FDI diversion, which 
provides strong evidence for tax treaty shopping. 
 The effect of the base company benefit is insignificant, whereas a positive effect was 
expected. This suggests that deferral of home country taxation is not a main determinant 
of FDI diversion, at least not in addition to structures that also yield a dividend conduit 
benefit. It is possible that such structures are also used to defer home country taxation, 
though, because reduced withholding taxes between the Netherlands and the home 
country do not imply that multinationals always distribute subsidiary profits up to the 
ultimate parent. 
 The second regression includes the benefit of a mixing company instead of a base 
company. The corresponding effect is positive but also insignificant. Thus, although 
anecdotal evidence indicates that some SPE structures were established specifically to 
achieve mixing of foreign tax credits, this motive is not a major determinant of FDI 
diversion. Further specifications are shown with the base company benefit only, but 
estimations with the mixing company benefit instead yield the same results. 
 The third regression adds tax treaty dummies, which hardly affects the result for the 
dividend conduit benefit. This confirms that the reduction of dividend withholding taxes 
is a key determinant of FDI diversion, even after controlling for legal certainty and other 
general provisions provided by tax treaties. However, the Dutch tax treaties dummy is 
significant too. Thus, apart from reduced dividend withholding taxes, tax treaties 
provide further benefits that induce FDI diversion. These benefits may result from legal 
certainty, but also from tax sparing clauses or reduced interest withholding taxes, for 
example. The fourth regression adds the European headquarters dummy. Similar to the 
previous regression series, it does not have the expected sign, which indicates that FDI 
diversion via the Netherlands is not driven by European headquarters of non-European 
firms. 
 The fifth regression limits observations again to non-EU host countries. For these 
host countries, the dividend conduit benefit has a larger effect on FDI diversion. On 
average, a 10 percentage points reduction in taxes on distributed profits is associated 
with an additional 5% of bilateral FDI being diverted via the Netherlands. This contrasts 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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Table	  3.8	   Effect	  of	  strategy-­‐specific	  tax	  benefits	  on	  FDI	  diversion	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  



















































-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  	  	  -­‐	  
Dutch	  tax	  treaties	  dummy	  
-­‐	   -­‐	  
0.06**	  
(0.02)	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Direct	  tax	  treaty	  dummy	  
-­‐	   -­‐	  
-­‐0.04*	  
(0.02)	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Developing	  host	  x	  
	  	  dividend	  benefit	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.60	  
(0.45)	  
Developing	  host	  x	  
	  	  base	  benefit	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
-­‐0.25	  
(0.42)	  
























European	  HQ	  dummy	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
-­‐0.05**	  
(0.02)	  
-­‐	   -­‐	  
Developing	  host	  dummy	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.05*	  
(0.03)	  




























































n	   1,727	   1,715	   1,727	   1,727	   957	   957	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.11	   0.11	   0.11	   0.11	   0.13	   0.13	  
Notes:	   Dependent	   variable	   is	   the	   share	   of	   bilateral	   FDI	   stock	   diverted	   via	   the	   Netherlands.	   All	  
specifications	  use	  Tobit	  estimation.	  All	  specifications	  use	  Tobit	  estimation.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  in	  
parentheses.	  *	  denotes	  p	  <	  0.10;	  **	  p	  <	  0.05;	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01.	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with the results for general tax variables, where the overall effect of Dutch tax treaties 
became insignificant after dropping EU host countries. However, these contrasting 
findings can be explained by the large FDI diversion within the EU. In the regressions 
with general tax variables, it increases the effect of a Dutch tax treaty route, because 
such a route exists for all intra-EU observations. By contrast, in the regressions with 
strategy-specific tax variables, it reduces the effect of dividend conduit benefits, because 
there are no such benefits within the EU and yet FDI diversion is large. The sixth 
regression tests again whether the effect of tax benefits on FDI diversion differs between 
developing host countries and other non-EU host countries. Using strategy-specific 
measures for tax benefits, no significant difference is found. 
 The regressions with strategy-specific tax variables confirm the three types of 
structural determinants identified above: gravity effects, tax treaties, and investment 
treaties. In particular, they show that bilateral withholding tax reductions are a key 
determinant of FDI diversion via Dutch SPEs. This result is in line with other studies 
(Collins & Shackelford, 1998; Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008). 
 The last two regressions show that dividend conduit benefits significantly increase 
FDI diversion into all non-EU host countries. By contrast, the regressions with dummy 
variables in the previous section show that tax treaties significantly influence FDI 
diversion into developing countries, but not into BRICSM countries and high income 
countries outside the EU. This paradox might be explained by the fact that Dutch tax 
treaties with developing countries often generate a dividend conduit benefit, because 
these treaties specify relatively low dividend withholding taxes. Dutch tax treaties with 
non-EU high income and BRICSM countries generate such a benefit less often, because 
half of these countries have no dividend withholding taxes and Dutch treaty rates are 
closer to treaty rates agreed with other partners. Thus, when differences in standard 
withholding tax rates and treaty characteristics are taken into account, the effect of tax 
treaties becomes similar and significant for all non-EU host countries. 
 Contrary to expectations, the analysis does not provide evidence that specific 
strategies to avoid home country taxation have an additional effect on FDI diversion. 
Other studies, such as Desai et al. (2003), do find that base company benefits increase 
the use of SPEs. However, as mentioned in the previous section, this may be explained 
by Dutch SPE whose direct and ultimate parents are located in different countries. 
 Four alternative specifications, presented in Annex 3.3, confirm that the overall 
effect of dividend conduit benefits on FDI diversion is sufficiently robust. The 
specifications are the same as for the regressions with general tax variables. Including 
home country fixed effects or using a linear dependent variable reduces the size and 
significance of the dividend conduit benefit effect, but it remains significant at the 10% 
level. In the other two specifications, findings for the dividend conduit are similar to 
above. Surprisingly, the specification without gravity variables shows a significant effect 
of the base company benefit, but the negative sign suggests that this variable does not 
capture deferral strategies properly. 
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3.5 Conclusions	  and	  discussion	  
This chapter analysed structural determinants of FDI diversion via the Netherlands. It 
shows that FDI diversion is higher if the home and host country both have a tax treaty 
with the Netherlands, and lower if there exists a direct treaty between the home and host 
country. Furthermore, the analysis shows that diversion of investments is partly driven 
by specific corporate structures that reduce the total tax on distributed foreign profits by 
taking advantage of reduced withholding taxes under Dutch tax treaties. It can therefore 
be concluded that FDI diversion partly results from tax treaty shopping. On average, the 
possibility to avoid dividend withholding tax causes a few percent of bilateral FDI stock 
to be routed through the Netherlands rather than being held directly from the origin 
country. This effect is not large, yet it is material and may also occur for some non-
Dutch treaty routes. Although the analysis focuses on tax treaties, it provides some 
evidence of investment treaty shopping via Dutch SPEs as well. 
 The results imply that apparent positive effects of tax and investment treaties on 
inward FDI can to some extent be attributed to treaty shopping. This has major 
implications for further research on foreign investment using bilateral FDI data, because 
FDI diversion changes the immediate destination of outward FDI and the immediate 
origin of inward FDI.  
 It is difficult to assess the social costs and benefits of tax treaty shopping, because 
the results do not show how FDI diversion influences the overall amount of investment 
between ultimate origin and destination countries. Social benefits include higher after-
tax returns for investors and potentially higher investment, which in turn may generate 
additional economic activity and tax revenues. Social costs include lower tax revenues at 
a given level of investment and implementation costs of tax planning. There are also 
indirect effects. A lower dividend withholding tax creates an incentive for a subsidiary 
to pay out higher dividends and reinvest less or repay less debt, for example. This 
reduces future investments and limits the tax base in the host country over time. 
 The results have policy implications for non-EU countries as well as for the 
Netherlands (Weyzig & Van Dijk, 2009). To keep better control over policy outcomes, 
non-EU countries may prefer unilateral measures to attract FDI instead of reducing 
withholding taxes on a bilateral basis. If countries suspect significant diversion of 
inward FDI via an existing treaty, they could renegotiate the treaty and include anti-
avoidance provisions, but this process would be costly. It would be more efficient if the 
Netherlands were to take unilateral measures against treaty shopping. In principle, such 
measures could be effective even if other countries do not take similar measures, 
because the Netherlands is by far the largest conduit country for FDI. 
 Some limitations to this study should be noted, although it is unlikely that these 
affect the main results. First, there are various limitations to the micro data. For 
example, some SPEs report larger assets than liabilities and the data do not cover 
smaller SPEs that may still be significant for particular destination countries. Second, 
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longer ownership chains distort the estimation of home country tax effects. Third, the 
analysis uses normal withholding tax rates and disregards preferential regimes, but for 
some countries special tax concessions may reduce the additional benefits of a tax treaty. 
Fourth, the regressions disregard qualitative differences between tax treaties, for 
example with regard to limitation on benefits and tax sparing clauses. Fifth, the analysis 
could not take into account what tax treaties and regulations were in place at the time an 
investment was made or how FDI diversion evolves over time. These last two 
limitations are probably the most important ones.  
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Annex	  3.1	   Calculation	  of	  tax	  benefits	  
 
Dividend conduit benefit  If the home country exempts foreign dividend income: 
( )( )( )









= − − −
− − − −  
and if the home country does not exempt foreign dividend income, but provides a tax 
credit: 
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
max ,  1 1 1
max ,  1 1 1
home host host home
home host host NL home




⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎣ ⎦  
with STR denoting the statutory tax rate on corporate income and 
 . 
 
Base company benefit  If the home country exempts foreign dividend income: 
 ; 
if the home country does not exempt foreign dividend income, but provides a tax credit: 
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
max ,  1 1 1
1 1 1
home host host home
host host NL




⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦
− − − −  
 
Mixing company benefit  If the home country exempts foreign dividend income:   
 ; 
if the home country does not exempt foreign dividend income, but provides a tax credit: 
 . 
 




2 home hostBenefit STR STR= −
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Annex	  3.2	   Correlation	  matrix	  



















Diverted	  FDI	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Home	  gravity	   0.277	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Host	  gravity	   0.137	   -­‐0.065	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   	  
Dutch	  tax	  treaties	   0.050	   -­‐0.035	   0.300	   1.000	   	   	   	   	  
Direct	  tax	  treaties	   -­‐0.088	   -­‐0.121	   0.114	   0.474	   1.000	   	   	   	  
Non-­‐exemption	   -­‐0.062	   -­‐0.266	   0.026	   -­‐0.034	   0.023	   1.000	   	   	  
Dividend	  conduit	   0.077	   0.041	   0.072	   0.104	   -­‐0.080	   0.017	   1.000	   	  
Base	  company	   -­‐0.065	   -­‐0.219	   -­‐0.010	   0.027	   -­‐0.033	   0.477	   0.304	   1.000	  
Dutch	  BITs	   0.018	   -­‐0.097	   0.073	   0.193	   0.313	   -­‐0.056	   -­‐0.087	   -­‐0.101	  
Direct	  BIT	   -­‐0.094	   -­‐0.106	   -­‐0.002	   0.140	   0.393	   -­‐0.011	   -­‐0.132	   -­‐0.055	  
Developing	  host	   -­‐0.023	   0.054	   -­‐0.418	   -­‐0.408	   -­‐0.195	   0.028	   -­‐0.117	   -­‐0.130	  
Home	  corruption	   -­‐0.085	   -­‐0.408	   0.146	   0.040	   0.119	   0.430	   -­‐0.109	   0.266	  
Host	  corruption	   -­‐0.056	   0.011	   -­‐0.290	   -­‐0.205	   -­‐0.054	   0.036	   -­‐0.030	   -­‐0.019	  
Host	  tax	  treaties	   0.054	   -­‐0.091	   0.522	   0.565	   0.364	   0.013	   0.090	   0.062	  
Host	  BITs	   0.060	   -­‐0.079	   0.508	   0.347	   0.238	   0.034	   -­‐0.012	   0.023	  
Note:	  n	  =	  1,715.	  


















	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Diverted	  FDI	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Home	  gravity	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Host	  gravity	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Dutch	  tax	  treaties	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Direct	  tax	  treaties	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Non-­‐exemption	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Dividend	  conduit	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Base	  company	  
1.000	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Dutch	  BITs	  
0.579	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   	   Direct	  BIT	  
0.043	   0.088	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   Developing	  host	  
0.281	   0.245	   -­‐0.083	   1.000	   	   	   	   Home	  corruption	  
0.163	   0.241	   0.618	   -­‐0.055	   1.000	   	   	   Host	  corruption	  
0.148	   0.100	   -­‐0.551	   0.192	   -­‐0.407	   1.000	   	   Host	  tax	  treaties	  
0.260	   0.233	   -­‐0.255	   0.191	   -­‐0.143	   0.759	   1.000	   Host	  BITs	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Annex	  3.3	   Results	  of	  robustness	  checks	  
 
Table 3.9 presents the results of robustness checks for the regressions with tax treaty 
dummies. The results are briefly discussed in the main text. The first regression omits 
gravity variables. The second regression includes home country fixed effects and the 
xxxxxx 
Table	  3.9	   Robustness	  checks	  for	  the	  overall	  effect	  of	  tax	  treaties	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Home	  gravity	  variable	  















































































Home	  fixed	  effects	   -­‐	   Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Host	  fixed	  effects	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  








n	   1,802	   1,757	   1,757	   1,781	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.04	   -­‐	   -­‐	   0.05	  
Likelihood	  ratio	   -­‐	   800.3	   601.2	   -­‐	  
Notes:	  All	  specifications	  use	  Tobit	  estimation.	  Standard	  errors	  are	   in	  parentheses;	  for	  specifications	  (1)	  
and	   (4)	   these	   are	   robust	   standard	   errors.	   Specifications	   (2)	   and	   (3)	   use	   normal	   Tobit	   estimation	  with	  
country	  dummies;	  the	  corresponding	  likelihood	  ratios	  have	  94	  and	  117	  degrees	  of	  freedom,	  respectively.	  
*	  denotes	  p	  <	  0.10;	  **	  p	  <	  0.05;	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01.	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third regression includes host country fixed effects. The fourth regression uses a linear 
dependent variable. Table 3.10 presents the same robustness checks for the regressions 
with strategy-specific tax variables. These are also discussed in the main text. The use of 
data for 2006 instead of 2007 (not shown) does not affect the results for general and 
strategy-specific tax variables. 
	  
Table	  3.10	   Robustness	  checks	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  strategy-­‐specific	  tax	  benefits	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Home	  gravity	  variable	  








































































Home	  fixed	  effects	   -­‐	   Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Host	  fixed	  effects	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  








n	   1,772	   1,814	   1,766	   1,751	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.04	   -­‐	   -­‐	   0.05	  
Likelihood	  ratio	   -­‐	   811.8	   593.7	   -­‐	  
Notes:	  All	  specifications	  use	  Tobit	  estimation.	  Standard	  errors	  are	   in	  parentheses;	  for	  specifications	   (1)	  
and	   (4)	   these	   are	   robust	   standard	   errors.	   Specifications	   (2)	   and	   (3)	   use	   normal	   Tobit	   estimation	  with	  
country	   dummies;	   the	   corresponding	   likelihood	   ratios	   have	   106	   and	   118	   degrees	   of	   freedom,	  
respectively.	  *	  denotes	  p	  <	  0.10;	  **	  p	  <	  0.05;	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01.	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Abstract  Large firms may issue debt securities to obtain external financing or set 
up lowly taxed affiliates for internal debt shifting purposes. In addition, they may 
channel interest payments through Dutch Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to avoid 
withholding taxes, a widely used arbitrage strategy. Analysing the capital structure 
of large EU-based multinationals, this chapter provides evidence that the use of 
Dutch issuing SPEs is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity. 
Furthermore, it shows that EU subsidiaries of larger firms are more leveraged and 
that the use of Dutch onlending SPEs is also associated with higher subsidiary 
leverage. Thus, the chapter provides evidence that Dutch SPEs facilitate higher 
external debt financing as well as internal debt shifting. The findings indicate that 
withholding taxes on interest payments to entities outside the EU, determined by 
individual EU member states, are not very effective. The national tax systems of EU 
countries like the Netherlands, which does not impose interest withholding tax, 
allow large firms to avoid those taxes. 
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4.1 Introduction	  
Taxation influences the decisions of multinational enterprises on their total use of 
external debt as well as on the internal financing of individual affiliates (Devereux, 
2006; Graham, 2003). At the level of the firm as a whole, leverage can provide a tax 
benefit because interest payments can usually be deducted from taxable income, but the 
return on equity cannot. At the level of individual affiliates, multinationals can adjust 
their internal capital structure to deduct more interest in high-tax countries and allocate 
income to lowly taxed affiliates (Büttner & Wamser, 2007; Huizinga et al., 2008; Ruf, 
2008).  
 This chapter analyses whether external debt financing at the firm level is facilitated 
by the issuance of debt securities in general and, more specifically, by issuing debt 
securities via Dutch Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). At the subsidiary level, it tests 
whether larger firms use relatively more debt to finance their EU subsidiaries, as debt 
shifting strategies involving lowly taxed affiliates may be more attractive for larger 
firms. In addition, it investigates whether Dutch onlending SPEs facilitate such debt 
shifting strategies, because firms can use Dutch SPEs to reduce withholding taxes on 
intra-group interest payments to lowly taxed affiliates. Analysing the overall capital 
structure of 82 large EU-based multinationals and the financing of 3,053 of their EU 
subsidiaries, the chapter provides evidence that all these factors are indeed associated 
with higher indebtedness. 
 From a public policy perspective, debt-financing strategies in large multinationals 
are relevant because of their potentially large impact on economic activity and on tax 
revenues. The findings indicate that the current EU policy on corporate tax, with no 
withholding taxes on payments to EU affiliates but withholding taxes on payments to 
non-EU entities determined separately by each member state, is problematic because of 
arbitrage. 
 From an academic perspective, this chapter contributes to existing literature by 
providing evidence on the role of Dutch financing SPEs. Although these SPEs pass on 
large amounts of internal and external debt financing, research on their role in the capital 
structure of large firms has so far been limited. It also contributes to research on debt 
shifting by analysing the tax sensitivity of subsidiary leverage among large 
multinationals, with a dataset and methodology specifically adapted to large firms. 
 The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides background 
information on Dutch SPEs and formulates hypotheses on debt financing at the firm and 
subsidiary levels. Section 4.3 explains the empirical approach. Section 4.4 describes the 
data set construction and the variables in the data set, with some examples of concrete 
SPEs. Section 4.5 contains the empirical results and section 4.6 presents the conclusion 
and a brief discussion of the findings. 
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4.2 Background	  and	  hypotheses	  
4.2.1 Dutch	  Special	  Purpose	  Entities	  
Many large multinationals channel international capital and income flows through Dutch 
SPEs. For statistical purposes, Dutch regulations formally define SPEs as “resident 
enterprises or institutions […] in which non-residents hold a direct or indirect 
participating interest […] and whose objective is or whose business consists to a major 
extent of receiving funds from non-residents and channelling them to non-residents”.73 
A common feature of SPEs is that they do not conduct significant real business activities 
and mainly have financial assets (OECD, 2008b). There are approximately 12,000 SPEs 
in the Netherlands and they usually form part of international tax planning structures 
(DNB, 2007a). At the end of 2005, a reference date for the analysis, Dutch SPEs held 
roughly €290 billion of intra-group loan assets and €860 billion of equity participations 
abroad.74 Together, this was 13% of the world’s total inward FDI stock, which makes 
the Netherlands the world’s largest conduit country for FDI.75 During 2005, the SPEs 
reported approximately €63 billion of income from FDI, mainly consisting of dividends 
and interest.76 They channel a large part of this income onwards to foreign affiliates or 
external creditors, and reinvest most of the remaining income within the group.  
 The Dutch tax system provides an attractive environment for SPEs. Key factors are 
the absence of withholding tax on outgoing interest and royalty payments, exemption of 
foreign dividend income and capital gains from Dutch tax, and a large and favourable 
tax treaty network.77 SPE operations are facilitated by highly developed fiscal and legal 
consultancy services and administrative services that provide legal substance to SPEs, so 
SPEs do not need an office or staff of their own (Weyzig & Van Dijk, 2009). Case law 
on many tax-planning issues is well established. Furthermore, multinationals can apply 
for tax rulings that provide certainty in advance about the fiscal treatment of specific 
                                                        
73  Section 1 of the Balance of Payments Reporting Instructions 2003, having regard to section 7 of the Dutch 
External Financial Relations Act 1994. 
74  The figure refers to intra-group loans of Dutch SPEs to foreign affiliates. Source: Dutch Central Bank, 
http://statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=uk&todo=Balans, tables 12.10 and 12.14 (accessed 19 Sep 2011). 
SPEs mainly finance these loans with external and internal debt. 
75  At the end of 2005, world inward FDI stock was roughly €8600 billion (UNCTAD, 2006). The second-
largest conduit country for FDI is Luxembourg. At the end of 2005, FDI stock held through Luxembourg 
was €712 billion, according to the Luxembourg Central Bank, 
http://www.bcl.lu/fr/statistiques/series_statistiques, table 9.2 (accessed 17 Jan 2012). 
76  Source: Dutch Central Bank, http://statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=uk&todo=Balans, tables 12.4 and 
12.13 (accessed 17 Jun 2011). 
77  In addition, from January 1997 to July 2001, firms could apply for the Group Financing Activities regime. 
In theory, this special Dutch tax facility could reduce the effective tax rate on net intra-group interest and 
royalty income to 7%. See also footnote 6 in Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009). Official documents and 
company accounts show that no more than 90 firms were admitted, including at least 27 Dutch 
multinationals. Smiths Group plc is the only firm in the dataset for which there is evidence that it used the 
facility. Therefore the special regime is of little significance to the analysis in this chapter. 
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corporate structures and transactions. A new ruling system was introduced in 2001, with 
a transition period until end of 2005. In practice, under both the old and new system, 
Dutch tax rulings allow low, fixed margins on intra-group financing transactions and 
require limited substance.78 The rulings also provide protection against domestic anti-
avoidance measures in the source countries where the interest arises. This chapter 
focuses on SPE structures for the avoidance of interest withholding tax in the period 
1997-2005 and considers both firm-level and intra-group debt financing. 
 At the firm level, many European multinationals issue debt securities via Dutch 
SPEs because of lower borrowing costs, which largely result from the absence of 
withholding tax. Some types of end investors, such as individuals or insurance 
companies, can usually recover withholding tax on interest income by offsetting it to 
their own tax obligations. However, end investors that are tax exempt, such as pension 
funds, cannot so the withholding tax is a disadvantage.79 Many other EU-countries 
exempt interest on corporate bonds from withholding tax as well, but only if certain 
conditions are met. For example, the UK only exempts listed Eurobonds, Germany does 
not exempt convertible bonds, and France does not exempt payments to secrecy 
jurisdictions. If withholding taxes apply, these typically range from 15% to 25% or 
higher. Other factors, such as the Dutch tax ruling practice and favourable tax treaty 
network, facilitate the distribution of funds within a firm. Before the implementation of 
the EU Interest and Royalties Directive in 2005, Dutch tax treaties already provided for 
zero withholding taxes on intra-group interest received from most EU countries.  
 The debts that non-financial firms issue via Dutch SPEs are guaranteed by the parent 
company and fully consolidated in financial statements. Many of these debt securities 
are publicly listed, but not in the Netherlands itself. For European firms, they are usually 
quoted in Luxembourg or Switzerland, and for Asian firms in Singapore. Outstanding 
debt securities of all Dutch SPEs combined had a nominal value of roughly €250 billion 
at the end of 2005.80 Company accounts and prospectuses show that SPEs lend the 
proceeds onwards to their foreign parents, to other affiliates in various countries, or a 
combination of both. The loans to parent companies enter Dutch inward FDI statistics 
with a negative sign and are reflected in negative net debt investments from Germany 
                                                        
78  For example, according to its annual accounts, the bond-issuing SPE of Energias de Portugal SA had no 
staff or office in the Netherlands; its board of directors consisted of two employees of a Dutch service 
provider and a Spanish legal person. In 2007, the SPE obtained a tax ruling that specifies its minimum 
taxable income as an arms-length return on equity plus a spread of 0.03% on onlent funds, minus 
operational costs. 
79  This type of end investors also includes wealthy individuals whose income is not taxed, for example 
because they are domiciled in a tax haven. 
80  Source: see note 74. This figure excludes securitisations of foreign financial claims issued by Dutch 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). Total non-current debt issued by Dutch SPEs was €312 billion; on the 
basis of other data, I estimate that SPVs account for 20% to 25% of this total. Of the remaining €250 
billion, I estimate that SPEs used some €225 billion to finance loans to foreign affiliates and €25 billion 
for other purposes, such as loans to domestic affiliates. 
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and Spain, of -€73 billion and -€32 billion respectively at the end of 2009 (IMF, 
2012a). 
 At the subsidiary level, Dutch SPEs may channel intra-group interest payments to 
affiliates in countries with low or zero corporate taxes or with preferential tax regimes. 
Most EU countries do not have full tax treaties with tax havens and levy maximum 
withholding tax rates on interest payments to such jurisdictions. The same applied to 
companies that operated under Luxembourg’s former 1929 Holding Companies regime, 
which were excluded from tax treaties and from the EU Interest and Royalties Directive. 
Similar to external debt financing, channelling intra-group loans through Dutch SPEs 
can be attractive due to the combination of lower withholding taxes, the Dutch tax ruling 
practice, and other factors. Some large multinationals may also use a Dutch SPEs as a 
central financing hub for affiliates in many different countries, including countries for 
which such a structure is not required to reduce withholding taxes. 
 FDI statistics illustrate the relevance of Dutch onlending structures involving lowly 
taxed affiliates. At the end of 2009, Bermuda, the Netherlands Antilles, Cayman Islands 
and British Virgin Islands, four major tax havens, had net intra-group debt investments 
of €95 billion in the Netherlands. In addition, the Netherlands reported €218 billion of 
net intra-group debt investments from Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland and Switzerland, 
four key countries with preferential tax regimes (IMF, 2012a). For both country groups, 
approximately 80% of FDI in the Netherlands was channelled onwards through SPEs.81 
 
4.2.2 Debt	  financing	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  
The use of debt financing relative to capital contributions and retained earnings is a 
central aspect of a firm’s consolidated capital structure. The amount and composition of 
debt financing is influenced by the attractiveness of different types of debt. Two main 
types are bank loans and debt securities. A firm’s choice between these two types 
depends, among others, on market access, issuance costs and agency costs (Esho et al., 
2001; James & Smith, 2000; Krishnaswami et al., 1999). Firms with investment-grade 
ratings may be able to issue debt securities at lower interest rates than what they would 
pay on bank loans, because of relatively low monitoring costs for creditors (Bharath, 
2002). This is especially relevant for larger firms, which have better access to credit 
markets and can exploit economies of scale in the issuance of publicly traded debt 
(James & Smith, 2000; Krishnaswami et al., 1999). When firms issue debt securities, the 
use of a Dutch issuing SPE may further reduce borrowing costs, as explained in the 
previous section. Lower borrowing costs per unit of debt, in turn, provide an incentive 
for higher debt financing relative to equity. This leads to the following two hypotheses 
at the firm level. 
                                                        
81  This percentage is calculated combining figures reported by the Netherlands on total (equity plus debt) 
inward investments including investments in SPEs from the IMF CDIS (IMF, 2012a) and on total inward 
investments excluding investments in SPEs from OECD Statistics (OECD, 2012b). 
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Hypothesis F1  The use of debt securities is associated with higher debt financing 
relative to equity. 
 
Hypothesis F2  For firms that use debt securities, the use of a Dutch issuing SPE is 
associated with yet higher debt financing relative to equity. 
 
The hypotheses state that debt securities and Dutch issuing SPEs are instrumental in 
achieving a more leveraged capital structure. They do not necessarily imply a causal 
effect, because the use of debt securities is part of a firm’s financing policy and may 
follow from a certain leverage target. Methodological implications will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 When testing these hypotheses, other factors that influence debt financing must be 
accounted for. In general, debt finance is more attractive for larger firms, because of 
lower informational costs, and for firms that have more tangible assets or are less likely 
to experience financial distress, because of lower risks for creditors and therefore lower 
borrowing costs (Graham, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Next, it is well established in 
literature that the tax benefits of debt are higher if a firm is more profitable (Graham, 
2000). However, due to transaction costs and information asymmetry between managers 
and investors, firms may prefer to finance new investments with retained earnings 
instead of debt (Myers, 1984). Empirical studies generally show that more profitable 
firms use less debt (Myers, 1993; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999). The tax 
benefits of debt are less important for companies that use other strategies to minimize 
their taxes, such as manipulation of transfer prices (Graham & Tucker, 2006). Finally, 
the use of debt varies substantially among industries because of differences in market 
concentration, product uniqueness, business cyclicality and growth opportunities 
(Graham, 2000).  
 The analysis addresses most of these factors by controlling for a firm’s profitability, 
size and tangibility and for industry fixed effects. Controlling for the probability of 
financial distress is more difficult, because this probability also depends on the financing 
structure and is therefore largely endogenous. Empirical studies often use Z-scores 
(Altman, 2002) to estimate the probability of financial distress.82 One individual 
component of the Z-score, working capital divided by total assets, can still be added as a 
separate control variable. The use of other tax planning strategies cannot be controlled 
for directly, but to the extent that such strategies are industry specific, this omission is 
partly addressed by controlling for industry effects. 
 
 
                                                        
82  The Z-score is a weighted sum of certain financial ratios of a firm. 
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4.2.3 Debt	  financing	  at	  the	  subsidiary	  level	  
At the subsidiary level, the mechanisms through which taxation affects leverage require 
some elaboration. Various studies show that the leverage of foreign subsidiaries 
increases with the statutory tax rate (STR) for corporate income (Altshuler & Grubert, 
2002; Desai et al., 2004b; Grubert, 2003b; Jog & Tang, 2001; Mintz & Weichenrieder, 
2005). Part of this effect is due to deliberate debt shifting among affiliates within a 
multinational, but taxes influence the leverage of domestically owned companies as well 
(Egger et al., 2010; Overesch & Voeller, 2010). Several studies have distinguished debt 
shifting from the domestic tax effect by analysing how leverage depends on tax rate 
differences within a firm rather than on absolute tax rates. They find that debt shifting is 
statistically significant but small in magnitude (Büttner & Wamser, 2007; Huizinga et 
al., 2008; Møen et al., 2011). A study that compares domestically owned and foreign-
owned firms finds a larger debt shifting effect (Egger et al., 2010). 
 In contrast to other studies, this research specifically analyses the internal capital 
structure of large firms. Debt shifting in large firms may differ from small firms for two 
reasons. 
 First, large multinationals often use central treasury entities to raise external debt 
financing and to manage intra-group loans and deposits (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2005; 
Ruf, 2008). Even large multinationals with a decentralised structure, raising external 
finance at the country level in local currencies for example, have many subsidiaries 
whose debt is entirely intra-group. Thus, in large firms, comprehensive debt shifting 
through external debts at the lowest subsidiary level is unlikely. This contrasts with 
smaller firms, for which the shifting of external and internal debt is of equal importance 
(Møen et al., 2011).  
 Second, large multinationals are more likely to use complex tax planning structures, 
involving special tax planning affiliates that are based in tax havens or that take 
advantage of preferential tax regimes. Such structures have largely fixed implementation 
costs (Ruf, 2011). More specifically, they typically involve initial fixed costs for 
advisory and legal services and annual fixed costs to manage the tax planning entities. 
This implies that such structures can generate net benefits only for firms whose taxable 
income is above a certain threshold.83 The size of a multinational’s corporate tax 
department plays a role as well. 
 Even among large firms, the attractiveness of debt shifting structures involving 
special lowly taxed affiliates might continue to increases with firm size due to 
economies of scale. Although various studies show that leverage increases with the size 
of the individual subsidiary (Barion et al., 2010; Büttner et al., 2011; Møen et al., 2011; 
                                                        
83  Assuming a moderate taxable income threshold of €1.5 million, corresponding earnings before interest 
and taxes of €2.0 million, and a profit margin of 10%, the corresponding sales threshold would be €20 
million only. However, a firm’s future taxable income is uncertain and additional costs may arise if tax 
laws are amended or if authorities challenge a tax planning structure. Therefore in reality the threshold is 
probably higher. 
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Ruf, 2008, 2011), the effect of firm size on subsidiary leverage has not yet been 
investigated. Furthermore, Dutch onlending SPEs may facilitate debt shifting by 
reducing withholding taxes on interest paid to lowly taxed affiliates. This leads to the 
following two subsidiary-level hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis S1  Larger firm size is conducive to higher subsidiary leverage. 
 
This hypothesis states a causal effect of firm size on subsidiary leverage. Firm size can 
be regarded an exogenous variable. 
 
Hypothesis S2  The use of a Dutch onlending SPE is associated with higher subsidiary 
leverage. 
 
This hypothesis does not state a causal effect. A Dutch onlending SPE is expected to 
facilitate debt shifting, but does not cause it. Instead, subsidiary leverage and the use of 
an onlending SPE both follow from a firm’s financial strategy. Again, methodological 
implications will be discussed in the next section. 
 In both hypotheses, higher subsidiary leverage refers to an additional debt financing 
effect over and above the normal sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to host country STR. 
It is therefore not necessary to decompose the normal tax sensitivity of leverage into an 
international debt shifting effect and a domestic tax effect. However, relevant subsidiary 
characteristics should be controlled for, similar to the analysis at the firm level. The 
hypotheses assume an increase in average subsidiary leverage rather than an increase in 
the sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to host country STR. This is because the potential 
benefits of allocating income to lowly taxed affiliates would be substantial for 
subsidiaries in most or all EU countries.  
 Note that the use of special tax planning affiliates contrast with the implicit 
assumption in most studies on debt shifting that firms respond to tax rate differences 
among countries where they have active operations. That assumption mainly reflects tax 
planning in small and medium sized firms. Büttner and Wamser (2007) and Møen et al. 
(2011) do account for the possibility of lowly taxed financing affiliates, which helps to 
understand more complex tax planning structures. However, their assumption that the 
lowest-tax affiliate provides internal loans to other affiliates may still be problematic for 
large firms, because some large firms establish tax haven affiliates for other purposes. 
 
 
4.3 Analytical	  approach	  
The analytical model largely follows the theoretical framework outlined by Barion et al. 
(2010). A key assumption is that a multinational independently chooses the desired level 
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of total external leverage84 and the amount of intra-group debt shifting. The external 
leverage decision depends on the benefits of debt financing, which follow from the tax 
systems of all countries where a firm operates, and on the expected costs of financial 
distress. The debt shifting decision depends, generally speaking, on debt shifting 
opportunities and factors restraining the use of these opportunities. Apart from the costs 
to implement tax planning structures, those factors include the costs of managing 
increasing complexity and loss of flexibility, effective anti-avoidance rules (Ruf & 
Weichenrieder, 2009), legal risks, and the overall attitude of the board towards tax 
planning. 
 The analysis of Dutch issuing SPEs and firm level indebtedness is rather 
straightforward. It uses the following specification: 
0 1 2 3 4 5kt kt kt kt kt kt p t ktDebtSecurities IssuingSPE Size Xλ β β β β τ β β γ δ ε= + + + + + + + + . 
In this equation, λkt is the consolidated debt ratio or leverage of firm k at the end of fiscal 
year t. Thus, the dependent variable reflects the consolidated balance sheet of the 
ultimate parent company. DebtSecuritieskt and IssuingSPEkt are dummy variables that 
take the value one for all observations with outstanding debt securities and for 
observations with outstanding debt securities issued via Dutch SPEs, respectively. 
Hypothesis F1 is equivalent to β1 > 0 and hypothesis F2 to β2 > 0. τkt denotes home 
country STR, Sizekt is firm size, and Xkt reflects other firm characteristics. Finally, the 
specification includes industry peer group and year fixed effects, γp and δt, and an error 
term εkt. 
 The analysis of debt shifting at the subsidiary level is tailored to large multinationals 
and uses an empirical approach that differs from earlier studies in three ways. First, 
domestic subsidiaries are included in the analysis, because large firms may shift debt 
among all affiliates. Second, only lowest-level subsidiaries are included to avoid double 
counting of assets held through ownership chains. This is important because large 
multinationals hold many of their subsidiaries indirectly (Desai et al., 2003; 
Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008). In addition, to the extent that intermediate entities 
provide intra-group loans as well as equity to lowest-level subsidiaries, it mitigates a 
methodological problem caused by debt chains. The problem is that intra-group loan 
assets reduce the net indebtedness of an affiliate, but this cannot be accounted for 
because data on intra-group loan assets are not available in Amadeus.85 Third, all lowest-
level subsidiaries of a firm in the same country are combined into one entity. This is 
done by adding up the assets, liabilities, and sales items of the individual subsidiaries. 
                                                        
84  In their theoretical framework, Barion et al. (2010) assume that external debt is divided among group 
entities, but this is not relevant for the debt shifting decision. 
85  Limiting the analysis to lowest-level subsidiaries has the disadvantage of excluding assets other than 
intra-group financial assets held by intermediate entities. However, as many large firms have intra-group 
holding and debt chains with more than one intermediate level, the double counting and net leverage 
problems are more important. 
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Financial ratios are then calculated for the country-level entity as a whole. This prevents 
that firms with many subsidiaries per country dominate the analysis. Furthermore, it 
produces more meaningful results for large firms that have various lowest-level 
subsidiaries of very different sizes in the same country. 
 The debt shifting analysis uses the following specification:86 
λikt = β0 +β1τ ikt +β2(τ ikt −τ kt )+β3OnlendingSPEkt +β4Sizekt +β5λkt +β6Xikt +δt +εikt . 
In this equation, λikt denotes the leverage of country-level entity i belonging to firm k at 
the end of fiscal year t. Thus, the dependent variable in this equation reflects the 
combined unconsolidated balance sheets of all lowest-level subsidiaries in a country. τikt 
indicates host country STR and, in line with some studies on small firms, the difference 
between host and ultimate home country STR (τikt - τkt) is also included. OnlendingSPEkt 
is a firm-level dummy variable indicating the use of a Dutch SPE that lends from and to 
group companies. Hypothesis S1 is equivalent to β3 > 0 and hypothesis S2 to β4 > 0. The 
specification controls for consolidated firm leverage λkt and thus captures potential 
indirect SPE effects on subsidiary leverage via lower external borrowing costs at the 
firm level. This ensures that the SPE effect β3 reflects additional debt shifting at the 
level of subsidiaries only. Consolidated firm leverage is an exogenous variable in this 
equation, because it can be assumed that a multinational independently determines 
external leverage and intra-group debt shifting. Finally, Xikt denotes country-level entity 
characteristics, δt stands for year fixed effects and εikt is an error term. 
 The use of debt securities or Dutch SPEs is part of a firm’s financing policy and this 
creates a potential bias in both equations. Some factors conducive to their use may also 
tend to increase debt financing in ways that are not facilitated by debt securities or 
Dutch SPEs. Some important factors, notably firm size, are included in the 
specifications. However, other factors, such as risk appetite or tax aggressiveness, are 
not included because they cannot be directly observed. For debt securities, the problem 
is probably limited, because if a firm uses debt securities, these probably play a major 
role in the implementation of the firm’s financing policy. For SPEs, the regressions test 
whether effects associated with issuing, onlending, and other types of Dutch SPEs are 
different. If relevant unobserved factors are correlated with the use of SPEs, they are 
probably correlated with various SPE types. Thus, if effects are specific to one type of 




                                                        
86  The β- and δ-coefficients in this equation are unrelated to those in the equation for firm  level 
indebtedness. 
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4.4 Data	  description	  and	  examples	  of	  SPEs	  
4.4.1 Data	  set	  construction	  and	  financial	  ratios	  
The data set was constructed in three main steps. First, a rough inventory of Dutch SPEs 
was established by selecting all Dutch companies classified as financial holdings that do 
not conduct business outside the group. The data were obtained from the Reach database 
of commercial data provider Bureau van Dijk, which contains data on 2 million Dutch 
companies. 
 Second, industry peer groups of publicly listed manufacturing firms, based in EU-25 
countries other than the Netherlands, were constructed on the basis of key competitors 
listed in Hoovers company profiles.87 The approximate list of Dutch SPEs was used to 
select peer groups that included firms with and without Dutch SPEs. This step resulted 
in 13 industry peer groups, with a total of 82 firms for which financial data were 
available of at least five majority-owned subsidiaries in two or more EU-25 countries 
other than the Netherlands. Annex 4.1 lists all firms in the data set. Consolidated firm 
data and unconsolidated subsidiary data were retrieved for the fiscal years 1997, 1999, 
2001, 2003 and 2005 from the largest version of the Amadeus database, also of Bureau 
van Dijk, which covers 19 million European companies.88 National tax rates are taken 
from the European Commission (European Commission, 2005) and surveys by KPMG 
and Deloitte. 
 At the firm level, in some cases consolidated financial data for particular years are 
missing in Amadeus. These data were manually added from published annual accounts, 
if available. Furthermore, some firm-level data from Amadeus were incorrect.89 In 
approximately a third of the observations, one or more variables were corrected on the 
basis of the original annual accounts. The balance sheet items total equity, total 
liabilities and accounts payable did not require significant corrections. Subsidiary-level 
data were not checked for errors. 
 As a third step, the dummy values for debt issuance and SPE types were determined. 
For each firm and for each year, the debt securities dummy is set to one if at least €50 
million of debt securities were outstanding at the balance sheet date.90 For firms that had 
                                                        
87  For large firms, industry peer groups cannot be constructed using NACE Rev. 2 codes. Many ultimate 
parents have code 6420 (management activities of holding companies), regardless of the industry, and 
subsidiaries one firm can have many different NACE Rev. 2 codes. 
88  Firms are included in the analysis only for the years in which they were publicly listed as a separate firm. 
89  For example, debts were incorrectly included in other liabilities or fully reported as short-term even 
though part of the debts was long term. Errors were identified by checking zero values, missing items, and 
large swings in balance sheet items.  
90  All types of debt securities with an original maturity of at least one year and reported in the financial 
statements under liabilities. This includes bonds, loan notes, convertibles, debenture stocks and industrial 
revenue bonds, secured and unsecured, publicly traded and privately placed. The €50 million threshold 
serves to exclude firms that only had issued debt for remuneration purposes or taken on debt as part of 
minor acquisition deals. 
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at least €50 million of debt outstanding via a Dutch SPE, the issuing SPE is also set to 
one. Furthermore, the onlending SPE dummy is one for firms with a Dutch SPE of 
which both assets and liabilities included at least €50 million of intra-group loans. To 
check whether SPE effects are specific to issuing and onlending SPEs, a general SPE 
dummy is constructed as well. This dummy is one for all firms with a Dutch subsidiary 
that meets the following criteria: total assets are at least €50 million, the assets are 
mainly participations in or loans to foreign affiliates, and the liabilities are mainly loans 
from foreign affiliates or financial debts. The main sources for this third step are annual 
reports and corporate websites, company records of Dutch SPEs, debt issuance 
prospectuses, and information from credit rating agencies and security exchanges. 
 The resulting data set has a total of 365 firm-year observations for 82 firms and 
2,493 country-year observations, which are based on 9,371 underlying subsidiary-year 
observations. On average, the debt shifting regressions include 24 lowest-level 
subsidiaries in 7 countries per parent per year, compared to only two to five subsidiaries 
in other studies. UK and French country-level entities each constitute about 12% of total 
observations, whereas German entities constitute only 4%. This is due to differences in 
data availability in Amadeus. Earlier studies using Amadeus data (Barion et al., 2010; 
Huizinga et al., 2008; Overesch & Voeller, 2010) did not indicate that these differences 
would have major consequences. On average, the assets of the subsidiaries included in 
the regressions represent over 20% of consolidated firm assets. Taking into account that 
only EU subsidiaries are included and data availability for some EU countries is limited, 
this is an acceptable coverage of firm assets.91 
 Similar to other studies, leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities minus 
accounts payable to total assets minus accounts payable. Most firms report substantial 
non-debt liabilities, though, notably pension provisions, deferred tax liabilities, prepaid 
income and accrued expenses. Therefore the debt ratio, defined as debt divided by debt 
plus equity, is used as an alternative measure that reflects a firm’s choice between debt 
and equity more accurately. At the level of subsidiaries, leverage is the preferred 
measure, because non-current provisions are relatively small and alternative measures 
might be less reliable due to data errors. A few firm observations have negative equity, 
with a maximum firm leverage of 2.26 and debt ratio of 4.88. 17 country-level 
observations have a leverage that is higher or even negative; these are excluded from the 
analysis. 
 The control variables profitability and tangibility are defined as operating income 
(before financial items and taxes) divided by total assets and tangible fixed assets 
divided by total assets, respectively. 18 country-level observations with profitability 
below -1 or above +1 are excluded. The working capital ratio is calculated as working 
capital divided by total assets. Preliminary analysis shows that the working capital ratio 
                                                        
91  If intermediate subsidiaries would be included in the analysis as well, total subsidiary assets would add up 
on average to 200% of firm assets, which confirms the importance of holding chains and the resulting 
double counting problem.  
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is not a suitable control variable for lowest-level subsidiaries, especially in combination 
with tangibility, because it is almost a function of leverage.92 At the firm level, this 
problem does not occur.  
 
4.4.2 Descriptive	  statistics	  
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics at the firm level. The first three data columns 
present means, median values and standard deviations for all firm-year observations. 
Mean firm sales and assets are relatively high because there are a few very large firms in 
the data set. The largest firm is DaimlerChrysler, with sales and assets exceeding €100 
billion. The last three columns provide separate statistics for firm-year observations with 
no debt issued (or less than €50 million), with debt issued but not via a Dutch SPE, and 
with debt issued via a Dutch SPE. On average, firms with debt securities are larger and 
have a higher leverage than firms without debt securities, and firms with debt securities 
issued via Dutch SPEs are yet larger and more leveraged. 
 
Table	  4.1	   Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  firm-­‐level	  variables	  
	   	  
All	  firms	   	   	   No	  debt	  
securities	  
issued	  
	   Debt	  
issued,	  not	  
via	  SPE	  
	   Debt	  
issued	  via	  
SPE	  
	   mean	   median	   st.	  dev.	   	   mean	   	   mean	   	   mean	  
Firm	  leverage	  ratio	   0.64	   0.61	   0.21	   	   0.58	   	   0.63	   	   0.74	  
Firm	  debt	  ratio	   0.48	   0.45	   0.38	   	   0.38	   	   0.48	   	   0.64	  
Debt	  securities	  dummy	   0.69	   1	   0.46	   	   0	   	   1	   	   1	  
Issuing	  SPE	  dummy	   0.20	   0	   0.40	   	   0	   	   0	   	   1	  
Onlending	  SPE	  dummy	   0.20	   0	   0.40	   	   0.03	   	   0.20	   	   0.46	  
General	  SPE	  dummy	   0.52	   1	   0.50	   	   0.18	   	   0.54	   	   1	  
Ultimate	  parent	  STR	  (%)	   33.0	   30.0	   8.2	   	   32.2	   	   31.2	   	   38.7	  
Firm	  sales	  (€	  bn)	   12.7	   5.3	   21.6	   	   3.1	   	   9.8	   	   34.3	  
Firm	  assets	  (€	  bn)	   15.0	   5.8	   26.8	   	   3.1	   	   12.2	   	   40.0	  
Firm	  profitability	  ratio	   0.08	   0.07	   0.09	   	   0.08	   	   0.07	   	   0.09	  
Firm	  tangibility	  ratio	   0.30	   0.30	   0.14	   	   0.31	   	   0.30	   	   0.28	  
Firm	  working	  capital	  ratio	   0.15	   0.15	   0.15	   	   0.17	   	   0.14	   	   0.16	  
Note:	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  all	  firm-­‐year	  observations	  included	  in	  the	  empirical	  analysis;	  n	  =	  365.	  
 
 
                                                        
92  On average, 73% of subsidiary assets are current assets and 22% are tangible fixed assets, and 80% of 
subsidiary liabilities are current liabilities. Thus, working capital ratio + tangibility = (current assets - 
current liabilities) / total assets + tangible fixed assets / total assets ≈ (total assets - current liabilities) / 
total assets, which for many observations is close or equal to 1 - leverage. 
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Table	  4.2	   Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  country-­‐level	  entity	  variables	  
	  
All	  country-­‐level	  entities	   	   Firms	  without	  
onlending	  SPE	  
	   Firms	  with	  
onlending	  SPE	  
	   mean	   median	   st.dev.	   	   mean	   	   mean	  
Entity	  leverage	  ratio	   0.61	   0.64	   0.29	   	   0.59	   	   0.68	  
Entity	  STR	  (%)	   32.4	   33.8	   6.9	   	   32.5	   	   32.2	  
Entity	  STR	  –	  Ultimate	  parent	  STR	  (%)	   -­‐1.4	   0.0	   9.9	   	   -­‐0.5	   	   -­‐4.3	  
Entity	  sales	  (€	  mln)	   235	   45	   1,047	   	   135	   	   566	   	  
Entity	  assets	  (€	  mln)	   196	   31	   601	   	   147	   	   357	   	  
Entity	  profitability	  ratio	   0.07	   0.05	   0.13	   	   0.07	   	   0.05	  
Entity	  tangibility	  ratio	   0.23	   0.16	   0.21	   	   0.22	   	   0.23	  
Note:	  descriptive	  statistics	   for	  all	  entity-­‐year	  observations	   included	   in	  the	  empirical	  analysis;	  n	  =	  2,458,	  
based	  on	  8,834	  underlying	  lowest-­‐level	  subsidiary-­‐year	  observations.	  
 
Table 4.1 also shows that roughly half of the firms have a Dutch SPE. However, some 
SPEs are intermediate holdings only with no or limited debt financing activities. Dutch 
issuing SPEs are present in 20% of the observations. Onlending SPEs were also present 
for 20% of the observations and partly overlap with issuing SPEs. At the end of 2005, 
16 firms in the data set together had approximately €42 billion of debt securities 
outstanding via Dutch issuing SPEs, out of their total debt (including bank loans) of 
€243 billion. For these firms, the median ratio of debt issued via Dutch SPE to total 
debt was 24%. This confirms that debt issuance via Dutch SPEs plays a significant role 
in their overall funding strategies. Debt securities in general play even a larger role for 
the firms that use them. 
 Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics for country-level observations. Only 12% of 
these observations concerns domestic entities. The first three data columns present 
means, median values and standard deviations for all observations. The country-level 
entities are larger than individual subsidiaries in other studies, but leverage and other 
financial ratios are similar. The last two columns provide separate statistics for entities 
of firms without and with Dutch onlending SPEs, which account for roughly 75% and 
25% of observations, respectively. On average, entities of firms with onlending SPEs are 
larger and have a higher leverage. 
 
4.4.3 Concrete	  examples	  of	  SPEs	  
Various concrete examples of Dutch issuing SPEs show their role in debt financing at 
the firm level. The examples are selected with a view to diversity in SPE structures and 
home countries, taking into account the amount of information available about each 
structure. 
 A first example is Altadis Finance BV, a subsidiary of Spanish tobacco company 
Altadis SA. In 2003, this SPE raised €1.1 billion by issuing bonds with fixed interest 
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rates and maturities of 5 and 10 years. It lent the proceeds to the Spanish parent with 
matching maturities, but in part at variable interest rates, and used derivatives to hedge 
the resulting interest rate risk. The Dutch SPE did not have other activities, employees, 
or an office. Two other subsidiaries of Altadis issued debt securities as well. In 2005, a 
Spanish subsidiary issued a €500 million bond and a French subsidiary had €340 
million of commercial paper outstanding at the end of the year. 
 A second example is Conti Gummi Finance BV, an SPE used by the German firm 
Continental AG to issue a €million convertible bond in 2004. The SPE lent the proceeds 
onwards to the parent with a matching maturity at a spread of 25 basis points. 
Continental AG also issued €500 million of non-convertible bonds in 1999 and 2001 
and did so without using the Dutch SPE, which may suggest that the firm was 
specifically avoiding German withholding taxes on interest payments for convertible 
bonds. The Dutch SPE engaged in short-term lending to and from various affiliates as 
well, with credit and debit positions of approximately €60 million in 2005. 
 A third example is Saint-Gobain Nederland BV, which has issued bonds in various 
currencies and maturities since 1990. These funds were onlent to other group companies, 
mainly to the French parent Compagnie de Saint-Gobain SA. In 2005, the Dutch SPE 
had €4.0 billion of bond obligations, accounting for the largest part of the firm’s total 
securitised debt of €5.1 billion. 
 A fourth example is Südzucker International Finance BV,  a subsidiary of German 
food company Südzucker. This SPE issued virtually all of the firm’s bonds, amounting 
to €1.8 billion in 2005, including ordinary corporate bonds as well as a convertible bond 
and a perpetual hybrid bond. The SPE lent the proceeds onwards to various affiliates, 
partly on a short-term basis, and entered into interest rate swap agreements with its 
German parent to hedge the resulting maturity mismatches. 
 A fifth example is BMW Finance NV. This SPE has a broad financing role for 
BMW’s European and Asian affiliates. It manages the firm’s euro cash pool and has 
integrated issuing and onlending activities. In 2005, it had roughly €5 billion of debt 
securities outstanding, mostly long-term debt denominated in euro or Japanese yen, and 
€1 billion of short-term debt to affiliates that could not be identified. At the firm level, 
BMW had a further €14 billion of bonds and commercial paper outstanding via other 
entities, mainly SPEs in Belgium and Delaware (US). The Dutch SPE onlent the funds 
to affiliates in Europe and Asia, but also in Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand, partly 
through a second Dutch SPE called BMW Holding BV. Apparently the terms of the 
loans differed from the funding and the first SPE used derivatives to hedge the resulting 
currency and interest rate risks. The second Dutch SPE also held BMW subsidiaries in 
some 25 countries worldwide. 
 Thus, the issuing role of the above SPEs ranges from one specific type of bond to 
issuing virtually all of a firm’s debt securities. Some issuing SPEs transform the 
characteristics of external funding from fixed to variable interest or from long-term to 
short-term and perform related hedging activities. Whereas various issuing SPEs simply 
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pass on the funding to the parent company, some also have a role in the distribution of 
funds among affiliates. 
 Next, some examples of Dutch onlending SPEs show that their role in the capital 
structure of multinationals is different. Two examples were already provided above; the 
SPEs of Continental and BMW combined onlending and issuing activities. In these case 
of Continental, the nature of the onlending activities could not be determined. In the case 
of BMW, the loans to and from affiliates were apparently related to internal cash 
pooling. 
 A third example is Earlsfort Holdings BV, an onlending SPE of Irish food company 
Greencore Group plc (which has its headquarters in Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin, hence the 
SPE’s name). In 2005, this SPE passed on a loan of approximately €400 million from 
one affiliate, possibly located in Ireland or Jersey, to various other affiliates, including in 
the UK. Thus, Greencore may have used the onlending structure to channel internal 
interest payments to a lowly taxed financing affiliate, but this could not be confirmed on 
the basis of public filings. The internal loans were large considering the firm’s 
consolidated total assets of €1.2 billion. 
 A fourth, somewhat similar example is Scania Group Treasury Netherlands CV, a 
limited partnership indirectly owned by Swedish trucks manufacturer Scania AB. In 
2005, this SPE had onlent €1 billion from a treasury affiliate in Luxembourg to some 30 
affiliates in various countries, including in Europe. The SPE’s onlending volume was 
large compared to Scania’s consolidated total assets of €7 billion. It passed on €26 
million of interest payments to the Luxembourg affiliate, which may have benefitted 
from a low-tax regime. Most of the Dutch SPE’s loans and borrowings were long-term, 
but not with fully matching maturities, and the SPE used derivatives to hedge the 
resulting risks. 
 A fifth example is UPM-Kymmene Finance BV, a subsidiary of Finnish pulp and 
paper company UPM-Kymmene Oyj. In 2005, this SPE passed a long-term loan of 
approximately €750 million, maturing in 2015, from a Canadian affiliate onwards to a 
German affiliate. It hedged the associated currency risk via a swap agreement with the 
Finnish parent. The internal loan could be related to tax planning opportunities arising 
from UPM-Kymmene’s acquisition of Canadian and German businesses in 2000 and 
2001. However, publicly available information was insufficient to determine the precise 
purpose of this structure. 
 A sixth example is Nokia Finance International BV, a very large SPE with a Swiss 
branch. The Dutch head office is administrated by an external service provider, whereas 
the Swiss branch acts as the primary internal bank of the Nokia group and has some 20 
employees. Such structures allow companies to access the Dutch tax treaty network 
while allocating most profits to Switzerland, where they benefit from a low-tax regime 
(Berne Declaration, 2011). Apart from providing treasury services, such as netting and 
cash pooling, the Swiss branch managed currency risks using forward contracts. At the 
end of 2005, the SPE had taken €15 billion of deposits from group companies, provided 
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€10 billion of short-term loans to group companies, and invested €7 billion in 
government bonds and other highly liquid securities. The SPE’s net interest income for 
2005 amounted to €110 million (including foreign exchange losses). The SPE also held 
subsidiaries in about 25 countries worldwide. 
 Thus, different onlending SPEs have somewhat different roles. Some pass on loans 
from one specific affiliate to many other affiliates, a structure consistent with internal 
debt shifting involving a special lowly taxed affiliate. By contrast, other onlending SPEs 
pass on a loan to one specific affiliate only or take deposits from many affiliates. 
Although these structures may serve different purposes, there could be a debt shifting 
element as well. This is difficult to verify because the affiliates that receive interest 
payments through Dutch SPEs are usually not identified. For the purpose of this 
research, it is assumed that all onlending SPEs can facilitate debt shifting. 
 
 
4.5 Empirical	  results	  
4.5.1 Debt	  financing	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  
Table 4.3 shows the regression results of the firm-level specifications with the debt ratio 
as the main dependent variable. Column (1) shows the baseline specification without 
dummy variables for debt securities and SPEs. Following other studies, it uses a 
logarithmic transformation of firm sales as the firm size variable. Some control variables 
have unexpected coefficients. Contrary to expectations, firm size has no significant 
effect. Perhaps this is because some firms in the data set are so large that economies of 
scale in debt financing have been exhausted. Next, higher profitability is associated with 
a higher debt ratio, which is in line with theory but not with results from earlier studies. 
The negative coefficient for tangibility suggests that the availability of collateral does 
not increase the use of debt. For large multinationals, whose debt is largely unsecured, 
this makes sense. Instead, it suggests that the depreciation of investments may generate a 
non-debt tax shield that reduces the incentive for debt financing (Büttner et al., 2011). 
Next, firms with relatively more working capital have a lower debt ratio. This may 
indicate that the working capital ratio alone is not a good indicator for the probability of 
financial distress or still partly endogenous. Finally, industry fixed effects are significant 
and substantial, as expected. 
 Specification (2) adds the debt securities dummy. The use of debt securities is 
associated with significantly higher debt financing, which confirms hypothesis F1. 
Everything else equal, large firms that issue debt securities finance 12% more of the 
total debt and equity on their balance sheet through debt. Specification (3) also adds the 
issuing SPE dummy. The issuance of debt securities via a Dutch SPE is associated with 
a further significant increase in debt financing relative to equity, over and above the 
increase of the debt ratio associated with debt securities in general. This confirms 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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Table	  4.3	   Analysis	  of	  debt	  financing	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  











Issuing	  SPE	  dummy	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.13**	  
(0.06)	  
-­‐	   -­‐	  
0.06**	  
(0.03)	  
Onlending	  SPE	  dummy	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.02	  
(0.05)	  
-­‐	   -­‐	  


















































































Year	  fixed	  effects	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Industry	  fixed	  effects	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
n	   365	   365	   365	   365	   365	   356	  
R2	   0.16	   0.18	   0.21	   0.18	   0.18	   0.27	  
Note:	   Dependent	   variable	   is	   the	   firm	   debt	   ratio,	   reflecting	   the	   consolidated	   balance	   sheet	   of	   the	  
ultimate	   parent.	   Firm	   size	   is	   calculated	   as	   10log(sales	   /	   €1	  mln).	   Standard	   errors	   are	   in	   parentheses.	   *	  
denotes	  p	  <	  0.10;	  **	  p	  <	  0.05;	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01.	  
 
hypothesis F2. The additional use of a Dutch issuing SPE facilitates higher debt 
financing as much as the use of debt securities in general. This is a rather strong yet not 
implausible result. 
 Specifications (4) and (5) test whether Dutch onlending SPEs or Dutch SPEs in 
general have a similar effect on debt ratios. The effect of such SPEs is insignificant, 
though. This confirms that the higher debt financing associated with issuing SPEs is 
indeed related to the specific purpose of those SPEs and does not merely reflect more 
elaborate tax planning or more aggressive tax strategies in general.93 
                                                        
93  Moreover, it indicates that Dutch onlending SPEs are not primarily used to pass on external debt financing 
issued in another country. 
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 Specification (6) excludes observations of firms with negative equity. Negative 
equity is often temporary, typically the result of accumulated losses or deliberate 
financing decisions, and properly reflects real-world capital structures.94 The exclusion 
of negative equity observations is therefore somewhat arbitrary and useful as a 
robustness check only. Although only nine observations are excluded, these have an 
average debt ratio of 2.14, compared to an average of 0.44 for the remaining 356 
observations. In the regression results, the issuing SPE coefficient is reduced by half but 
remains significant. 
 Other robustness checks, not shown in the table, include the following: using the 
original firm data from Amadeus without manual additions and corrections, using assets 
instead of sales to measure firm size, leaving out the working capital ratio or industry 
fixed effects, using leverage instead of the debt ratio as the dependent variable, and 
testing the issuing SPE dummy among the subset of firms that have outstanding debt 
securities. The main results are robust to all of these variations. 
 
4.5.2 Debt	  financing	  at	  the	  subsidiary	  level	  
Table 4.4 shows regression results of country-level entity specifications for the analysis 
of debt financing at the subsidiary level. The dependent variable is the country-level 
entity’s leverage, reflecting the combined balance sheets of lowest-level subsidiaries. 
Column (1) presents the baseline specification. It uses the same logarithmic 
transformation of sales as above to measure entity size. The host country STR 
coefficient is significant, but the coefficient for the difference between host and home 
country STR is not. The latter contrasts with other studies, but is in line with 
expectations for large multinationals. The effects associated with firm leverage, entity 
size and entity profitability all have the expected sign and are highly significant. Entity 
tangibility does not have a significant effect, though, while a negative effect was 
expected due to the debt shield of depreciation. 
 Column (2) is similar to (1) but includes only wholly-owned subsidiaries in the 
country-level entities.95 The entity STR coefficient now becomes larger and fully 
significant. This is consistent with the finding from other studies that leverage is more 
responsive to tax variables for subsidiaries that are wholly owned (Büttner & Wamser, 
2007; Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2005). Keeping ultimate parent STR constant, a 1 %- 
point increase in entity STR on average increases leverage by 0.3 %-point. The size of 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
                                                        
94  This can be illustrated with firms from the data set. Premier Foods plc had been deliberately loaded with 
debt by private equity investors when it became publicly listed in 2005. During the period 1997-2005, the 
book value of Imperial Chemical Industries plc’s equity was relatively small; in 2001 and 2005 it was 
slightly negative and in 1997, 1999 and 2003 it was slightly positive. For Charter plc, it was negative in 
1997 but positive in later years, and for Rhodia SA, it was negative in 2005 but positive in earlier years. 
95  These are defined as subsidiaries for which Amadeus gives an exact total ownership percentage of at least 
98% or “WO” (subsidiary is wholly owned, that is, for at least 98%) and/or a global ownership 
qualification of “UO+” (direct ownership percentage at each step in the holding chain is at least 98%). 
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Table	  4.4	   Analysis	  of	  debt	  financing	  at	  the	  subsidiary	  level	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	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-­‐	   -­‐	  
0.03**	  
(0.01)	  
Issuing	  SPE	  dummy	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
-­‐0.00	  
(0.02)	  
-­‐	   -­‐	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Year	  fixed	  effects	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
k	  (firm-­‐year	  groups)	   365	   358	   365	   365	   358	   358	   358	   365	  
n	  (entity-­‐year	  obs.)	   2,458	   2,191	   2,458	   2,458	   2,191	   2,191	   2,191	   2,351	  
Subsidiaries	  /	  entity	   3.6	   3.2	   3.6	   3.6	   3.2	   3.2	   3.2	   3.7	  
R2	   0.16	   0.15	   0.17	   0.17	   0.16	   0.15	   0.16	   0.15	  
Note:	   Dependent	   variable	   is	   country-­‐level	   entity	   leverage,	   reflecting	   the	   combined	   unconsolidated	  
balance	   sheets	  of	   a	   firm’s	   lowest-­‐level	   subsidiaries	   in	   a	   country.	   Firm	  and	   country-­‐level	   entity	   size	   are	  
calculated	   as	   10log(sales	   /	   €1	   mln).	   Standard	   errors,	   robust	   to	   clustering	   in	   firm-­‐year	   groups,	   are	   in	  
parentheses.	  Observations	  are	  weighted	  by	  total	  assets	  of	  all	  subsidiaries	  of	  the	  same	  firm	  in	  the	  same	  
country.	  *	  denotes	  p	  <	  0.10;	  **	  p	  <	  0.05;	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01.	  
 
this effect is similar to the estimates (without firm heterogeneity variables) of Büttner et 
al. (2011), but smaller than the estimates of Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), Barion et 
al. (2010), and Møen et al. (2011). 
 Specification (3) adds the sales variable for firm size to test whether large firms 
finance their EU subsidiaries with relatively more debt. The effect is significant, which 
confirms hypothesis S1. If firm sales increase by a factor ten, everything else equal, the 
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leverage of subsidiaries in an EU country increases with 5 %-points. Entity STR 
becomes insignificant. Specification (4) adds the onlending SPE dummy to test whether 
large firms use onlending SPEs to implement such financing strategies. The use of a 
Dutch onlending SPE is indeed associated with significantly higher country-level entity 
leverage, which confirms hypothesis S2. On average, the difference in leverage is 4 %-
points. This finding does not result from the correlation between the use of SPEs and 
firm size, because firm size is controlled for.96 The effect of firm size remains 
significant, which indicates that larger firms also use strategies to shift debt towards EU 
subsidiaries that do not involve Dutch SPEs. Column (5) restricts the observations again 
to wholly-owned subsidiaries. This increases the effect of strategies involving Dutch 
onlending SPEs. Entity STR becomes significant again and its partial effect on entity 
leverage is similar to column (2). 
 Analogous to the firm-level specifications, columns (6) and (7) test whether Dutch 
issuing SPEs or Dutch SPEs in general also have an effect on the leverage of wholly-
owned subsidiaries in an EU country. The results do not show significant direct effects, 
though. This confirms that the leverage effect associated with the use of onlending SPEs 
is indeed related to the specific operations of those SPEs and not merely driven by 
unobserved factors that also influence the use of SPEs in general. 
 Specification (8) excludes all entity observations with negative equity, in line with 
most studies on debt shifting. Similar to the firm-level specifications, this is useful as a 
robustness check only and somewhat arbitrary, because negative equity may be 
unintended and is often temporary.97 Compared to specification (4), the firm size and 
onlending SPE coefficients are slightly smaller and host country STR becomes 
significant again. The tangibility coefficient is significantly negative, as in Büttner et al. 
(2011) and Huizinga et al. (2008). 
 Other robustness checks, not shown in the table, include using the uncorrected 
Amadeus data, leaving out tangibility as a control variable, using assets instead of sales 
to measure firm and entity size, including intermediate-level subsidiaries with limited 
fixed financial assets,98 excluding domestic entities, and combinations of these 
variations. The main results are very similar to columns (4) and (5). It can be concluded 
that the findings are robust. 
 
                                                        
96  The correlation between the onlending SPE dummy and the sales variable for firm size is 0.42. A probit 
regression shows that if firm size doubles and other firm level variables are kept constant, the probability 
of having a Dutch onlending SPE increases approximately 10%-points.  
97  Out of the 107 entity observations with negative equity, 78% concern entities that had positive equity in 
another year. 
98  These are subsidiaries that have one or more subsidiaries themselves. A relatively low threshold of fixed 
financial assets is used to include only intermediate-level subsidiaries with substantial operational 
activities and to limit double-counting of assets and equity in holding chains. Approximately half of the 
4,700 intermediate-level subsidiary observations are below this threshold. The number of entity 
observations slightly increases to 2,759.  
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4.6 Conclusions	  and	  discussion	  
This chapter analysed external and internal debt financing of large European 
multinationals. At the firm level, it confirmed the hypotheses that the use of debt 
securities is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity and that the use of a 
Dutch issuing SPE is associated with yet higher debt financing. These effects are robust 
to alternative specifications and relatively large. 
 Controlling for relevant firm characteristics, firms with a Dutch issuing SPE on 
average have a ten percentage points higher debt ratio. One might wonder how this 
effect can be so large. If the effect is due to strongly reduced borrowing costs, then why 
do not all large European firms choose to issue debt through Dutch SPEs? At least two 
answers to this question are possible. First, the use of Dutch issuing SPEs and the 
amount of debt financing may both result from a firm’s overall tax strategy. Firms that 
pursue corporate tax deductions more aggressively will use more debt and are also more 
inclined to avoid withholding taxes. Second, large EU firms with a more risky financing 
structure may require a broader investor base and more diverse debt securities to place 
all their debt. This probably increases the benefits of a Dutch SPE, because avoidance of 
withholding tax may be related to creditors from particular countries or specific types of 
debt securities only. 
 At the subsidiary level, the analysis confirmed the hypotheses that EU subsidiaries 
of larger multinationals are more leveraged and that the use of Dutch onlending SPEs is 
also associated with higher subsidiary leverage. These effects are robust as well. In 
addition, the analysis shows that in large firms, the sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to 
host country STR is relatively low. In combination, these results suggest that large firms 
are more likely to shift debt from special lowly taxed affiliates towards subsidiaries in 
most or all EU countries and that this is partly facilitated by Dutch onlending SPEs. 
 However, the results provide only indirect evidence for such structures. Due to data 
limitations, it could not be directly verified that SPEs channelled interest payments from 
EU subsidiaries onwards to lowly taxed affiliates. Various concrete examples show that 
some, but not all, onlending SPEs are likely to facilitate such structures. A few more 
general methodological limitations should also be noted, but these are unlikely to affect 
the overall results. 
 The consequences of external and internal debt financing through SPEs are 
profound. Social benefits include higher after-tax returns for firms and potentially higher 
investment, which in turn may generate additional economic activity and tax revenues. 
The corresponding social costs consist of lower tax revenues at a given level of 
investment, implementation costs of tax planning, and higher financial risks in the 
corporate sector. In addition, the use of SPEs affects market functioning. It reduces 
differences in taxation between large firms from different EU countries, while it 
increases differences in taxation between large and small firms due to fixed 
implementation costs. The most profound impact, though, is that tax-planning structures 
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involving SPEs effectively limit the policy space of individual EU countries. The EU 
system for withholding taxes is like a free trade area with members that set their own 
tariffs for external trade while there are no rules of origin. Inevitably, such a system 
results in arbitrage, and Dutch SPEs are instrumental in arbitrage schemes to avoid 
interest withholding tax. A policy option for the EU, to address the negative impacts of 
arbitrage, is to consider uniform EU-wide external withholding taxes. 
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Food	  products	   Südzucker	  AG	  
Danisco	  A/S	  
Tate	  &	  Lyle	  plc	  
Associated	  British	  Foods	  plc	  
Uniq	  plc	  
Premier	  Foods	  plc	  
Kerry	  Group	  plc	  
Greencore	  Group	  plc	  
Tobacco	   Altadis	  SA	  
British	  American	  Tobacco	  plc	  
Swedish	  Match	  AB	  
Imperial	  Tobacco	  Group	  plc	  




Stora	  Enso	  Oyj	  
Holmen	  AB	  












Heidelberg	  Cement	  AG	  
FLSmidth	  &	  Co.	  A/S	  
Vicat	  SA	  





Buzzi	  Unicem	  SpA	  
Italmobiliare	  SpA	  
Steel	   ThyssenKrupp	  AG	  
GEA	  Group	  AG	  
Acerinox	  SA	  






Packaging	   Rexam	  plc	  
Huhtamäki	  Oyj	  





Böhler	  -­‐	  Uddeholm	  AG	  
Vossloh	  AG	  
Vestas	  Wind	  Systems	  A/S	  





Spirent	  Communications	  plc	  
Indesit	  Company	  SpA	  
Charter	  plc	  
Pirelli	  &	  Co	  SpA	  
Sandvik	  AB	  
AB	  Electrolux	  
Atlas	  Copco	  AB	  





Alcatel	  –	  Lucent	  SA	  
Telefon	  AB	  LM	  Ericsson	  
Telent	  plc	  
Safran	  SA	  
Motor	  vehicles	   Volkswagen	  AG	  











Smiths	  Group	  plc	  
Meggitt	  plc	  
Thales	  SA	  
BAE	  Systems	  plc	  
Saab	  AB	  
Rolls-­‐Royce	  Group	  plc	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Abstract  Many large firms use Dutch Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to avoid 
corporate taxes. This chapter shows that Dutch SPEs mainly pass on equity and 
loans to foreign affiliates, sometimes combined with debt issuance. These structures 
facilitate avoidance of withholding taxes, particularly in specific developing and 
EU countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Ghana, Mongolia, Portugal, 
and Spain. Dutch SPEs also facilitate profit shifting through royalty payments. Tax 
avoidance via SPE structures has major implications for international tax policy. 
Countries could respond by adjusting withholding taxes unilaterally, improving 
anti-avoidance measures, or renegotiating certain tax treaties. 
	  ·∙	  151	  ·∙	  
5.1 Introduction	  
Developing countries require sustainable sources of finance for development. Most 
countries will need to increase domestic tax revenues to gradually replace aid and debt 
as sources of finance for public goods and services (OECD & AfDB, 2010; UNCTAD, 
2010). For low income countries, this need is often reinforced by the loss of tariff 
revenues due to trade liberalisation (Braunsgaard & Keen, 2005; Khattry & Mohan Rao, 
2002). In the EU, raising tax revenues is a priority as well, but for different reasons. 
Various EU countries are faced with unsustainable fiscal deficits, because their public 
debt and borrowing costs increased sharply as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 In developing countries, donor support to strengthen tax systems mainly addresses 
domestic constraints, such as administrative capacity (OECD, 2012c). However, 
international constraints are important as well. These include illicit capital flight and 
evasion of personal income tax on assets held offshore (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2008; 
UNCTAD, 2010) and transfer pricing abuses and international tax arbitrage by 
multinationals (Lesage et al., 2010; OECD & AfDB, 2010). Developing countries can 
take steps to mitigate these problems themselves, but donor countries can also help to 
reform the international tax system. In some EU countries with large deficits, curbing 
domestic tax evasion is a priority. Regarding international constraints, in 2012, the 
European Commission launched an initiative against so-called double non-taxation, 
targeting international tax arbitrage. 
 Policies against aggressive corporate tax avoidance often focus on profit shifting to 
jurisdictions with low or zero corporate income taxes. However, withholding taxes 
(WHT) require attention too. These are a material source of revenue by themselves, 
especially for countries with relatively large foreign investments. In addition, 
withholding taxes on interest or royalties can form a barrier against profit shifting 
(Conklin & Robertson, 1999) and withholding taxes on dividends provide an incentive 
against repatriation of profits and capital. Corporate structures to avoid withholding 
taxes usually involve conduit entities in countries with favourable tax treaties, such as 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Mauritius. Tax treaties reduce or lock in withholding 
taxes on a bilateral basis. 
 This chapter provides new insights on withholding tax and tax treaty policy. These 
insights follow from an analysis of international tax avoidance strategies involving 
Dutch Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). The chapter addresses three related questions. 
First, what are the main Dutch SPE types and what tax avoidance strategies do they 
facilitate? Second, considering the total investment positions and income flows of all 
Dutch SPEs, what tax avoidance strategies have the largest consequences for 
international tax policy? And third, which countries are most affected by particular tax 
avoidance strategies? The results indicate that in general, policy implications are largest 
for developing and EU countries. In specific countries, such as Indonesia and Portugal, 
multinationals avoided more than €50 million of taxes in 2010. In other countries, such 
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as Mongolia and Ghana, foreign firms have invested via SPEs structures that may result 
in substantial future tax avoidance. Policy options for these countries are discussed at the 
end of the chapter. 
 This chapter contributes to existing research by analysing which individual countries 
are most affected and why. Previous studies show that the Netherlands is a key conduit 
country for FDI and hosts many debt-issuing SPEs (Desai et al., 2003; Dreßler, 2012; 
Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008; Weyzig, in press; Weyzig & Van Dijk, 2009). In 
addition, several case studies provide examples of tax avoidance via Dutch SPEs 
(Bender, 2007; Berne Declaration, 2011; Hearson & Brooks, 2010; Kandev, 2009; 
Kleinbard, 2011; Michielse, 2011). However, so far a more comprehensive analysis was 
still lacking. This chapter combines insights from case studies and case law with a 
quantitative analysis that covers all firms with large Dutch SPEs. It uses a unique 
combination of data sources, including anonymous micro data on Dutch SPEs, macro 
data from the IMF, OECD and BIS, data from security exchanges and individual 
company accounts. 
 The outline of the chapter is as follows. The next section reviews existing literature 
on Dutch SPE structures. After that, each of the three research questions above is 
addressed in a separate empirical section. These sections include descriptions of the 
relevant data sources and methodology. Finally, the last section presents overall 
conclusions and discusses policy implications. 
 
 
5.2 Literature	  review	  
5.2.1 Introduction	  
This literature review discusses reasons why multinationals use Dutch SPEs. It draws 
from academic sources as well as court and arbitration cases and source documents of 
civil society reports and news articles. The various reasons are grouped into four 
subsections. The first two subsections focus on FDI routed through the Netherlands, 
commonly referred to as FDI diversion. They discuss tax and non-tax reasons, 
respectively. The third subsection focuses on external funding (from outside the 
corporate group) via Dutch SPEs and the fourth on the role of Dutch SPEs in trading 
services or goods. These last two subsections discuss tax strategies only, because no 
information was found on non-tax reasons.  
 
5.2.2 FDI	  diversion	  for	  tax	  reasons	  
Previous research shows that Dutch tax treaties are a key determinant of FDI diverted 
through the Netherlands. In part, this is due to specific corporate structures aiming to 
avoid dividend withholding taxes (Weyzig, in press). Investing in foreign countries via a 
Dutch holding generally allows to benefit from the reduction of host country 
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withholding taxes under these treaties. Since 2006, many firms have extended these 
holding chains by inserting a Dutch members cooperative between the Dutch holding 
and its foreign parent. Until 2012, this allowed to avoid any Dutch withholding tax on 
profits distributed onwards to the home country as well, because profit distributions by 
cooperatives were not treated as dividends.99 Firms may also avoid Dutch dividend 
withholding tax by distributing income in the form of capital repayments (Merks, 2011). 
Other aspects of tax treaties, such as legal certainty or reduced withholding taxes on 
interest, probably play a role for FDI diversion as well (Weyzig, in press). 
 In one example, in 2009, the Canadian firm Ivanhoe Mines (now Turquoise Hills 
Resources) transferred most of its stake in the Mongolian copper mine project Oyu 
Tolgoi LLC to a newly established Dutch company, which it holds via a Dutch 
cooperative. As a consequence, the dividends from the Mongolian subsidiary are not 
subject to the standard 10% withholding tax rate specified in the investment agreement 
or the 5% rate of the Mongolia-Canada tax treaty, but exempt under the Mongolia-
Netherlands treaty. At the time, profits distributed onwards via the Dutch cooperative to 
the Canadian parent would have been exempt from withholding tax as well (Michielse, 
2011; Sunley et al., 2010). In another example, Volvo from Sweden and Henlys Group 
from the UK set up a Dutch holding company to acquire the Canadian firm Prévost Car. 
As a consequence, the dividends they received from Prévost were subject to the 5% 
withholding tax rate under the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty instead of the 15% and 
10% rates under the Canada-Sweden and Canada-UK tax treaties, respectively (Kandev, 
2009).100 Some firms use a Dutch intermediate holding with a Swiss branch. Examples 
are commodity traders Trafigura and Gunvor, who carry out their main trading activities 
in Switzerland. This structure allows them to access Dutch tax treaties, which generally 
specify lower withholding taxes than Swiss treaties, while allocating most of their 
trading profits to Switzerland, where they are taxed at a low rate (Berne Declaration, 
2011; Thuronyi, 2001). 
 Avoidance of host country tax on capital gains can be another reason to invest via a 
Dutch holding. This is illustrated by the Lamesa Holding case concerning a US private 
equity firm that acquired an Australian mining company via a Dutch conduit.101 When 
the conduit sold the mining company’s shares, the capital gains on the mining property 
were exempt from Australian tax under the Netherlands-Australia tax treaty and from 
Dutch tax under domestic tax rules (Bender, 2007).  
 Firms may also avoid host country corporate income tax through hybrid financing 
via Dutch SPEs. Under certain conditions, interest payments on so-called profit 
participating loans from Dutch entities are regarded as dividends for Dutch tax 
                                                        
99  A cooperative must have at least two members, so most firms divide the direct ownership of the Dutch 
cooperative between two legal entities in the home country. In 2012, the Dutch government introduced 
anti-abuse legislation, treating distributions to foreign members as dividends if a structure mainly aims to 
avoid dividend withholding tax. 
100  Prévost Car Inc. v. Canada, Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, case no. 2009 FCA 57. 
101  Lamesa Holding BV v. Commissioner of Taxation, Federal Court of Australia, case no. 1999 FCA 612. 
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purposes.102 Since 2007, these payments are tax exempt in the Netherlands, even if they 
are tax deductible in the source country (Heithuis, 2006). Examples of countries that 
allow such deductions are France, Belgium, Spain, and Finland. 
 Various studies show that multinationals from countries that tax foreign dividend 
income, notably the US, invest via intermediate holdings in so-called base countries like 
the Netherlands to avoid this home country tax (Altshuler & Grubert, 2002; Desai et al., 
2003; Grubert, 1998; Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008). For US firms, this frequently 
involves foreign subsidiaries that are disregarded as separate entities for US tax 
purposes. Statistics show that large US investments in the Netherlands relatively often 
involve such entities (Mahony & Miller, 2011). Other data show that Dutch subsidiaries 
distributed approximately USD 90 billion of dividends qualifying for the US tax holiday 
on repatriated foreign profits during 2004-2006. This was almost a third of total 
qualifying dividends from all countries worldwide (Redmiles, 2008). Thus, 
multinationals use Dutch holdings to avoid home country taxes on foreign profits as well 
as host country taxes. 
 
5.2.3 FDI	  diversion	  for	  non-­‐tax	  reasons	  
FDI diversion via the Netherlands can also be motivated by non-tax reasons, such as 
investment protection under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). As of June 2011, at 
least 29 claims had been filed by foreign-controlled Dutch intermediate holdings that 
sought protection under a Dutch investment treaty (Van Os & Knottnerus, 2011). 
 A striking example is the investment in Aguas del Tunari, a privatised drinking 
water enterprise in Bolivia, by utilities firms Bechtel from the US and Abengoa from 
Spain. After public protests in 2000 about access to drinking water, the Bolivian 
government cancelled the concession to Aguas del Tunari. Anticipating this, Bechtel and 
Abengoa had transferred the Aguas del Tunari shares to a Dutch holding. They 
subsequently claimed compensation under the Netherlands-Bolivia investment treaty.103  
Similarly, in 2005, Mobil Corporation transferred the ownership of its oil projects in 
Venezuela to a Dutch holding before these projects were nationalised, in order to claim 
protection under the Netherlands-Venezuela investment treaty (Blyschak, 2011). The 
arbitration tribunals allowed both claims to proceed despite the obvious diversion of the 
investments. 
 Beyond protection under bilateral treaties, one might expect that FDI diversion can 
reduce exposure to political instability, corruption, or weak legal infrastructure in the 
home and host country. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is relevant for joint 
ventures. However, a quantitative study found that home and host country corruption 
have no significant impact on overall patterns of FDI diversion via the Netherlands 
(Weyzig, in press). 
                                                        
102  X B.V. v. Deputy Minister of Finance, Dutch Supreme Court, case no. AT5958. 
103  Aguas del Tunari SA v. The Republic of Bolivia, ICSID, case no. ARB/03/2. 
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5.2.4 Tax	  strategies	  involving	  external	  funding	  
Some tax avoidance strategies involve the diversion of external debt or equity funding 
rather than FDI. Some non-financial firms from EU countries use Dutch conduits to 
issue debt securities. This eliminates any withholding taxes on interest payments to 
foreign creditors, because payments to a Dutch conduit are exempt under the EU Interest 
and Royalties Directive and the Netherlands has no withholding tax on interest. The 
Dutch conduits usually onlend the funds to the foreign parent company or other affiliates 
(DNB, 2009a). This tax strategy is similar to the issuance of bonds by US multinationals 
via the Netherlands Antilles in the past (Papke, 2000). Firms from non-EU countries can 
use this strategy if the withholding tax rate on interest payments to Dutch affiliates is 
lower than the average rate on payments to foreign non-affiliated creditors. The 
diversion of debt financing can involve bank loans as well. Some foreign financial firms 
also use Dutch special purpose vehicles to issue structured products, such as securities 
backed by foreign assets (DNB, 2009b). 
 In one example, a Dutch financing conduit may also have facilitated avoidance of 
corporate income tax. This example concerns a conduit of Energias de Portugal that 
onlends financing from debt issuance and bank loans to affiliates in Portugal and Spain. 
An agreement with the Dutch tax authority specified its minimum taxable income as an 
arms-length return on equity, plus a spread of 0.03% on on-lent funds, minus operational 
costs. Apparently the agreement allowed the conduit to earn some €12 million of net 
interest income effectively tax free in the years 2008 and 2009 combined. For the years 
2010 to 2012, the conduit reported much higher net interest income. However, in 2012 it 
was decided that the agreement with the tax authority did no longer apply from 2010 
onwards, so for these years the full profits of the conduit were subject to corporate 
income tax in the Netherlands.104 
 Next, some foreign multinationals (that are no joint ventures) have their ultimate 
parent company in the Netherlands. The tax and non-tax benefits of these structures are 
largely similar to those of Dutch intermediate holdings. Withholding tax rates on 
dividend payments to external shareholders are not exceptionally low.   
 Various examples of such multinationals are publicly known or have attracted media 
attention.105 These include Ikea, Pluspetrol, EADS, STMicroelectronics, X5 Retail 
Group, ShalkiyaZinc, PPF Group, Chicago Bridge & Iron, Celtel (since 2010 part of 
Bharti Airtel), and James Hardie Industries (in 2010 relocated to Ireland). The 
                                                        
104  The company initially reported an effective tax rate on the conduit’s profit for 2010 of 1.4%, but in 2012 
this was adjusted to 25%. See also European Commission (TAXUD), Summary report of the responses 
received on the public consultation on factual examples and possible ways to tackle double non-taxation 
cases, 5 Jul 2012. 
105  See for example “IKEA: Flat-pack accounting,” The Economist”, 11 May 2006; Tax Justice Network 
blog, http://taxjustice.blogspot.nl/2009/06/fiscal-fireworks-dutch-announce-5-tax.html (accessed 23 Aug 
2012) on James Hardie; Permanent People’s Tribunal (2010), “The European Union and transnational 
corporations in Latin America” on Pluspetrol. 
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shareholding structure differs per firm. For example, EADS is partly listed on several 
European exchanges, X5 Retail Group is listed in London, and Chicago Bridge & Iron in 
New York. South American oil company Pluspetrol and Czech private equity firm PPF 
Group are privately held by foreign investors. Ikea has no shareholders, but is owned by 
a Dutch foundation and controlled by the family of Ikea’s founder. Some of these 
multinationals, such as Pluspetrol and X5 Retail Group, do not have a physical presence 
in the Netherlands. 
 
5.2.5 Tax	  strategies	  involving	  trade	  in	  services	  or	  goods	  
In all tax avoidance strategies reviewed above, diversion of investment and borrowings 
plays a key role. Other strategies depend on trade arrangements instead. These trading 
strategies have an investment component as well, but in contrast to the investment 
strategies above, tax is mainly avoided on trading income and not on investment income. 
 Several studies found evidence that R&D-intensive firms have more flexibility to 
shift profits (Desai et al., 2006; Grubert, 2003a; Stöwhase, 2002). For example, US 
legislation facilitates the migration of intellectual property to tax haven affiliates through 
cost-sharing agreements with R&D sites in the US (Mutti & Grubert, 2009). As a 
consequence, Forest Laboratories and Google were able to locate key intellectual 
property in Bermuda, a zero tax jurisdiction. They collected royalties for the use of this 
intellectual property via Ireland and then passed the payments onwards to Bermuda via a 
Dutch conduit.106 In this strategy, the Dutch royalty conduit holds a sub-license and 
serves to avoid the standard Irish 20% withholding tax on royalties (Kleinbard, 2011). 
The rate to the Netherlands is 0% because of the EU Interest and Royalties Directive and 
the Netherlands does not impose a withholding tax on royalties. The Velcro Canada case 
illustrates that non-US firms can use similar strategies.107 Velcro migrated its intellectual 
property to the Netherlands Antilles and also channelled royalties through a Dutch entity 
with a sub-license. The payments qualified for 0% withholding tax under the Canada-
Netherlands tax treaty instead of the standard 25% rate. 
 Some foreign multinationals use different Dutch royalty companies that own 
intellectual property themselves. An example is SABMiller, which transferred 
trademarks of originally African beers from African subsidiaries to a Dutch SPE. From 
1998 to 2005, SABMiller benefitted from a Dutch low-tax regime for royalty income 
(SOMO, 2008). After that, SABMiller apparently obtained a ruling from the Dutch tax 
authority108 that allows a flexible amortisation of the trademark rights in excess of their 
                                                        
106  J. Drucker, “Forest Laboratories' Globe-Trotting Profits”, BloombergBusinessweek, 13 May 2010; J. 
Drucker, “The Tax Haven That's Saving Google Billions”, BloombergBusinessweek, 21 Oct 2010. 
107  Velcro Canada Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, Tax court of Canada, case no. 2012 TCC 57. 
108  The accounts of the relevant Dutch SPE of SABMiller mention an “agreement with the fiscal authority”. 
SABMiller denied that it concluded an advance tax ruling or advance pricing agreement with the Dutch 
tax authority, but confirmed that the taxable income of the SPE “is reduced by a tax amortisation 
allowance”. 
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market value, almost exempting the royalty income. Royalty payments from South 
African and Ghanaian subsidiaries to the Dutch SPE amount to approximately €15 
million and €0.3 million per year, respectively (Hearson & Brooks, 2010). Another 
example is Inter Ikea, a firm related to Ikea that is held by a foundation in Liechtenstein. 
A Dutch Inter Ikea subsidiary owns the Ikea trademark, receives license fees from Ikea 
stores, and pays fees to a Luxembourg affiliate.109 In this case, the Dutch royalty 
company may effectively operate as a conduit even though it owns trademark rights 
itself. 
 Apart from royalty companies, the Netherlands hosts SPEs that provide other 
services within a multinational, including operational lease and re-invoicing (DNB, 
2009a). However, no information was found on potential tax advantages of such SPE 
structures. 
 Finally, Dutch entities may facilitate tax avoidance through trade in goods, as the 
case of Finnish pulp and paper company Stora Enso illustrates. This is remarkable, 
because earlier studies did not find evidence of such strategies (IBFD, 2004; Muller et 
al., 2004). In the case of Stora Enso, a Dutch subsidiary buys pulp from a Brazilian joint 
venture at ‘cost plus’ prices and sells it onwards to a Finnish affiliate at market prices, 
which are considerably higher. Due to a tax ruling, apparently only a small trading 
margin is included in the tax base, even though the actual margin is much larger.110 This 
results in double non-taxation of most of the company’s trading profits. 
 
 
5.3 Analysis	  of	  SPE	  types	  and	  tax	  strategies	  
5.3.1 Linking	  tax	  strategies	  to	  SPE	  types	  
The literature review provides a broad overview of tax strategies involving Dutch SPEs. 
This section uses those strategies to distinguish several types of SPEs on the basis of 
balance sheet data.111 The resulting typology of SPEs allows to analyse the relative 
importance and characteristics of each type, which in turn provides further information 
about tax strategies. 
 The various strategies involving FDI diversion suggest two basic SPE types that can 
be easily identified. The first is an “intermediate holding”. This SPE type includes joint 
ventures and is associated with avoidance of host country dividend withholding or 
capital gains tax and home country tax on foreign profits. An intermediate holding can 
also provide investment protection. On the basis of other studies, it can be expected that 
most SPEs are intermediate holdings (DNB, 2009b; Weyzig, in press). The second type 
                                                        
109  A. Ward, “Wrappers come off Ikea structure”, Financial Times, 27 Jan 2011; “IKEA: Flat-pack 
accounting,” The Economist”, 11 May 2006. 
110  L. Finér, M. Laine, and M. Ylönen, “Verosuunnittelu vauhdittaa Stora Enson sellusampoa [Tax planning 
boosts the pulp trade of Stora Enso]”, Talouselämä [Economy], 8 Jun 2012. 
111  See Table 5.1 for the precise balance sheet criteria. 
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is an “intra-group loan conduit”, which allows to avoid interest withholding tax. If a loan 
conduit channels interest payments onwards to a tax haven affiliate, the overall strategy 
may also involve avoidance of host country corporate income tax through income 
shifting, a more aggressive strategy. Apart from these two basic types, some firms may 
use a Dutch SPE to divert equity investments as well as intra-group loans. Therefore it 
makes sense to define a third SPE type, an “intra-group financing company”, for FDI 
diversion other than simple intermediate holdings or loan conduits. Unfortunately, the 
balance sheet data used in this section do not allow to identify strategies involving 
hybrid financing, hybrid entities, or lowly taxed foreign branches. 
 Three more SPE types are associated with external funding strategies. The fourth 
SPE type is a “fund raising vehicle”, which issues debt securities via the Netherlands to 
avoid withholding tax on the interest payments. The fifth SPE type, a “mixed financing 
company”, covers all structures that combine FDI diversion with external funding and 
includes firms with a Dutch ultimate parent and SPEs with substantial unknown 
liabilities. The sixth and last SPE type is a “securitisation vehicle”, which also issues 
debt securities but is off-balance and holds portfolio investments only. Although this 
thesis focuses on direct investment, it is useful to distinguish securitisation vehicles so 
they can be excluded from parts of the analysis.  
 Some SPE types or tax strategies cannot be identified using balance sheet data. 
These include trading strategies and SPEs that benefit from alternative tax bases 
specified in advance pricing agreements with the Dutch tax authority. 
  
5.3.2 Data	  and	  processing112	  
The analysis of SPE types uses micro data on investment positions and transactions of 
Dutch SPEs (DNB, 2009c). By definition, Dutch SPEs hold mainly foreign financial 
assets or intellectual property and are mainly funded with foreign equity and liabilities. 
Most SPEs do not conduct real business activities (DNB, 2009b, 2010). The micro data 
are collected by the Dutch central bank (DNB) and cover approximately 90% of total 
SPE assets (DNB, 2009b). The analysis uses data for 2007.113 
 The data require some processing, for three reasons. First, some SPEs consist of a 
group of affiliated companies that report their positions and transactions separately. 
Often these companies form holding chains. To avoid double counting, consolidated 
SPE balance sheets are created by netting out Dutch intra-group equity and loan 
positions. Affiliated companies are identified using data on ultimate parents from the 
                                                        
112  Access to the anonymised micro data used for this research was obtained from De Nederlandsche Bank in 
cooperation with Statistics Netherlands, subject to DNB's disclosure policies, see 
http://www.dnb.nl/en/statistics/statistische-microdata/index.jsp. The interpretation of the data is solely the 
responsibility of the author. 
113  For a more elaborate description of the SPE micro data, see Chapter 3.  
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Reach database of Bureau van Dijk.114 Second, for SPEs that belong to a banking group, 
the data do not distinguish between intra-group loans and external bank loans. 
Examination of the data shows that these SPEs represent approximately 10% of total 
assets.115 Because of the nature of SPE operations, it is assumed that all of these loans 
are intra-group. Third, some SPEs report assets well in excess of total liabilities plus 
equity. For these SPEs, an unknown liability is created that equals this difference. 
 The classification of SPEs requires a threshold for how closely assets and liabilities 
match the typical balance sheet of an SPE type. This threshold is set at 80%. Thus, an 
SPE classifies as an intermediate holding, for example, if at least 80% of its assets 
consist of equity participations in foreign subsidiaries and at least 80% of its liabilities 
and equity consist of equity participations by one or more foreign parent companies. The 
80% threshold allows for some transitory items, derivatives, cash, provisions, financial 
positions with Dutch non-SPE affiliates, and minor statistical discrepancies. The data set 
for this study does not include all of those items. It is therefore not possible to 
distinguish derivatives positions from statistical discrepancies, for example, which limits 
the maximum threshold that produces useful results. A threshold of 80% accommodates 
the data limitations and still distinguishes reasonably well-defined types. For 
securitisation vehicles, an alternative liability criterion is used because of their off-
balance character: the ultimate parent must be a foundation. 
 
5.3.3 Results	  on	  SPE	  types	  
Table 5.1 lists all SPE types, associated tax and non-tax strategies, and corresponding 
balance sheet criteria. In addition, for each type, the table shows the number of SPEs and 
their total assets as of end-2007. The six SPE types account for approximately 80% of 
total SPE assets, which means that they represent the most common investment 
structures. 
 Both in number of SPEs and in total assets, the main type is an intra-group financing 
company and not a plain intermediate holding. This indicates that many SPEs combine 
holding activities with other intra-group financing arrangements, such as long-term 
onlending or taking deposits and providing short-term loans within the group. Plain 
intermediate holdings constitute the second-largest type. Plain intra-group loan conduits 
form a much smaller category. Together, these three FDI diversion types account for 
approximately 40% of SPEs and almost 60% of total SPE assets. 
 Mixed financing companies represent the largest SPE type with external funding. 
Considering that this is a rather broad type, its 13% share in total assets is relatively 
modest and confirms that most SPEs have a more specific capital structure. Separate 
fund raising vehicles form a somewhat smaller category with 8% of total assets. The 
                                                        
114  This is a commercial database that integrates data from national company registers. Ultimate parents are 
defined as companies that own an SPE through shareholdings of more than 50% at each step in the 
ownership chain and that are not known to be majority owned by another company. 
115  Excluding off-balance securitisation vehicles. 
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Table	  5.1	   SPE	  types	  and	  associated	  tax	  strategies	  












§ Avoidance	   of	   WHT	   on	  
intra-­‐group	  dividends	  
§ avoidance	  of	  capital	  gains	  
tax	  
§ avoidance	   of	   home	  
country	   tax	   on	   foreign	  
dividend	  income	  
§ investment	  protection	  
	   § >80%	   of	   liabilities	   are	  
participations	   by	   foreign	  
parents	  
§ >80%	   of	   assets	   are	  
participations	   in	   foreign	  
subsidiaries	  
	  
104	   15%	   403	   19%	  
Intra-­‐group	  
loan	  conduit	  	  
§ Avoidance	   of	   WHT	   on	  
intra-­‐group	  interest	  
§ avoidance	   of	   host	  
country	  corporate	  tax	  
	   § >80%	   of	   liabilities	   are	   loans	  
from	  foreign	  affiliates	  
§ >80%	   of	   assets	   are	   loans	   to	  
foreign	  affiliates	  
	  




§ Combinations	   of	   the	  
above	  
	   § >80%	   of	   liabilities	   are	   intra-­‐
group	  
§ >80%	   of	   assets	   are	   intra-­‐
group	  
§ other	   than	  types	   1-­‐2	   (mainly	  
combinations	   of	   type	   1	   and	  
2)	  
145	   22%	   647	   31%	  
Fund	  raising	  
vehicle	  	  
§ Avoidance	   of	   WHT	   on	  
interest	   to	   external	  
creditors	  
	   § >80%	   of	   liabilities	   are	   debt	  
securities	  
§ >80%	   of	   assets	   are	   loans	   to	  
foreign	  affiliates	  




§ Combinations	   of	   the	  
above	  
	   § Any	  mix	  of	  liabilities	  
§ >80%	   of	   assets	   are	   intra-­‐
group	  
§ other	  than	  types	  1-­‐4	  (mainly	  
combinations	  of	   type	  4	   and	  
type	  1,	  2	  or	  3)	  
67	   10%	   275	   13%	  
Securitisation	  
vehicle	  
	   	   § Foundation	   as	   ultimate	  
parent	  
§ >80%	  of	  assets	  are	  non-­‐FDI	  
91	   14%	   41	   2%	  
Other	   	   	   § All	  remaining	  SPEs	   193	  	   29%	   411	   19%	  
All	  types	   	   	   	   669	   100%	   2,120	   100%	  
Note:	  Data	  at	  31	  December	  2007.	  Source:	  DNB	  (2009c),	  author’s	  calculations.	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sixth type, securitisation vehicles, accounts for a very small fraction of total assets only. 
This may be an underestimate, because securitisation vehicles are probably 
underrepresented in the monthly reporting population of large SPEs due to their 
relatively small size. However, other data confirm that the vast majority of Dutch SPE 
structures are on-balance and not specifically related to financial sector strategies.116 
 The remaining SPEs, representing approximately 20% of total assets, do not fit into 
the six categories defined above and hold more than 20% non-FDI assets. These SPEs 
probably include treasury companies of foreign multinationals that hold large liquidity 
reserves, as well as leasing and re-invoicing SPEs. They may also include SPEs that 
directly hold foreign real estate, which is not included in the FDI data.117 
 
5.3.4 Results	  on	  characteristics	  of	  SPE	  types	  
The typology of SPEs allows to analyse further characteristics of each type. Table 5.2 
shows several characteristics that are relevant from a tax perspective. 
 First, the table shows average SPE assets. For each of the first five types, average 
SPE assets in the reporting population are €4 billion or more and the largest 
observations have assets above €10 billion. This indicates that the overall pattern of 
SPE investments is largely determined by a few hundred very large multinationals that 
hold or finance a substantial part of their overall operations via the Netherlands.118 
 Second, Table 5.2 displays the number of origin countries, from which the funding 
of the SPE originates, and destination countries, to which the SPE has passed on these 
funds. Intra-group financing and mixed financing companies have many origin and 
destination countries. Thus, these SPEs act as central financing hubs within a large 
multinational, engaging in a variety of financing arrangements with many affiliates. 
Intermediate holdings also have a relatively large number of destination countries, but a 
small number of origin countries. This suggests that intermediate holdings act as 
distributors of equity capital within a multinational. By contrast, plain intra-group loan 
conduits and fund raising vehicles do not have a distributive role and lend onwards to a 
few affiliates only. For fund raising companies, the low number of origin countries is 
misleading, because the origin country of listed debt securities refers to the securities 
exchange. The securities are typically held by investors from many countries.  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
                                                        
116  Macro data show that Dutch securitisation vehicles with mainly foreign assets had €110 billion of debt 
securities outstanding at end-2009. Source: DNB Statistics Table 9.1, http://statistics.dnb.nl/en/financial-
institutions/other-financial-institutions/special-purpose-vehicles/index.jsp (accessed Dec 21, 2011). 
117  Probably the unclassified SPEs also include a few securitisation vehicles for which data on the ultimate 
parent were missing and SPEs consisting of affiliated companies with intra-group positions that were not 
netted out due to differences in valuation. 
118  Excluding securitisation vehicles, on average, SPE assets are equal to approximately 20% of the 
consolidated balance sheet total of the corresponding multinational. This is a rough estimate, though, 
because for some multinationals financial data were unavailable and the valuation of an SPE’s 
participations in subsidiaries often differs from the net asset value of these subsidiaries. 
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Table	  5.2	   Characteristics	  of	  SPE	  types	  


















































































































































Source:	   DNB	   (2009c),	   author’s	   calculations.	   Notes:	   SPE	   investment	   positions	   at	   31	   December	   2007,	  
unweighted	  averages,	  standard	  deviation	  in	  brackets;	  a)	  Bermuda,	  Cayman	  Islands,	  British	  Virgin	  Islands,	  
Jersey,	  Guernsey,	  Aruba,	  Curacao,	  Puerto	  Rico,	  Switzerland,	  Luxembourg,	  Ireland,	  and	  Belgium.	  	  
 
 Third, the table shows the share of Dutch SPE liabilities and assets in countries that 
have a tax treaty with the Netherlands. On the liability side, virtually all intermediate 
holdings have direct parents in treaty countries. This confirms that withholding tax 
reductions or other treaty benefits are essential for holding chains. By contrast, intra-
group loan conduits are, on average, financed for only 75% from treaty countries. 
Considering that the Netherlands has tax treaties with all major economies, this figure is 
remarkable low. It shows that the absence of Dutch interest withholding tax renders a 
tax treaty irrelevant for loans to Dutch SPEs. The share for intra-group financing 
companies is somewhere in between, which is consistent with their financing mix of 
equity and intra-group debt. On the asset side, tax treaty benefits are of key importance 
for all SPE types. 
 Fourth, Table 5.2 shows the proportion of SPE liabilities and assets in twelve large 
tax havens. On average, intra-group loan conduits have a much higher share of tax haven 
liabilities than intermediate holdings. This suggests that some loan conduits facilitate 
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income shifting to tax havens through interest payments. Again, intra-group financing 
companies are in between holdings and loan conduits. Fund raising vehicles and 
securitisation vehicles have a high share of tax haven liabilities due to debt securities 
issued in Luxembourg and Switzerland. 
 Although the largest SPE types are associated with a broad range of tax strategies, 
the analysis of SPE characteristics shows that tax treaty benefits in the host country are 
relatively important. More specifically, differences between intermediate holdings and 
intra-group loan conduits suggest that withholding tax avoidance is a key purpose of 
Dutch SPEs. Intra-group loan conduits may also facilitate avoidance of host country 
corporate income tax via income shifting to low-tax regimes. 
 
 
5.4 Analysis	  of	  total	  SPE	  positions	  and	  income	  flows	  
5.4.1 Relation	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  SPE	  types	  
The previous section showed that many SPEs are financing companies with more than 
one main type of assets or liabilities. Therefore the analysis of SPE types provides 
limited information on the size of specific investment structures. This section uses 
aggregate data on SPE asset-liability combinations and income flows to analyse 
financing structures and tax strategies regardless of how they are combined within SPEs. 
It includes an analysis of royalty strategies, which are only reflected in income flows 
and not in financing structures. 
 
5.4.2 Data	  and	  processing	  
An asset-liability matrix is generated for each SPE by attributing asset categories to 
liability categories. See Annex 5.1 for an example. Next, all matrices are added up to a 
total matrix for all SPEs combined. The construction of asset-liability matrices largely 
follows the methodology described for origin-destination matrices in Annex 7 to the 
OECD Benchmark Definition on FDI (OECD, 2008b). However, it uses different 
attribution rules. For origin-destination matrices, by default all assets (destinations) are 
attributed proportionally to all liabilities (origins). For asset-liability matrices, it is more 
appropriate to first attribute equity assets to own equity, to the extent possible, and loan 
assets to debts. This reflects SPE operations more accurately. 
 In addition, annual income flow matrices are constructed, using the same attribution 
rules for dividend and interest flows as for equity and debt positions. Note that inflows 
may differ from outflows, for instance because of timing differences and because SPEs 
may retain income received from foreign affiliates. In principle, SPEs may also use 
income flows to finance new equity investments or loans. However, exploratory data 
analysis indicates that capital outflows are usually financed with matching capital 
inflows during the same year. A separate matrix is constructed for royalty payments on 
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the basis of data from approximately 20 SPEs that reported royalty income. All 
dividends, interest and royalties are gross amounts before withholding taxes. 
 
5.4.3 Results	  on	  total	  SPE	  positions	  
Table 5.3 shows an aggregate asset-liability matrix as of 30 June 2007.119 Because the 
table focuses on the financing of direct investments, it does not include the securitisation 
vehicles identified above or portfolio investments, derivatives, and real estate.120 The 
Dutch assets include positions between different SPE affiliates of the same firm that 
were not fully netted out due to data limitations. This asset category also includes 
positions with domestic affiliates that conduct active businesses and loans to third 
parties, such as customers or suppliers. On the liability side, Dutch equity mainly 
consists of SPE holding chains that were not fully netted out and orphan structures like 
Ikea, but it also includes publicly traded shares issued by Dutch ultimate parents. 
Unknown liabilities capture the difference between total assets and total reported 
liabilities plus equity. To the extent that this reflects a difference in valuation, unknown 
liabilities may be interpreted as a revaluation reserve. 
 The matrix shows that at the aggregate level, three asset-liability combinations stand 
out. First, over €700 billion or approximately 40% of SPE assets and liabilities consists 
of holding chains. These are clearly the main element of Dutch SPE structures. Due to 
data limitations, the matrix also includes some intermediate holding positions in Dutch 
assets financed with equity participations and in foreign subsidiaries financed with 
Dutch equity or with unknown liabilities. The true share of holding chains may be close 
to 50% of SPE balance sheets. Second, SPEs onlend more than €250 billion raised in 
debt markets within the group. These fund raising structures account for approximately 
15% of SPE assets and liabilities. Third, loans to and from foreign affiliates account for 
over €150 billion or approximately 10% of SPE balance sheets. These include narrow 
intra-group loan conduits as well as broader internal banking activities of intra-group 
financing and mixed financing companies. Together, these three asset-liability 
combinations account for 65-75% of SPE balance sheets. 
 The table also shows conversions between debt and equity. Intra-group loans 
financed by equity participations and vice versa together account for €150 billion or 
10% of SPE balance sheets. From a tax perspective, the rationale behind these 
conversions is not straightforward. In theory, some SPEs can minimise withholding 
taxes by receiving dividends and paying interest (Merks, 2011). However, this may not 
yield a tax advantage unless the SPE can offset the interest expenses against taxable 
xxxxxxxxxxx 	  
                                                        
119  The tables in this second empirical section are shown for a different date than Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, to 
avoid potential data confidentiality issues that might result from the combination of data in various tables. 
120  Data on these asset categories were not included in the data set. Macro data show that SPEs excluding 
securitisation vehicles held total portfolio investments of €37 bn and derivatives with market value of 
€60 bn at end-2010. Source: DNB Statistics Tables 12.10, 12.4 and 9.1, 
http://statistics.dnb.nl/en/home/index.jsp (accessed Sept 19, 2011). 
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Table	  5.3	   Aggregate	  SPE	  asset-­‐liability	  matrix	  (€	  bn)	  
	   	   Liabilities	   	  

























Participations	  in	  	  
foreign	  subsidiaries	  
709	   87	   5	   42	   61	   75	   979	  
Loans	  to	  foreign	  affiliates	   71	   154	   258	   57	   5	   10	   554	  
Loans	  to	  third	  parties	  
and	  Dutch	  assets	  	  
48	   83	   29	   24	   6	   18	   208	  
	  
Total	   827	   324	   291	   123	   71	   103	   1,739	  
Source:	  DNB	  (2009c),	  author’s	  calculations.	  Notes:	  SPE	  investment	  positions	  at	  30	  June	  2007,	  excluding	  
securitisation	  vehicles.	  
 
income, for example from domestic businesses. Conversely, an SPE that receives net 
interest income may not generate a tax advantage unless it can offset the income against 
tax-deductible expenses. 
 On the basis of the asset-liability matrix, it can be concluded that the main tax 
strategies of SPEs are those associated with holding chains, issuance of debt securities, 
and intra-group onlending. The next part analyses those strategies in more detail using 
data on income flows. 
 
5.4.4 Results	  on	  total	  income	  flows	  
Income flow data allow to compare the volume of different types of SPE income and to 
distinguish conduit flows associated with avoidance of withholding tax from other 
strategies. Table 5.4  shows the origins and uses of foreign dividend income of Dutch 
SPEs in 2007. The rows split the origins into three broad country groups, so the tax 
consequences for different types of countries can be assessed separately.121 The first 
group consists of 42 developing and emerging economies that had a tax treaty with the 
Netherlands in 2007. The second group consists of all EU-27 countries except 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands itself, plus 17 other high income 
xxxxxxxxx  
                                                        
121  Confidentiality requirements limit the number of country groups that can be shown separately in Table 
5.4, Table 5.5, and Table 5.6. Therefore a further breakdown, for example distinguishing between low and 
middle income countries, is unfortunately not possible. 
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Table	  5.4	   Dividend	  flows	  of	  Dutch	  SPEs	  (€	  bn)	  













Paid	  onwards	  as	  
dividends	  to	  external	  





Low	  and	  middle	  income	  
countries	  with	  Dutch	  tax	  
treaty	  
5.5	   2.9	   0.1	   2.4	   53%	  
High	  income	  countries	  with	  
Dutch	  tax	  treaty	  and	  EU	  
38.2	   14.1	   1.3	   22.8	   37%	  
Tax	  havens	  and	  countries	  
without	  Dutch	  tax	  treaty	  
27.2	   14.2	   0.9	   12.1	   52%	  
Total	   70.9	   31.2	   2.3	   37.3	   44%	  
Source:	   DNB	   (2009c),	   author’s	   calculations.	   Note:	   Income	   data	   for	   calendar	   year	   2007,	   excluding	  
securitisation	  vehicles.	  
 
countries that have a tax treaty with the Netherlands. The third group includes the tax 
havens Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland, Curacao, Aruba and all countries 
that did not have a tax treaty with the Netherlands in 2007. The columns show total 
dividends paid to Dutch SPEs and the amounts of dividend income channelled onwards 
to foreign parents, used to pay other funding providers, and retained by the SPEs. 
 In 2007, 468 SPEs in the data set had foreign subsidiaries; other SPEs held intra-
group loans and non-FDI assets only. Only 108 out of these 468 SPEs received 
dividends from foreign subsidiaries in 2007. Together, their gross dividend income was 
more than €70 billion. This corresponds to an average dividend yield of approximately 
11% on their foreign participations. Overall, the SPEs distributed 44% (€31.2 bn out of 
€70.9 bn) onwards to foreign parents and retained most of the remaining dividend 
income. They used only a small part for payments to other funding providers, mainly 
interest on bank loans. Probably most of the €17 billion of dividends from the first two 
country groups that were distributed onwards are associated with conduit structures to 
avoid dividend withholding tax. The two country groups are affected more or less 
proportionally to total inward FDI stocks via Dutch SPEs. The €25 billion of retained 
dividend income from these country groups could be related to avoidance of home 
country tax, which according to data on ultimate parents mainly affects high income 
countries. The largest part of dividend income form tax havens ultimately originates 
from other countries. The flows from tax havens indicate that Dutch intermediate 
holdings also play a substantial role in more complex tax strategies involving SPEs in 
several countries.  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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Table	  5.5	   Interest	  flows	  of	  Dutch	  SPEs	  (€	  bn)	  




















Low	  and	  middle	  income	  
countries	  with	  Dutch	  tax	  
treaty	  
1.1	   0.2	   0.2	   0.4	   0.1	   91%	  
High	  income	  countries	  with	  
Dutch	  tax	  treaty	  and	  EU	  
19.1	   1.3	   4.0	   9.0	   1.9	   85%	  
Tax	  havens	  and	  countries	  
without	  Dutch	  tax	  treaty	  
6.5	   2.6	   0.7	   1.6	   1.3	   94%	  
Total	   26.7	   4.1	   4.8	   11.1	   3.3	   87%	  
Source:	   DNB	   (2009c),	   author’s	   calculations.	   Note:	   Income	   data	   for	   calendar	   year	   2007,	   excluding	  
securitisation	  vehicles;	  tax	  havens	  as	  in	  Table	  5.2.	  
 
 Table 5.5 shows the origins of SPE interest income from foreign affiliates and the 
use of this income. The total interest income of almost €27 billion implies an average 
interest rate of roughly 5% on the total loans to foreign affiliates, which were 
approximately €550 billion. Strikingly, 87% of gross interest payments are passed on to 
creditors of the SPE. Taking into account that some SPEs receive interest net of 
(reduced) withholding taxes or incur expenses for credit guarantees and hedging of 
currency mismatches, the profit margin of SPEs on these structures is probably close to 
zero. 
 A large part of the interest is passed on to debt security holders.122 Thus, avoidance 
of withholding tax on portfolio interest is the main debt-related tax strategy. Interest 
payments passed on within the group are also substantial. However, interest flows from 
normal economies to tax havens are limited; they amount to €0.2 billion from low and 
middle income countries and €1.3 billion from high income countries. Thus, Dutch 
SPEs potentially facilitate avoidance of host country corporate income tax through 
interest payments to tax havens, but only on a small scale. 
 Next, Table 5.6 shows similar data for royalty payments. Gross royalty payments to 
Dutch SPEs were approximately €7 billion, which is several times lower than dividend 
or interest income. However, royalty payments to SPEs often form part of more 
aggressive tax strategies, because they are usually tax deductible in the source country 
and relatively easy to manipulate. It is quite plausible that the €7 billion in royalty 
payments reduce tax revenues in source countries by more than €1 billion, without 
xxxxxxx 
                                                        
122  Probably the €0.4 billion of interest from developing countries paid onwards to debt security holders, 
shown in Table 5.5, is an underestimate. The micro data on debt issued via Dutch SPEs in Table 5.9 
indicate that in 2010, these flows were approximately €1 billion. 
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Table	  5.6	   Royalty	  flows	  of	  Dutch	  SPEs	  (€	  bn)	  
Source	  of	  payment	  to	  Dutch	  
SPEs	  
Royalties	  paid	  
to	  Dutch	  SPEs	  
Of	  which	  paid	  onwards	  as	  royalties:	   Royalties	  pass-­‐
through	  ratio	  To	  tax	  havens	   To	  other	  countries	  
Low	  and	  middle	  income	  
countries	  with	  Dutch	  tax	  
treaty	  
0.4	   0.0	   0.1	   25%	  
High	  income	  countries	  with	  
Dutch	  tax	  treaty	  and	  EU	  
3.2	   0.1	   1.0	   33%	  
Tax	  havens	  and	  countries	  
without	  Dutch	  tax	  treaty	  
3.3	   1.8	   1.0	   85%	  
Total	   6.9	   1.9	   2.1	   61%	  
Source:	   DNB	   (2009c),	   author’s	   calculations.	   Note:	   Income	   data	   for	   calendar	   year	   2007,	   excluding	  
securitisation	  vehicles;	  tax	  havens	  as	  in	  Table	  5.2	  except	  for	  Belgium,	  which	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  normal	  EU	  
country	  in	  relation	  to	  royalty	  flows.	  
 
generating material tax revenues elsewhere.123 Only a small share of the royalties from 
normal economies are passed onwards. This may reflect onwards payments in a different 
form, as in the case of Inter Ikea, or the use of special amortisation schemes, as in the 
case of SABMiller. By contrast, royalties from tax haven countries are mostly passed 
onwards to other tax havens. This reflects the use of Dutch royalty conduits in 
combination with technology transfer to Irish affiliates, as in the case of Google.  
 It can be concluded that holding chains, issuance of debt securities, and intra-group 
onlending are the largest elements of SPE balance sheets. For interest payments, Dutch 
SPEs mainly act as conduits to avoid host country withholding taxes. For dividends and 
royalty payments, Dutch SPEs have more diverse uses and act only partly as conduits. 
 
	  
5.5 Analysis	  at	  country	  and	  company	  level	  
5.5.1 Relation	  to	  total	  SPE	  positions	  and	  income	  flows	  
Whereas aggregate SPE micro data provide valuable information about the overall size 
of various tax strategies, these data are not very useful to assess potential consequences 
for specific countries. The reason is that tax avoidance affects different countries in a 
highly uneven way and confidentiality requirements restrict the use of central bank 
micro data to analyse individual countries. This section uses other data sources to 
identify which countries are potentially most affected by various tax strategies. It 
                                                        
123  Assuming that most royalty payments to Dutch SPEs from part of tax avoidance schemes, that missed tax 
revenues net of (reduced) withholding taxes amount to at least 20% of payments, and that royalty income 
remains largely untaxed because of special amortisation schemes or offsetting payments by Dutch SPEs to 
tax haven affiliates. 
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analyses FDI diversion, issuance of debt securities, and royalty schemes. The analysis 
pays special attention to host countries with a large proportion of inward FDI diverted 
via Dutch SPEs and to home countries with a large amount of debt securities issued via 
Dutch SPEs. 
 
5.5.2 Data	  and	  processing	  
For FDI diversion, the analysis combines macro from the IMF and the OECD. The IMF 
Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data (IMF, 2012a) include SPE positions 
for all countries. By contrast, the FDI statistics of the OECD (OECD, 2012b) exclude 
SPE positions for countries that collect separate SPE data, such as the Netherlands. 
Therefore the difference between Dutch outward FDI in the IMF CDIS and in OECD 
statistics is equal to Dutch SPE investments (excluding loans to parents).124 OECD 
statistics do not split FDI into a debt and equity component. Therefore the share of debt 
in SPE positions cannot be calculated precisely. 
 For selected low and middle income countries, large investments of individual SPEs 
were examined using company filings from the Dutch chamber of commerce. This 
provides information on the home country, industrial sector, capital structure, and 
starting date of SPE investments in a specific country. The SPE investments were 
identified by checking all Dutch legal entities with assets over €5 billion, companies 
with assets over €0.5 billion administrated by external service providers, companies 
with a certain country in their name (e.g. “Thani Ghana Tano B.V.”), companies with a 
MIGA guarantee or IFC loan, UNCTAD country profiles for Least Developed 
Countries, and reports of national investment promotion agencies.125 This method works 
best for host countries with a few very large SPE investments, such as Angola and 
Ghana. For other countries, for example El Salvador and Indonesia, the firms listed in 
the table mainly illustrate the sectors of investment. 
 For the issuance of debt securities, the analysis also uses IMF CDIS data. Dutch 
SPEs lend a large proportion of external debt funding to their foreign parents. The CDIS 
provide separate data on such reverse loans, which provide a proxy for debt issued via 
Dutch SPEs by home country. However, the CDIS outward reverse loans reported by the 
Netherlands are often inconsistent with inward reverse loans reported by the partner 
country. For relevant countries, CDIS data are therefore complemented with more 
reliable micro data from individual SPEs. In addition to the methods mentioned above, 
these SPEs are identified using data from security exchanges, rating agencies, debt 
market investment funds, and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
                                                        
124  The Dutch central bank is the underlying Dutch source for both databases. For many countries, the Dutch 
central bank also publishes FDI positions including and excluding SPEs on its own website, see 
http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/en/balance-of-payents-and-international-investment-positions/index.jsp 
(accessed Oct 1, 2012). 
125  It is possible that the results include Dutch companies with mainly foreign assets and liabilities that are 
not identified as SPEs by the central bank. 
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(AFM). Nearly all SPEs with outstanding debt securities can be identified, because debt 
securities are issued by a small number of SPEs, usually in amounts of at least €200 
million, and public information is often available. Debt securities issued via Dutch SPEs 
are compared to foreign private debt securities issued directly from the home country as 
reported by the Bank on International Settlements (BIS, 2012).  
 For royalty schemes, no useful macro data are available. Therefore the analysis uses 
accounts from individual entities only. Some large Dutch royalty companies have been 
exposed in the media; checking foreign-owned entities with specific business activity 
codes identified a few others. This method allows to describe nearly half of the royalty 
flows to Dutch SPEs. 
 
5.5.3 FDI	  diversion	  
Table 5.7 describes diverted FDI in selected host countries. These countries have a 
relatively large share of inward FDI stock that is directly held by Dutch SPEs, at least 
10% for low and middle income countries and 20% for high income and EU countries. 
The table also includes Mongolia and Gabon, for which macro data on SPE investments 
are not available126 but some major investments of individual SPEs were identified, and 
Croatia, which has an unusual composition of diverted FDI. Table 5.8 lists examples of 
investments via Dutch SPEs in some developing countries. 
 The countries with the largest shares of inward FDI via Dutch SPEs include low and 
middle income countries (e.g. Angola, Kazakhstan), EU countries (e.g. UK, Italy), and 
tax havens (e.g. Ireland, Switzerland). The SPE investments in tax havens involve 
underlying assets in other host countries. Remarkably, there are no major emerging 
economies or (non-haven) high income countries outside the EU with inward FDI shares 
above 20%. Those countries have more administrative capacity and a stronger position 
in tax treaty negotiations (Baistrocchi, 2008); some also have relatively strong domestic 
anti-avoidance legislation. Smaller developing countries and EU countries are probably 
more vulnerable, the former because they have weaker tax systems and the latter 
because the EU has an integrated economy without harmonised external withholding 
taxes or anti-avoidance rules.  
 For most host countries, less than half of diverted FDI consists of intra-group debt. 
Croatia is an exception, probably because FDI diversion generates a large withholding 
tax benefit for interest payments, reducing the rate from 15% to zero, but not for 
dividends, which are always free from withholding tax in Croatia.  
 The table includes various developing countries that have no tax or investment treaty 
with the Netherlands. For example, Angola hosts large investments via Dutch SPEs that 
                                                        
126  For some countries, macro data on SPE investments are available for 2009 only and less reliable. 
Kazakhstan and Mauritania are nonetheless included in the table because individual company accounts 
confirm that investments via Dutch SPEs are relatively large. Examples of other countries with relatively 
large Dutch SPE positions according to 2009 data are Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Bermuda, Curacao, and 
Malta. 
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do not enjoy any treaty benefits. These are investments in the oil and gas sector. The 
relatively high SPE investments in Mauritania and Gabon, two other countries without 
Dutch treaties, are also mainly from extractive industries. Moreover, some oil companies 
started to invest in Kazakhstan via Dutch SPEs before the country signed tax and BITs 
with the Netherlands (e.g. Eni, Chevron, Parker Drilling). Together, this suggests that 
the Dutch route offers specific unilateral benefits to extractive industries. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that a key factor might be the exemption of dividend income from 
subsidiaries, or profits of foreign branches, operating under a production-sharing 
contract. SPE investments in Kenya, El Salvador and Uruguay might be driven by 
investment protection rather than tax advantages. The same applies to SPE investments 
in South Africa, Turkey, Egypt and Brazil, because Dutch tax treaties do not lower the 
withholding taxes applied by these countries. For developing countries that do not have 
a tax treaty with the Netherlands, Dutch tax law provides unilateral relief for double 
taxation and this may also play a role. 
 For Mongolia, by contrast, tax treaties are probably the main factor. Ivanhoe Mines 
inserted a Dutch intermediate holding to benefit from the Netherlands-Mongolia tax 
treaty, for instance, as described in the literature review. This treaty offers large benefits 
because it completely eliminates dividend withholding tax, which is uncommon for tax 
treaties with developing countries. Other Mongolian tax treaties specify non-zero rates, 
except those with Luxembourg, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. In 2012, the 
Mongolian government concluded that such treaties granted excessive benefits to 
foreign investors and it tried to renegotiate with the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The 
Mongolian operations of Ivanhoe did not pay dividends yet in 2010. 
 For Ghana, tax treaties are probably a key factor as well. Two major investments via 
SPEs stand out. The first is Modec’s financial lease of an oil rig off Ghana’s coast, 
which had a value of €600 million. This investment constitutes a permanent 
establishment of Modec’s Dutch SPE, which is mainly financed with external debt. The 
SPE structure allows Modec to avoid Ghanaian or Japanese withholding tax on interest 
to foreign creditors. In addition, the Ghana-Netherlands tax treaty eliminates the 
Ghanaian 10% withholding tax on profits distributed to a foreign head office. The 
second major investment is Vodafone’s 70% stake in a Ghanaian telecommunications 
company, which it valued at €300 million in 2010. Vodafone owns this and other 
subsidiaries through a Dutch SPE that holds €19 billion of equity investments and is 
financed with a mix of equity and intra-group loans. The SPE structure allows Vodafone 
to benefit from the 5% withholding tax on dividends under the Ghana-Netherlands tax 
treaty, compared to 7.5% under the Ghana-UK treaty. Both Modec and Vodafone 
invested in Ghana five months after the Ghana-Netherlands tax treaty was signed and 
their Ghanaian operations did not distribute profits yet in 2010.  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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Table	  5.7	   FDI	  diverted	  via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  (€	  bn)	  
Country	   (1)	  Total	  inward	  
FDI	  stock	  
(2)	  Inward	  FDI	  
via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  
(2)	  /	  (1)	   Share	  of	  




Angolaa)	   18.7	   8.5	  	   45%	   	   10%	   	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Kazakhstanb)	   60.7	   17.1	   34%	   	   40-­‐60%	   	   1996	   2002	  
Kenyaa)	   1.7	   0.6	  	   33%	   	   0-­‐15%	   	   -­‐	   1970	  
Venezuelaa)	   28.5	   8.8	  	   31%	   	   25-­‐30%	   	   1991	   1991	  
Philippines	   16.0	   4.3	  	   27%	   	   30-­‐45%	   	   1989	   1985	  
Mauritaniaa),	  b)	   1.6	   0.4	   24%	   	   0%	   	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Ghanaa)	   6.8	   1.4	  	   20%	   	   10-­‐15%	   	   2008	   1989	  
Nigeria	   25.9	   5.0	   20%	   	   ..	   	   1991	   1992	  
Uruguaya)	   11.1	   1.9	  	   17%	   	   0%	   	   -­‐	   1988	  
Serbia	   12.8	   2.2	  	   17%	   	   15%	   	   1982	   1989	  
South	  Africa	   110.5	   18.4	  	   17%	   	   20-­‐25%	   	   1971	   1995	  
Ukraine	   36.2	   5.3	  	   15%	   	   25-­‐35%	   	   1995	   1994	  
El	  Salvador	   5.9	   0.7	  	   12%	   	   0-­‐5%	   	   -­‐	   1999	  
Turkey	   99.6	   11.9	  	   12%	   	   0-­‐15%	   	   1986	   1986	  
Egypta)	   54.7	   6.2	  	   11%	   	   0-­‐5%	   	   1999	   1996	  
Brazil	   487.2	   49.1	  	   10%	   	   0-­‐10%	   	   1990	   1998	  
Taiwana)	   48.1	   4.8	  	   10%	   	   0-­‐20%	   	   2001	   -­‐	  
Indonesia	   115.4	   11.4	  	   10%	   	   30-­‐40%	   	   1973	   1994	  
Mongoliaa)	   3.4	   0.2-­‐0.5d)	   6-­‐15%	   	   0%d)	   	   2002	   1995	  
Gabona)	   1.1	   ..	   ..	   	   ..	   	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
United	  Kingdom	   800.6	   310.8	  	   39%	   	   10-­‐40%	   	   1948	   -­‐	  
Italy	   248.4	   77.6	  	   31%	   	   20-­‐40%	   	   1957	   -­‐	  
Spain	   430.4	   117.5	  	   27%	   	   35-­‐50%	   	   1971	   -­‐	  
Portugal	   82.5	   19.1	  	   23%	   	   35-­‐45%	   	   1999	   -­‐	  
Slovak	  Republic	   37.6	   8.1	  	   21%	   	   15-­‐20%	   	   1974	   1991	  
Romania	   51.4	   10.8	  	   21%	   	   25-­‐35%	   	   1979	   1994	  
Croatia	   25.6	   2.9	  	   11%	   	   70-­‐75%	   	   1982	   1998	  
Ireland	   184.9	   80.0	  	   43%	   	   35-­‐50%	   	   1969	   -­‐	  
Switzerland	   416.6	   108.9	  	   26%	   	   ..	   	   1951	   -­‐	  
Other	  countriesc)	   ~11,700	   1,083	   9%	   	   ..	   	   	   	  
All	  countriesc)	   ~15,100	   1,976	   13%	   	   ..	   	   	   	  
Sources:	  IMF	  (2012),	  OECD	  (2012a),	   individual	  company	  data,	  author’s	  calculations.	  Notes:	  FDI	  stocks	  at	  
31	  December	   2010;	   a)	   total	   inward	   FDI	   stock	   from	  UNCTAD	   instead;	   b)	   (share	  of)	   inward	   FDI	   via	  Dutch	  
SPEs	  at	  31	  Dec	  2009	  instead;	  c)	  excluding	  the	  Netherlands,	  based	  on	  IMF	  CDIS	  outward	  investments	  data	  
of	  56	  investor	  countries;	  d)	  author’s	  estimates	  based	  on	  Mongolian	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Development	  
(2012)	  and	  individual	  company	  data.	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Table	  5.8	   Examples	  of	  investments	  via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  in	  selected	  countries	  
Country	   Firms	  (home	  country	  code	  in	  brackets)	  
Angola	   Tullow	  Oil	   (UK),	   Eni	   (IT),	   BP	   (UK),	   ExxonMobil	   (US),	   Repsol	   (ES),	   Brunei	   Energy	   (AE),	  
Chevron	  (US),	  Petrobras	  (BR)	  
Kazakhstan	   Central	  Asia	  Metals	  (UK),	  Vitol	  (LU	  via	  CH),	  GDF	  Suez	  (FR),	  Chevron	  (US),	  Petrofac	  (UK),	  
Saipem	   (IT),	   Eni	   (IT),	   Bateman	   (NL),	   Parker	   Drilling	   (US),	   Heidelberg	   Cement	   (DE),	  
Mubadala	  Development	  Company	  (AE),	  ShalkiyaZinc	  (NL)	  
Kenya	   Vodafone	  (UK),	  Bharti	  Airtel	  (IN),	  Africa	  Oil	  (CA),	  Tullow	  Oil	  (UK)	  
Philippines	   Gold	  Fields	  (ZA),	  Anglo	  American	  (UK),	  Premier	  Oil	  (UK),	  ExxonMobil	  (US),	  Pfizer	  (US),	  
Total	   (FR),	  First	  Pacific	  (HK	  via	  CW),	  Ericsson	  (SE),	  Alstom	  (FR),	  Nomura	  (JP),	  Western	  
Digital	  (US	  via	  SG),	  Brenntag	  (DE),	  Hewlett	  Packard	  (US),	  Alcatel-­‐Lucent	  (FR),	  Xerox	  (US	  
via	  UK),	  STMicroelectronics	   (NL),	  Analog	  Devices	  (US),	  Hitachi	   (JP),	  Futura	  Group	  (IT),	  
Molex	  (US),	  II-­‐VI	  (US),	  Panasonic	  (JP),	  Qualfon	  (MX),	  Bosch	  (DE),	  Takata	  (JP),	  Teradata	  
(US),	  VXI	  (US),	  WNS	  (JE),	  Vitalo	  Group	  (BE),	  UnitedHealth	  Group	  (US),	  Swedish	  Match	  
(SE),	  Stream	  Global	  Services	  (US),	  ProV	  International	  (US)	  
Mauritania	   Petronas	  (MY),	  Total	  (FR),	  Kuwait	  Foreign	  Petroleum	  Exploration	  (KW),	  GDF	  Suez	  (FR)	  
Ghana	   Modec	   (JP),	   Vodafone	   (UK),	   Gold	   Fields	   (ZA),	   Thani	   Emirates	   Petroleum	   (AE),	   Bharti	  
Airtel	  (IN)	  
Nigeria	   Saipem	  (IT),	  BT	  (UK),	  Bharti	  Airtel	  (IN),	  Petrobras	  (BR),	  Panoro	  Energy	  (NO)	  
Ukraine	   Archer	  Daniels	  Midland	  (US),	  Saipem	  (IT),	  System	  Capital	  Management	  (UA)	  
El	  Salvador	   Brenntag	  (DE),	  Hewlett	  Packard	  (US),	  Alcatel-­‐Lucent	  (FR),	  Trafigura	  (CH)	  
Turkey	   Japan	  Tobacco	  (JP),	  Vodafone	  (UK),	  Alcatel-­‐Lucent	  (FR),	  Ericsson	  (SE),	  Adidas	  (DE)	  
Egypt	   Cepsa	   (ES),	   Alstom	   (FR),	   Saipem	   (IT),	   Adidas	   (DE),	   Eli	   Lilly	   (US),	   GDF	   Suez	   (FR),	  
Vodafone	  (UK)	  
Indonesia	   Kuwait	   Foreign	   Petroleum	   Exploration	   (KW),	   Lundin	   Petroleum	   (SE),	   General	   Electric	  
(US),	   Saudi	   Telecom	   (SA),	   Alstom	   (FR),	   Nomura	   (JP),	   Saipem	   (IT),	   BP	   (UK),	   BT	   (UK),	  
Sasando	  (SG),	  GDF	  Suez	  (FR),	  Holcim	  (CH)	  
Mongolia	   Ivanhoe	  Mines	  (now	  Turquoise	  Hills	  Resources;	  CA),	  Trafigura	  (CH),	  Central	  Asia	  Metals	  
(UK)	  
Gabon	   Forest	  Oil	  (US),	  Panoro	  Energy	  (NO),	  Bharti	  Airtel	  (IN)	  
Sources:	   individual	   company	   data,	   IFC,	   MIGA,	   UNCTAD,	   national	   investment	   promotion	   agencies,	  
national	  company	  registers,	  and	  Reach	  database.	  Note:	  	  see	  page	  206	  for	  a	  list	  of	  country	  codes.	  
 
 In the Philippines and Indonesia, SPE investments are more diversified and include 
manufacturing and business services. Dutch SPE loans to Indonesian affiliates benefit 
from substantial withholding tax reductions, especially if the loans have a maturity of 
more than two years, as the Indonesia-Netherlands treaty reduces the standard 20% rate 
to zero in that case. This explains why 30-40% of SPE investments consist of intra-
group debt. Dutch SPE investments in the Philippines benefit from a 10% dividend 
withholding tax, whereas a rate of at least 15% applies to the home countries of many of 
the SPEs. In addition, several SPEs hold investments of US firms in special economic 
zones. These specific structures preserve the benefits of the applicable tax holiday or 
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special 5% tax regime when profits are distributed (Chalk, 2005) and do not negatively 
affect tax revenues in the Philippines. 
 It can be concluded that some countries with relatively large investments via Dutch 
SPE are vulnerable to avoidance of withholding tax. These include Croatia and 
Indonesia, for withholding tax on interest, and the Philippines, Mongolia and Ghana, for 
withholding tax on dividends. 
 
5.5.4 Issuance	  of	  debt	  securities	  
Table 5.9 describes debt issuance via Dutch SPEs by firms from selected home 
countries. The first two columns show Dutch reverse loans, which are a macro data 
proxy for debt funding via SPEs, and outstanding debt securities issued by individual 
SPEs, calculated from micro data. The micro data are generally more informative, 
except for Germany, because of the large number of issuers.127 The data show that most 
Dutch SPE debt is issued by firms from six countries: Germany, Spain, Portugal, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Japan. Firms from other home countries issued debt via the 
Netherlands in smaller quantities. These include firms from Nigeria, Venezuela, 
Hungary, Poland, Greece, Ireland, France, the US, and Saudi Arabia. 
 The third column shows outstanding international corporate debt securities not 
issued through foreign SPEs. Firms from the first five countries in the table issued more 
corporate debt via Dutch SPEs than via domestic entities. The Dutch SPEs mostly lend 
the debt funding onwards to their parents or to other affiliates in the home country. The 
Indonesian firms Persero and Listrindo do this in two steps. First, the Dutch issuing 
entity invests the issuance proceeds as equity into a Dutch subsidiary. Second, this 
Dutch subsidiary onlends the funds to the ultimate parent in Indonesia. These structures 
may provide a legal defence against anti-avoidance measures. The SPEs of Japanese 
firms are an exception and lend mainly to affiliates outside Japan. Some SPEs, such as 
those of Energías de Portugal and Iberdrola, obtain external funding from banks as well 
as from debt markets. The SPEs of Unión Fenosa and Endesa also serve as conduits for 
interest on securities issued via US affiliates (not included in the figures). 
 Most Dutch fund raising vehicles facilitate avoidance of withholding taxes on 
interest payments to debt security holders. For Indonesian firms, withholding taxes on 
interest paid directly to foreign creditors typically range from 10% to 20%, depending 
on the country. Interest paid via a Dutch SPE is free of withholding tax, provided the 
loan has a maturity of more than two years. For Spanish and Portuguese firms, 
withholding taxes are zero on interest payments via Dutch SPEs instead of up to 20% on 
direct payments to external creditors. Note that various large Spanish firms also issue 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
                                                        
127  Reverse loans to German parents as reported by the Dutch central bank also seem reliable because (unlike 
other countries) they match closely with the data reported by Germany. For Portugal, the apparent 
discrepancy between macro and micro data is partly explained by the Dutch SPE of Portugal Telecom, 
which holds intra-group convertible bonds and commercial paper instead of intra-group loans. For Japan, 
it is largely explained by Dutch SPE loans to non-Japanese affiliates. 
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Table	  5.9	   Debt	  securities	  issued	  via	  Dutch	  SPEs	  (€	  bn)	  



























Indonesia	   3.4	   7.8	   2.4	   76%	   0.6	   20%	   	   0-­‐10%	   	   Persero,	   Asia	   Pulp	   &	   Paper,	  
Berlian	   Laju	   Tanker,	   Listrindo,	  
Indosat,	   Indika	   Energy,	   Gajah	  
Tunggal,	   Global	   Mediacom,	  
Bakrie	   Sumatera	   Plantations,	  
Arpeni	  Pratama	  Ocean	  Line	  
Kazakhstan	   0.8	   6.6	   2.6	   72%	   0.5	   15%	   	   10%	   	   KazMunaiGas,	  Kazakhstan	  Temir	  
Zholy,	   Astana	   Finance,	   Intergas	  
Central	  Asia/KazTransGas	  
Spain	   36.7	   30.1	   16.2	   65%	   1.2	   19%	   	   0%	   	   Telefónica,	   Repsol,	   Endesa,	   Red	  
Eléctrica	   de	   España,	   Iberdrola,	  
Unión	   Fenosa,	   Abertis	  
Infraestructuras,	  Ferrovial	  
Portugal	   1.5	   14.0	   10.7	   57%	   0.6	   20%	   	   0%	   	   Energías	   de	   Portugal,	   Portugal	  
Telecom,	  Carris	  
Germany	   102.5	   ..	   95.6	   52%c)	   ..	   0-­‐25%	   	   0%	   	   Deutsche	  Bahn,	  BMW,	  Siemens,	  
Volkswagen,	   Schaeffler,	   RWE,	  
Heidelberg	   Cement,	   EnBW,	  
Adidas,	   Deutsche	   Telekom,	  
E.ON,	   Linde,	   Allianz,	   Elster,	  
Celesio,	   Deutsche	   Post,	   Metro,	  
Pfleiderer,	  Phoenix	  
Japan	   0.6	   21.4a)	   312b)	   6%	   0.2	   15%	   	   10%	   	   Nomura,	  Toyota	  
Other	  
countries	  
30.3	   ..	   2,515	   1%c)	   ..	   	   	   	   	   	  
Total	   175.8	   ..	  	   2,683	   6%c)	   ..	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sources:	   IMF	  (2012),	  BIS	  (2012),	   individual	  company	  data,	  author’s	  calculations.	  Notes:	  Debt	  stock	  at	  31	  
December	  2010,	  annual	  interest	  assuming	  constant	  debt	  stock;	  a)	  includes	  other	  borrowings	  of	  Nomura;	  
b)	   corporate	   (€40	  bn)	  plus	   financial	   bonds	   instead,	   because	  Nomura	   is	   a	   financial	   company;	   c)	   (1)/(1+3)	  
instead.	  
 
debt via Luxembourg SPEs. For firms from Kazakhstan, the benefit is smaller because 
the withholding tax rate is reduced from a maximum of 15%, which applies only to 
countries that do not have a tax treaty with Kazakhstan, to 10%. However, Nigeria 
illustrates that even small withholding tax differences might give rise to avoidance 
structures. Nigeria’s first ever private foreign debt issue, by the Guarantee Trust Bank in 
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2007, took place via a Dutch SPE, even though this structure reduced withholding tax 
merely from 10% to 7.5%. 
 For German firms, the reasons to use Dutch fund raising vehicles are less clear. 
Germany applies a withholding tax for convertible and profit-sharing bonds only and not 
for other corporate debt instruments. Some German firms use their Dutch SPEs 
specifically to issue convertible or profit-sharing bonds, but most firms use them to issue 
other debt securities as well. 
 The results show that specific home countries are vulnerable to withholding tax 
avoidance via Dutch debt issuing SPEs, due to idiosyncratic combinations of low 
bilateral interest withholding tax rates to affiliates in the Netherlands and higher rates to 
external creditors in other countries. In terms of avoided withholding taxes, the most 
affected countries are Spain, Portugal, and Indonesia. Probably Dutch fund raising 
vehicles helped to avoid more than €50 million of interest withholding tax in each of 
these countries in 2010.128 
 
5.5.5 Royalty	  companies	  
Table 5.10 shows six foreign multinationals with large Dutch royalty companies. 
Google‘s SPE receives by far the largest royalty income, over €5.7 billion in 2010, and 
passes on nearly all of this to a group entity in Bermuda. Merck & Co and Forest 
xxxxxxxxx 
Table	  5.10	   Dutch	  royalty	  SPEs	  (€	  mln)	  




Source	  of	  royalties	   Royalty	  expenses	  
or	  fees	  
Destination	  of	  
royalties	  or	  fees	  
Google	  (US)	   5,725	   	   Europe,	  Middle	  East	  
and	  Africa,	  via	  Ireland	  
5,716	   Bermuda	  
Inter	  IKEA	  (LI)	   988	   	   Global	   908b)	   Luxembourg	  
Merck	  &	  Co	  (US)	   775	   	   Mainly	  Europe	   768	   Bermuda	  	  
Forest	  Laboratoriesa)	  (US)	   ..	   	   US,	  via	  Ireland	   708	   Bermuda	  
Schlumberger	  (CW)	   338	   	   Global	   531c)	   ..	  
SABMillera)	  (UK)	   78	   	   Mainly	  Africa	  and	  
Europe	  
5	   ..	  
Source:	  individual	  company	  data,	  author’s	  calculations.	  Notes:	  see	  page	  206	  for	  a	  list	  of	  country	  codes;	  
Income	   data	   for	   fiscal	   years	   2010;	   a)	   fiscal	   year	   ending	   31	  March	   2011;	   b)	   exploitation	   costs;	   c)	   general	  
expenses.	  
                                                        
128  Portugal: withholding tax difference of at least 10 %-point on €0.6 bn of interest payments. Indonesia: 
assuming an average difference of 10 %-point on €0.6 bn of interest, including €0.3 bn of interest from 
the state-owned energy company Persero; the difference is lower (5 %-point) for direct interest payments 
to security holders in Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Spain: assuming an average difference of 5 %-
point on €1.2 bn of interest payments; the difference is lower (0 %-point) for direct payments to 
Switzerland, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, the former Soviet Union and 5 smaller economies. 
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Laboratories use similar Dutch royalty conduits. The other three SPEs own intellectual 
property themselves. However, the SPEs of Inter IKEA and Schlumberger pay large 
license fees (or similar expenses) to foreign affiliates, so these SPEs still effectively 
operate as conduits. By contrast, SABMiller’s SPE benefits from a low effective tax rate 
on its royalty income and pays only minor royalties or fees to other affiliates. 
 Four of the SPEs receive royalties directly from affiliates in Europe, Africa or other 
parts of the world. These SPEs probably facilitate avoidance of royalty withholding tax 
as well as host country corporate income tax. This affects all countries worldwide, 
although EU countries and countries with a Dutch tax treaty that reduces royalty 
withholding tax are again more vulnerable. In the schemes of Google and Forest 
Laboratories, Dutch tax treaties do not play a role. 
 Dutch royalty companies are growing quickly. Total services exports of Dutch 
SPEs, mostly consisting of licensing services, increased from €11 billion in 2007 to 
€21 billion in 2011.129 
 
 
5.6 Conclusions	  and	  discussion	  
To summarise, the analysis provides the following answers to the three research 
questions. First, the main Dutch SPE types are financing companies, which provide 
equity and loans to foreign affiliates and sometimes attract external funding, and plain 
intermediate holdings. A key purpose of Dutch SPEs is to avoid various types of 
withholding taxes. Royalty companies and intra-group loan conduits also facilitate 
income shifting to low-tax regimes. SPEs of extractive industry firms partly facilitate 
other strategies, such as exemption of foreign income generated under a production-
sharing contract. 
 Second, in 2007, almost 75% of SPE balance sheets consisted of holding chains, 
fund raising structures, and loans to and from foreign affiliates. The SPEs passed on 
€17 billion of dividends from countries with normal tax regimes to foreign parents, €11 
billion of interest payments to debt security holders and €9 billion of interest payments 
within the group. They also received €7 billion of royalties, the largest income flow 
associated with income shifting. Thus, the main policy implications are related to 
avoidance of withholding taxes and income shifting through royalty payments. 
 Third, the most affected countries apply substantially lower withholding tax rates on 
payments to Dutch affiliates than on payments to affiliates or external creditors in many 
other countries, without effective anti-avoidance mechanisms. The Philippines, 
Mongolia, and Ghana are relatively vulnerable to avoidance of dividend withholding tax 
via holding structures. Croatia and Indonesia are relatively strongly affected by 
avoidance of withholding taxes on intra-group interest. Spain, Portugal, and Indonesia 
                                                        
129  Source: DNB Statistics Tables 12.3 and 12.13, http://statistics.dnb.nl/en/balance-of-payents-and-
international-investment-positions/index.jsp (accessed Nov 15, 2011). 
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are faced with substantial avoidance of withholding tax on portfolio interest via fund 
raising structures. Income shifting through royalty payments affects many countries 
worldwide. 
 Avoidance of withholding taxes has several consequences. It reduces host country 
tax revenues at a given level of investment. At the same time, it may increase the overall 
level of foreign investment, although this effect is usually small for FDI attracted by 
natural resources or domestic markets. More importantly, both avoidance of dividend 
and interest withholding taxes may increase debt financing relative to equity, the former 
because it facilitates repatriation of profits and the latter because it reduces borrowing 
costs. Finally, tax avoidance reduces market efficiency, because it allocates resources to 
unproductive uses and distorts competition between large firms that can engage in 
international tax arbitrage and medium-sized or smaller firms that cannot. 
 Countries faced with substantial withholding tax avoidance have two main policy 
options to improve economic outcomes. First, they can unilaterally reduce withholding 
taxes, for example to the lowest tax treaty rate. This would cause an immediate further 
loss of tax revenue, but it would stimulate investments of medium-sized enterprises and 
gradually enhance market efficiency. This option is most attractive for interest or 
dividend withholding taxes that are easily avoided via various routes. Second, countries 
can improve anti-avoidance measures or try to renegotiate the tax treaties with the 
lowest rates. This can increase tax revenues while reducing unproductive fiscal 
competition between firms. However, designing effective anti-avoidance measures can 
be very difficult and renegotiating treaties is a costly process. This option is most 
attractive if relatively simple measures, such as thin capitalisation rules, are not yet in 
place, or if one or two tax treaties are more generous than all others. Furthermore, this is 
the preferred option to address income shifting through royalties. A combination of 
unilaterally lowering rates to some extent and improving anti-avoidance measures is also 
possible. 
 From a development perspective, donor countries have a responsibility too. 
Facilitating tax avoidance in developing countries is incoherent with development 
policy. Supporting tax administrations in developing countries does not address this 
incoherence. Moreover, it is difficult for developing countries to assess the full 
consequences of a tax treaty themselves. Therefore donor countries like the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg also have a responsibility to reduce undesirable effects of their tax 
systems on developing countries. Policy options include adding standard anti-abuse 
clauses in every new tax treaty (as the UK does), revising tax ruling practices, 
strengthening substance requirements under domestic law, and disallowing deduction of 
royalties and fees paid to low tax jurisdictions in relation to intellectual property and 
trademarks that originate from elsewhere. 
 At a more fundamental level, the system of bilateral tax treaties is becoming 
increasingly unmanageable and dysfunctional because of SPE structures. For the EU, it 
makes sense to harmonise external withholding taxes and anti-abuse rules. A transition 
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towards harmonised rates would be complicated because of the existing bilateral tax 
treaty network. However, if SPE structures continue to erode the effectiveness of 
national law and bilateral treaties, EU-level alternatives might become more attractive. 
For developing countries, it makes sense to enhance tax treatment of foreign investors 
on a unilateral instead of a bilateral basis. This could greatly simplify their international 
tax policy and make policy outcomes more predictable. 
 Finally, a limitation of this research is that it could not systematically analyse 
hybrid-financing structures, rulings that define an alternative tax base, or avoidance of 
capital gains tax. These issues deserve attention in further research because of their 
potentially large impact. Especially avoidance of capital gains in major takeover 
transactions can have very large consequences for host country tax revenues. 
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Annex	  5.1	   Example	  of	  asset-­‐liability	  matrix	  construction	  
 
Assume an SPE has the following balance sheet. 
 
Assets	   	  
Participations	  in	  foreign	  subsidiaries	   50	  
Participations	  in	  Dutch	  subsidiaries	   10	  
Loans	  to	  foreign	  affiliates	   40	  
Total	   100	  
	   	  
Equity	  and	  liabilities	   	  
Own	  equity	   72	  
Unknown	   8	  
Debt	  securities	   20	  
Total	   100	  
 
 To construct the asset-liability matrix, first equity assets are attributed to own 
equity, to the extent possible, and loan assets to debt. For loans and debt, the first step is 
straightforward in this example: all debt liabilities (20 debt securities) form part of the 
funding for loan assets. The equity assets consist of two items (50 + 10 participations) 
that can be fully attributed to own equity and unknown funding. Unknown funding is 
treated as equity here, because this item is probably related to valuation differences 
between participations and own equity, and hence similar to a revaluation reserve. The 
participations in foreign subsidiaries (50) are attributed to own equity (45) and unknown 
funding (5) in the same proportion as total own equity (72) to total unknown funding (8). 
The same applies to participations in Dutch subsidiaries. After this step, the asset-
liability matrix looks as follows. 
 
	   	   Equity	  and	  liabilities	   	  
	   	   Participations	  by	  
foreign	  parents	  






Participations	  in	  	  
foreign	  subsidiaries	  
45	   5	   	   50	  
Participations	  in	  
Dutch	  subsidiaries	  
9	   1	   	   10	  
Loans	  to	  foreign	  
affiliates	  
	   	   20	   40	  
	  
Total	  assets	   72	   8	   20	   100	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 Next, remaining equity assets are attributed to debt, or remaining loan assets to 
equity. In this example, the net loan assets (20) are proportionally attributed to own 
equity (18) and unknown funding (2). Thus, with these attribution rules, the SPE in this 
example has the following unique asset-liability matrix. 
 
	   	   Equity	  and	  liabilities	   	  
	   	   Participations	  by	  
foreign	  parents	  






Participations	  in	  	  
foreign	  subsidiaries	  
45	   5	   0	   50	  
Participations	  in	  
Dutch	  subsidiaries	  
9	   1	   0	   10	  
Loans	  to	  foreign	  
affiliates	  
18	   2	   20	   40	  
	  
Total	  assets	   72	   8	   20	   100	  
 
 Some SPEs have negative balance sheet positions. These reflect a negative valuation 
of investments on the assets side or negative net worth reported as negative equity on the 
liabilities side, for example. The matrix calculations include rules to prevent attribution 
of positive assets to negative liabilities (as a negative proportion) and vice versa. 
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6.1 Introduction	  
This chapter summarizes the results from the four empirical chapters and uses these 
findings to answer the main research question. The introduction chapter of this thesis 
distinguishes different pathway effects of Dutch corporate tax policy on tax revenues in 
developing countries (see Figure 1.6, reproduced below as Figure 6.1). These pathway 
effects concern the impact of Dutch tax treaties and other aspects of the Dutch tax 
system on the volume of investment in developing countries, on the rate of applicable 
withholding tax, and on the composition of international capital and income flows. 
 
 
Figure	  6.1	   Potential	  pathway	  effects	  of	  Dutch	  corporate	  tax	  policy	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 The empirical results mainly cover rate effects, such as lower dividend withholding 
taxes due to treaty shopping, and composition effects, such as changes in the financing 
structure of subsidiaries due to profit shifting. The first chapter also provides a broader 
developmental perspective for analysing revenue mobilisation (see Table 1.1). 
According to this perspective, taxation has four main purposes. In addition to revenue 
generation for the government, taxation can also play an important role in redistribution 
of income and wealth, representation of citizens, and re-pricing of economic 
alternatives. Thus, the answer to the main research question considers how Dutch 
corporate tax policy influences these other purposes of taxation as well. 
 The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 summarizes the empirical 
results and answers the four sub-questions. Next, Section 6.3 presents the answer to the 
main research question with regard to revenue effects and Section 6.4 with regard to 
redistribution, representation, and re-pricing effects. Section 6.5 briefly describes the 
main academic contributions of this thesis and Section 6.6 discusses methodological 
aspects. Reflecting on the research results, Section 6.7 discusses why developing 
countries sign tax treaties that may produce adverse effects. Finally, Section 6.8 presents 
concrete and specific policy implications for the Netherlands and other donor countries. 
 
 
6.2 Empirical	  results	  
The first empirical chapter analysed how international aspects of Dutch corporate tax 
policy relate to Dutch development policy. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims 
to promote coherence of government policy in other areas with its policy on 
development cooperation and recognises the relevance of Dutch corporate tax policy in 
this regard. Over the past decade, it has paid considerable attention to both domestic and 
international constraints for domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries, 
including transfer mispricing and excessive use of tax incentives. This implies that 
unintended negative effects of Dutch tax policy on developing countries are incoherent 
with development policy and can thus be considered as adverse effects. Substantial 
adverse effects arise from the large role of Dutch SPEs in international tax avoidance 
strategies of multinationals. It appears that this specific aspect of the Dutch tax system 
had largely escaped attention from policy makers and the broader public until 2007. The 
approval of the group interest box in 2006, a special low-tax regime that was to replace 
the Group Financing Activities regime and could obviously be used to shift profits out of 
developing countries, provides clear evidence of the policy incoherence. The causes of 
policy incoherence are structural and political in nature, because the interests of 
developing countries inherently conflict with special interests of various large 
multinationals and Dutch service providers. 
 The second empirical chapter investigated how tax treaties influence the diversion of 
FDI through Dutch SPEs and focussed on withholding tax rate effects (pathway effect 
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5B in Figure 6.1). The econometric analysis shows that FDI diversion is higher if the 
home and host country both have a tax treaty with the Netherlands, and lower if there 
exists a direct treaty between the home and host country. Diversion of investments is 
partly driven by specific corporate structures that reduce the total tax on distributed 
foreign profits by taking advantage of reduced withholding taxes under Dutch tax 
treaties. It can therefore be concluded that FDI diversion partly results from tax treaty 
shopping. On average, the possibility to avoid dividend withholding tax causes a few 
additional percent of bilateral FDI stock to be routed through the Netherlands. This is 
consistent with descriptive statistics on diverted FDI. In 2007, out of the €582 billion of 
inward FDI in developing countries130 that have a tax treaty with the Netherlands, €53 
billion or approximately 9% was held via Dutch SPEs. For the group of developing 
countries that did not have a tax treaty with the Netherlands, this proportion was 6%, 
thus a third lower. 
 In theory, FDI diversion can have both a volume effect and a rate effect (pathway 
effects 2A and 5B in Figure 6.1, respectively). However, studies analysing the volume 
effect of tax treaties on total FDI in a developing country (pathway effects 1A and 2A 
combined) have produced mixed results. At the level of developing countries as a group, 
a significant positive volume effect is even more uncertain than at the level of individual 
countries. It can therefore be concluded that the rate effect is dominant. 
 The third empirical chapter assessed the relation between Dutch SPEs and the 
financing structure of EU-based multinationals, both at the firm and subsidiary level. 
Thus, it investigated effects of the Dutch tax system on the composition of invested 
capital (pathway effects 5C and 6C). At the firm level, debt issuance via Dutch SPEs 
allows to avoid withholding taxes on interest payments to all debt security holders and is 
associated with significantly higher debt financing. Controlling for relevant firm 
characteristics, EU firms with a Dutch issuing SPE on average have a ten percentage 
points higher ratio of debt to equity capital plus debt. This large effect could result from 
differences in tax aggressiveness; firms with a more aggressive tax strategy may use 
more debt financing and are also more likely to avoid withholding taxes via Dutch SPEs. 
At the subsidiary level, the analysis produces three important results. First, EU 
subsidiaries of larger multinationals are more leveraged. Second, the use of Dutch 
onlending SPEs is associated with higher subsidiary leverage. Third, in large firms, the 
sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to host country tax rate is relatively low. In 
combination, these results suggest that large firms are more likely to shift profits from 
EU subsidiaries to special lowly taxed affiliates and that this is partly facilitated by 
Dutch onlending SPEs. 
 The findings on the financing structure of subsidiaries show that intra-group 
onlending has a composition effect. In case this involves profit shifting to low-tax 
jurisdictions, there may not be a corresponding rate effect in the host country, because 
the final destination of interest payments is related to the use a Dutch onlending SPE. 
                                                        
130  Excluding Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, South Africa, and Mexico. 
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For example, it is possible that subsidiaries of firms with a Dutch onlending SPE borrow 
more from tax haven affiliates via the SPE, whereas subsidiaries of other firms borrow 
mainly from affiliates in non-haven countries to which a low or zero interest 
withholding tax applies. Applicable withholding tax rates could then be similar for both 
types of firms.131 Thus, profit shifting through intra-group loans is a specific tax strategy 
that has other revenue effects than FDI diversion in general. By contrast, external debt 
financing at the firm level has both a composition and a rate effect (pathway effects 6B 
and 6C); potential volume effects (3A) have not been investigated.132 
 The fourth empirical chapter analysed how specific tax avoidance strategies 
facilitated by Dutch SPEs affect developing countries, assessing the relative importance 
of various rate and composition effects. Descriptive statistics confirm that a key purpose 
of Dutch SPEs is to avoid various types of withholding taxes (pathway effects 5B and 
6B). Royalty companies and intra-group loan conduits also facilitate avoidance of host 
country corporate income tax through profit shifting (7C/8C and 5C, respectively). 
Avoidance of withholding taxes and income shifting through royalty payments have the 
largest effects on developing countries. Tax avoidance via Dutch SPEs affects 
developing countries in an uneven way. The most affected developing countries have a 
tax treaty with the Netherlands that specifies substantially lower withholding tax rates 
than the rates that apply to most other countries, without effective anti-avoidance 
mechanisms. Profit shifting through royalty payments probably affects many developing 
countries, including some countries that do not apply reduced royalty withholding taxes 
to the Netherlands. 
 
 
6.3 Revenue	  effects	  
The answer to the main research question, which regards the adverse effects of Dutch 
corporate tax policy on developing countries, follows from the findings of the four 
empirical chapters. This section addresses the revenue aspect. The next section discusses 
effects on other purposes of tax systems beyond revenue generation. 
 It can be concluded that several aspects of Dutch corporate tax policy have negative 
revenue effects on developing countries. These effects can be considered adverse 
because they are incoherent with the aims of Dutch development policy and against the 
interests of developing countries. This thesis provides evidence of adverse revenue 
                                                        
131  Depending on broader internal financing structures, interest income may be shifted from affiliates in other 
countries to affiliates in tax havens. 
132  Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) provide a compelling argument that investment in many developing 
countries is not constrained by access to external finance, but by attractive investment opportunities. This 
suggests that lower external borrowing costs due to lower withholding taxes probably generate only a 
small volume effect on investment by domestic multinationals. The effect on total investment can even be 
negative if additional external borrowing crowds out domestic finance and appreciates the real exchange 
rate, reducing competitiveness of the export sector. 
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effects for four specific aspects of Dutch corporate tax policy. Table 6.1 summarizes 
these aspects, their effect on the financing structure and intra-group transactions of 
multinationals, the main types of revenue effects, and corresponding income flows from 
developing countries to or via Dutch SPEs. The table also mentions some key countries 
identified in this thesis that are affected by  different SPE structures. The pathway codes 
in the table refer to Figure 6.1. As explained in the introduction, this thesis focusses on 
negative and unintended effects, which have so far received less attention in academic 
studies. Therefore Table 6.1 does not mention pathway effects 1A, 2A and 3A, which 
are usually positive, and 4A and 4B, which are usually taken into account as known by-
effects of tax treaties. It would also be difficult to estimate the volume effects 1A and 
2A on the basis of existing studies. The reason is that those studies analyse the average 
effect of tax treaties on individual developing countries, which probably differs from the 
specific effects of Dutch tax treaties on developing countries as a group. Furthermore, it 
would be difficult to calculate the partial revenue effect of increased inward FDI, 
because this involves estimating the taxable profits generated by additional foreign 
investments. The revenue effects of Dutch corporate tax policy investigated in this thesis 
are described below. 
 First, Dutch tax treaties that specify relatively low dividend withholding tax rates, 
without anti-avoidance provisions, allow avoidance of dividend withholding tax by 
foreign multinationals and therefore induce tax treaty shopping. In 2007, Dutch SPEs 
passed on €2.9 billion of dividends from developing countries to foreign parents. 
Assuming that foreign multinationals avoided on average 3 percentage point 
withholding tax in the host country on these diverted dividend flows, missed tax 
revenues for all developing countries combined would be roughly €100 million.133 
 Second, Dutch tax treaties that specify relatively low interest withholding taxes, 
without anti-avoidance provisions, facilitate several types of tax avoidance strategies. 
Combined with the absence of a Dutch withholding tax on interest, these tax treaties 
(and the EU Interest and Royalties Directive) enable avoidance of withholding tax on 
interest paid to foreign affiliates. In 2007, Dutch SPEs passed on approximately €0.4 
billion of interest payments from developing countries to affiliates in other countries, of 
which €0.2 billion to affiliates in tax havens. Probably the payments to non-havens 
mainly reduce interest withholding taxes. The payments to tax havens confirm that for 
developing countries, intra-group onlending via Dutch SPEs involves substantial profit 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
                                                        
133  The assumption of 3 percentage point average withholding tax reduction allows for FDI diversion for non-
tax reasons that does not benefit from lower withholding taxes. In case FDI diversion reduces withholding 
taxes in the host country, the reduction is often 5 or 10 percentage points, because most tax treaties 
specify maximum withholding tax rates that are a multiple of 5%. For firms from non-EU countries, the 
total withholding tax reduction may be lower than the reduction in the host country if a Dutch withholding 
tax applies to dividends that are passed onwards. In such cases, some dividend withholding tax revenues 
are effectively transferred from developing host countries to the Netherlands. The estimate assumes that 
missed tax revenues are not materially offset by additional revenues from a positive volume effect on FDI, 
for the reasons mentioned in the previous section. 
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Table	  6.1	   Adverse	   effects	   of	   Dutch	   tax	   policy	   on	   tax	   revenue	   in	   developing	  
countries	  




Effect	  on	  financing	  
structure	  and	  
transactions	  
Main	  effect	  on	  tax	  











5B	   Equity	  participations	  
diverted	  via	  NL	  
Rate	  effect:	  lower	  
dividend	  WHT	  





WHT,	  no	  interest	  
WHT	  in	  NL	  
5B	   Intra-­‐group	  loans	  from	  
normal	  countries	  
diverted	  via	  NL	  
Rate	  effect:	  lower	  interest	  
WHT	  
0.2	   	  
Indonesia	  5C	   Intra-­‐group	  loans	  from	  
tax	  havens	  via	  NL	  
Composition	  effect:	  larger	  
share	  of	  debt	  financing	  
reduces	  corporate	  income	  
tax	  
0.2	   	  
6B	  
6C	  
Debt	  issuance	  and	  
external	  borrowing	  via	  
NL	  
Rate	  and	  composition	  
effect:	  lower	  interest	  
WHT,	  larger	  share	  of	  debt	  
financing	  reduces	  
corporate	  income	  tax	  
1.1	   Indonesia,	  
Kazakhstan	  
APAs	  resulting	  in	  
low	  effective	  tax	  
rate	  
7C	   Royalty	  payments	  to	  NL	   Composition	  effect:	  larger	  
royalty	  payments	  abroad	  




WHT,	  no	  royalty	  
WHT	  in	  NL	  
8B	   Royalty	  payments	  to	  
normal	  countries	  
diverted	  via	  NL	  
Rate	  effect:	  lower	  royalty	  
WHT	  
0.1	   	  
8C	   Royalty	  payments	  to	  tax	  
havens	  diverted	  via	  NL	  
Composition	  effect:	  larger	  
royalty	  payments	  abroad	  
..c)	   	  
	  
Note:	  WHT	  =	  withholding	  tax,	  APA	  =	  advance	  pricing	  agreement;	  a)	  pathway	  effects	  refer	  to	  Figure	  6.1;	  b)	  
estimate	  of	  corresponding	   income	  flows	  from	  low	  and	  middle	   income	  countries	  (outside	  EU)	  to	  or	  via	  
Dutch	   SPEs;	   interest	   payments	   on	   debt	   issued	   via	   NL	   for	   2010,	   other	   income	   flows	   for	   2007;	   c)	   no	  
estimate	  because	  of	  insufficient	  data.	  
 
shifting. This is likely to increase subsidiary leverage, but does not necessarily reduce 
withholding tax revenues, as discussed in the previous section.134 
 The same aspects of the Dutch tax system also facilitate avoidance of withholding 
tax on interest paid to external creditors. For example, in 2010, Dutch SPEs passed on 
                                                        
134  Chapter 3 shows that the use of Dutch onlending SPEs is associated with a 6 percentage point higher ratio 
of debt to total assets. An average leverage ratio of 0.6 implies that the use of Dutch onlending SPEs 
increases debt financing of subsidiaries by 10% and reduces their tax charge by approximately 2-3% of 
total interest payments. Rate effects (which are mainly associated with payments to non-havens) can be 
larger, for example for Indonesia rate effects can amount to 10% of interest payments. 
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€0.6 billion of interest payments from Indonesian firms to holders of debt security 
holders, resulting in estimated missed withholding tax revenues of approximately €50 
million.135 Some other developing countries are also affected, including Kazakhstan, 
Nigeria, and Venezuela. The missed withholding taxes in those countries are 
considerably lower, though. As withholding tax avoidance reduces borrowing costs, it is 
associated with substantially higher debt financing relative to equity. This limits the tax 
base in the firm’s home country and therefore results in an additional revenue loss, 
which may be equal to a third of the avoided withholding tax.136 
 Third, advance pricing agreements between SPEs and the Dutch tax authority that 
specify an alternative tax base can facilitate profit shifting to the Netherlands through 
royalty payments or other types of transactions.137 In 2007, Dutch SPEs received 
approximately €0.3 billion of royalty income from developing countries that was not 
passed onwards. At least part of these flows involved profit shifting to the Netherlands. 
 Fourth, Dutch tax treaties that specify relatively low royalty withholding taxes, 
again without anti-avoidance provisions, combined with the absence of a Dutch 
withholding tax on royalties, may result in avoidance of royalty withholding tax. In 
2007, royalty income from developing countries passed on by Dutch SPEs was €0.1 
billion and thus relatively small. The absence of a Dutch withholding tax on royalties 
can also facilitate profit shifting to low-tax affiliates in other countries by way of royalty 
payments passing through Dutch SPEs. This affects developing countries indirectly, for 
example in the case of Google, which collects royalties from African countries in Ireland 
and then passes on this royalty income via the Netherlands to Bermuda.  
 Withholding tax avoidance by multinationals raises broader revenue issues. The 
efforts of multinationals to avoid interest withholding tax indicate that these practices 
yield private benefits and thus the withholding tax does not merely reallocate tax 
revenues between different countries. For payments to external creditors, this suggests 
                                                        
135  This estimate takes into account that interest payments may have been some 12% lower if they were not 
passed through a Dutch SPE, because withholding tax avoidance induces larger debt financing (see also 
note 136). Roughly half of the interest payments concern the state-owned energy company Persero. Thus, 
the missed tax revenues are partly offset by higher profits of this company. However, Persero incurs some 
costs for operating the tax avoidance structure and the lower borrowing costs probably induce higher debt 
financing. As a consequence, the structure still reduces total revenues for the Indonesian government. 
136  Chapter 3 shows that the use of Dutch issuing SPEs is associated with a 10 percentage point higher ratio 
of debt to debt plus equity, at least for publicly listed EU manufacturing firms in the period 1997-2005. 
An average debt ratio of 0.5 implies approximately 20% higher total debt financing for firms that use a 
Dutch issuing SPE, which would raise interest payments (net of withholding taxes) by more than 20% due 
to increasing marginal borrowing costs. Assuming a more conservative increase in deductible interest 
payments of 14% in the case of Indonesia suggests a reduction in tax revenues of approximately 3% of 
total interest payments. Considering that according to Table 5.9 most debt of Indonesian firms is issued 
via Dutch SPEs, this reduction is roughly a third of the withholding tax avoidance, which is estimated at 
10% of interest payments via Dutch SPEs. 
137  The Dutch Group Financing Activities regime, which was phased out by end-2010, had similar effects. In 
2007, this regime may still have applied to some Dutch SPEs that received royalty income from 
developing countries. 
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that some recipients cannot obtain a full tax credit for the withholding tax paid abroad. 
Those recipients may be pension funds or other tax-exempt investors based in normal 
economies as well as investors registered in low-tax jurisdictions. Taking into account 
that the private wealth held in such jurisdictions is extremely large and mostly invested 
in fixed income securities, it is plausible that avoidance of interest withholding tax is 
also linked to personal income tax evasion on offshore assets. 
 
 
6.4 Redistribution,	  representation	  and	  re-­‐pricing	  effects	  
Considering the other purposes of taxation beyond revenue generation, it can be 
concluded that tax avoidance strategies facilitated by Dutch corporate tax policy have 
further adverse effects on developing countries. They also have an impact on the 
redistribution, representation, and re-pricing roles of taxation. 
 The effect on income redistribution is rather complex, because it is difficult to 
determine who ultimately bears the withholding and corporate income tax paid by 
multinational firms and benefits from tax avoidance. Probably some of the private 
benefits from tax avoidance accrue to the shareholders of multinational firms. However, 
part of the tax savings may also be passed on to customers and consumers, through 
lower sales prices, and to suppliers and creditors, through higher procurement prices and 
interest rates. The distribution among shareholders, clients, suppliers, creditors, and 
other stakeholders depends on the characteristics of the markets in which the firm 
operates. If a firm has some degree of market power or has a highly inelastic demand for 
its products and debt securities, the shareholders can capture a larger part of the benefits. 
A substantial part of the benefits accrues to beneficiaries are in high income countries. 
 In addition to the net private benefits for the firm, two types of actors also benefit 
from the costs that a firm incurs through its tax avoidance practices. The first type are 
tax advisors, law firms, accountants, administrators, and other service providers that 
help to set up and manage tax avoidance structures. For Dutch SPE structures, 
specialised firms in the Netherlands provide the majority of these services. Some 
structures also involve SPEs in other countries, such as Bermuda or Ireland. The second 
type are foreign governments that obtain revenues138 from (relatively low) withholding 
                                                        
138  The Dutch Central Bank estimated that Dutch tax revenues from SPEs were €1.2 billion in 2001 (DNB, 
2003). More recently, a consultancy firm estimated the tax revenues from Dutch legal entities 
administrated by trust firms (these entities are also known as mailbox companies) at €1.2 billion in 2006 
and €0.9 billion in 2009, on the basis of a survey among trust firms (Risseeuw & Dosker, 2011). These 
figures are not fully comparable to the central bank estimate, though, for two reasons. First, some large 
SPEs are not managed by external administrators. Second, trust companies also manage other entities that 
are no SPEs, such as securitisation vehicles of Dutch banks. Probably a large part of the Dutch tax 
revenues from SPEs consist of dividend withholding tax. The revenues have been declining because of the 
cooperative structures explained in Chapter 5. It is not clear whether revenues have been rising again 
since the introduction of domestic anti-avoidance legislation in 2012. 
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taxes and corporate income taxes on the operational margins of SPEs. Thus, the tax 
avoidance facilitated by Dutch SPEs redistributes income from developing countries to 
the Netherlands and other high income countries. 
 Distributional effects at the domestic level in developing countries are less clear and 
depend on the incidence of other types of taxes. The more progressive the domestic tax 
system, the less likely that tax avoidance by multinational firms has an adverse impact 
on redistribution within a developing country. 
 The effect on representation is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, tax 
avoidance by foreign and domestic multinationals can weaken broader taxpayer morale 
(IMF, 2011) and hinder constructive revenue bargaining. On the other hand, citizens in 
developing countries may find other revenue problems more pressing, such as excessive 
tax incentives for foreign investors offered by the government itself or the diversion of 
public revenues by domestic elites. In case the tax practices of a specific multinational 
become the subject of a public scandal, it is also possible that this has a positive by-
effect on representation by strengthening civil society groups that promote responsible 
tax practices and stimulating tax reforms. 
 Finally, the re-pricing effect of tax avoidance by multinationals goes well beyond 
incentives for higher debt financing and is decidedly negative. Tax avoidance reduces 
market efficiency, because it redirects resources to unproductive uses and distorts 
competition between large firms that can engage in international tax arbitrage and 
medium-sized or smaller firms that cannot. These negative effects on broader economic 
development are difficult to quantify, but may be at least as important as the direct effect 
on public revenue mobilisation. 
 
 
6.5 Academic	  contributions	  
This thesis intends to make several contributions to existing academic research. Overall, 
the main contribution is that it shows how foreign corporate tax systems can affect 
domestic revenue mobilisation in developing countries. The thesis builds a bridge 
between development studies and economic research on corporate taxation. In the field 
of development studies, research on taxation has mainly focussed on domestic issues or 
regional tax competition and attention for broader international constraints to raising 
corporate tax revenues has been limited. By contrast, many studies on corporate taxation 
examine international tax strategies of multinational firms, but these studies pay little 
attention to consequences for developing countries. This thesis shows that corporate tax 
revenues are a relatively important source of public finance for many developing 
countries and that these revenues can be negatively affected by tax treaties that strongly 
reduce withholding tax rates. Importantly, the potential negative effects extend beyond 
lower withholding tax revenues from existing investments, or investments that would 
occur regardless of the treaty, originating from the partner country itself. A structural 
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analysis of such negative effects was lacking so far. The thesis also contributes to a 
better understanding of withholding tax avoidance in general, a relatively neglected 
issue in empirical economic research. 
 Regarding the field of development studies, this thesis extends academic literature 
on policy coherence for development towards tax policy in donor countries. Various 
studies of policy coherence, for example by Hoebink (2004) and Keijzer (2010), provide 
a useful framework for analysis and review a broad range of policy areas, but do not yet 
consider tax policy. Some recent policy documents (e.g. European Commission, 2011; 
OECD, 2012c) do include initiatives to strengthen tax systems in developing countries. 
However, these documents do not address potential incoherence between tax policy and 
development policy in donor countries. This thesis nevertheless shows that such 
incoherence is relevant to take into account, since it can hinder revenue mobilisation in 
developing countries. Donor countries can address policy incoherence by systematically 
assessing the impact of their tax policy on developing countries. All in all, this means 
that it is useful to include tax policy in further analyses of policy coherence for 
development. 
 Linked to this, the thesis also presents an alternative “beyond ODA” perspective. 
Existing literature on development cooperation beyond ODA mainly considers 
alternative forms of external financing (e.g. OECD, 2012a; Vanheukelom et al., 2012), 
new types of international taxes (e.g. Addison et al., 2005; United Nations, 2012), and 
non-aid issues other than tax policy, such as trade policy and corporate social 
responsibility (e.g. Kalinowski, 2011; Wilde Ramsing, forthcoming). Increasing fiscal 
self-reliance of developing countries should also be considered a key aspect of moving 
beyond ODA, because in the long run ODA is not a sustainable source of financing. 
This thesis shows that donor countries can support that aim, and thus provide an 
important type of support beyond ODA, by addressing international obstacles to revenue 
mobilisation in developing countries. 
 A more fundamental contribution to the literature lies in the development of a 
contemporary analytical and normative framework regarding financing for development. 
Often existing literature focuses on foreign sources of development financing and pays 
limited attention to the distinction between public and private sources (e.g. World Bank, 
2011b). There is, for example, a tendency to compare the volume of ODA to FDI and to 
migrant remittances. Such an analytical approach has probably been influenced by 
policy responses to the debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s, which were primarily 
concerned with solving balance of payment problems and restoring macroeconomic 
stability. For those policy objectives, all external flows are relevant, even though their 
roles in financing development may be very different. Moreover, in responses to the 
debt crises, fiscal balance was often regarded more important than the adequacy of 
government revenues to finance essential public goods and services. In contrast to 
literature that follows such an approach, other studies analysing financing for 
development distinguish explicitly between private and public components, recognising 
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or even emphasising the relevance of these components for particular financing needs 
(Botchwey, 2003; OECD & AfDB, 2010). The current thesis adds to this line of thinking 
by analysing developments within different subsets of financing sources – external 
sources of private earnings, financing for private investments, and financing of public 
goods and services – with a focus on public finance. 
 The thesis contrasts ODA with domestic revenue mobilisation and shows that lower-
middle income countries have compensated decreasing aid levels by increasing tax 
revenues, whereas low income countries remain highly dependent on development aid 
for public financing. The analysis suggests that further increasing fiscal self-reliance 
remains important for both groups of countries. In sum, the current thesis departs from 
the former overall focus on external flows and separately analyses different components 
of financing for development, including domestic as well as foreign sources. It presents 
fiscal self-reliance as a central aim for the public component of financing for 
development. Such a normative framework has only been applied in a few other studies 
before (e.g. Heggstad, 2011; McKinley & Kyrili, 2009). 
 It must be acknowledged that private sources of financing can also contribute to 
domestic revenue mobilisation by generating additional economic activity and thus 
broadening the tax base. However, reviewing the existing literature, it appears that 
effects on public finance are still poorly understood. There exist no empirical studies 
that assess the impact of increasing FDI in developing countries on tax revenues, for 
example. This contrasts with the large body of literature studying the impact of tax 
systems on FDI, in line with the analytical focus on external flows mentioned above. 
The lack of research on revenue effects of private external financing flows also contrasts 
with the abundance of research on growth effects of these flows. The theoretical 
framework presented in this thesis, which recognises public finance as a separate 
component of financing for development and fiscal self-reliance as a key aim, helps to 
identify and address such research gaps.  
 To analyse revenue mobilisation in developing countries, the thesis further develops 
the developmental framework of Cobham (2005b) that distinguishes four key roles of 
taxation. The original framework was mainly intended for analysing tax systems at the 
level of main revenue components, such as foreign aid, natural resource rents, direct 
taxes, consumption taxes, and trade tariffs. This thesis integrates general disincentives to 
economic activity and market distortions as well as the potential for countercyclical 
fiscal policy into the framework. It shows that the extended framework is also useful to 
study more specific types of taxes, such as corporate tax or withholding tax. The 
extended framework has broad applicability and may enable more comprehensive 
academic analyses of tax policy, with more consideration for other roles of taxation 
beyond revenue generation. 
 Regarding the field of corporate taxation and international investment, the thesis 
provides a new theoretical framework to study firm behaviour by distinguishing volume, 
rate, and composition effects. Most studies in this field are concerned with effects of tax 
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policy on the volume of FDI. A small body of literature addresses profit shifting and 
thus composition effects. By contrast, there exists hardly any empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of rate effects. This is somewhat surprising, because intended rate effects, 
notably effects of new tax treaties on withholding tax revenues from existing 
investments covered by these treaties, are relatively easy to investigate. The framework 
presented in this thesis may help to rebalance research efforts. Moreover, it may help to 
better understand firm behaviour by considering the possibility of FDI diversion. 
Although FDI diversion is an important aspect of how multinational firms respond to tax 
policy, this aspect is rarely taken into account in economic analysis. 
 The main empirical contribution to research on corporate taxation is that the thesis 
provides one of the first quantitative analyses of FDI diversion and yields strong 
evidence of tax treaty shopping. So far, there exist only a few other studies that present 
direct empirical evidence on tax treaty shopping (Dreßler, 2012; Weichenrieder & 
Mintz, 2008). These other studies analyse the probability that firms use intermediate 
holdings and do not describe the overall magnitude of diverted investments. The current 
thesis therefore provides the first estimates of the effect of tax treaties and withholding 
tax reductions on the amount of FDI diversion. The effect is material, which calls for a 
reinterpretation of studies that conclude that tax treaties have a positive effect on 
bilateral FDI (Barthel, Busse, & Neumayer, 2010; Blonigen & Davies, 2008; Siegmann, 
2007). This thesis demonstrates that the apparent positive effect partly results from tax 
treaty shopping. Thus, it shows that most studies overestimate the effect of a tax treaty 
on FDI originating from the partner country itself. Furthermore, tax treaty shopping 
increases bilateral FDI from treaty countries relative to non-treaty countries, but does 
not necessarily increase total inward FDI from all countries combined. Therefore the 
findings in this thesis also imply that the effect of tax treaties on total inward FDI may 
be smaller than most existing studies suggest. 
 In addition, the thesis shows that the effects of tax treaties are heterogeneous and 
depend on the combination of domestic tax law and specific provisions in the treaty. 
Except for a few studies on tax sparing clauses (Azémar et al., 2006; Hines, 2001), all 
existing economic studies investigating the effect of tax treaties on FDI regard tax 
treaties as homogenous and use dummy variables only to test their impact on FDI. This 
thesis finds that differences in the reduction of dividend withholding tax rates have a 
significant effect on FDI patterns, even after controlling for the general effect of tax 
treaties. Moreover, it shows that analysing effects of tax treaties without taking into 
account relevant treaty characteristics can produce misleading results. The analysis of 
FDI diversion with general tax variables in Chapter 3 suggests that treaty effects differ 
between developing countries and other non-EU host countries, for example. The 
analysis with strategy-specific tax variables in the same chapter shows that this 
difference becomes insignificant once bilateral withholding tax reductions are accounted 
for. Similarly, the analysis of SPE structures at the country level in Chapter 5 shows that 
some structures can be explained by specific treaty characteristics. The large debt 
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issuance via Dutch SPEs by firms from a few countries that apply relatively low 
withholding tax rates to the Netherlands, notably Indonesian and Kazakhstan, is a good 
example. Thus, the findings imply that further economic research on tax treaties should 
consider differences in tax treaty benefits. 
 Regarding research methods, the thesis presents a new approach to analyse treaty 
shopping and SPE structures. This new research approach relies on the use of 
anonymised DNB micro data on Dutch SPEs, which have not yet been used in other 
academic research projects. Most studies on corporate tax strategies focus on 
multinationals from, or investing in, a specific high income country or a set of European 
countries. The current thesis analyses investments from and to over 100 countries that 
pass through a specific intermediate country. This new approach provides more 
information about certain types of tax avoidance in developing countries, because it 
allows to analyse FDI in developing countries from many different home countries. The 
limitation of this approach is that it works only for tax strategies in which the 
intermediate country, in this case the Netherlands, figures prominently. 
 Finally, by developing a typology of SPEs and testing different SPE types in an 
analysis of capital structures, the thesis helps to understand the use of SPEs. Other 
empirical research on the use of SPEs mainly focusses on entities located in low-tax 
jurisdictions or on intermediate holdings (Desai et al., 2002; Desai et al., 2006; Dreßler, 
2012; Weichenrieder & Mintz, 2008). By contrast, this thesis analyses SPEs in a conduit 
country with a normal tax rate and it covers various well-defined SPE types. The 
quantitative description of Dutch SPE structures can help to focus further research 
efforts on particular tax strategies or investments in particular countries. The typology 




6.6 Methodological	  robustness	  and	  limitations	  
In addition to the separate discussions at the end of each empirical chapter, some general 
comments on methodological robustness and limitations are in place. 
 To start with robustness, the combination of comprehensive anonymised micro data 
and many concrete cases of corporate structures involving Dutch SPEs shows 
unambiguously that Dutch corporate tax policy enables tax avoidance in developing 
countries. A key strength of the research is that it does not treat SPEs as black boxes, but 
distinguishes clearly between different types of SPEs and associated tax strategies. In 
Chapter 4, for example, this demonstrates that debt-financing effects are linked to the 
use of specific types of onlending SPEs and not a mere coincidence. Ultimately, the 
robustness and strength of the research is based on a thorough examination and – labour 
intensive – processing and crosschecking of data from different sources. This also 
applies to the introductory chapter, which combines revenue data from various sources 
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to provide a more reliable and representative description of tax systems in developing 
countries. Furthermore, the econometric analysis in the Chapters 3 and 4 relies on 
models of firm behaviour that are appropriate for large firms and allow for complex 
internal financing structures. These models are relatively flexible and do not assume a 
relationship between total external debt financing and intra-group debt shifting, for 
example. Thus, the research relies on robust data and suitable model assumptions. 
 The main methodological limitation of this thesis is that each empirical chapter uses 
data for a small number of years only. This is primarily due to data constraints. The 
DNB micro data set contained suitable data for 2006 and 2007, IMF CDIS data are 
available from 2009 onwards only, and the Reach and Amadeus databases cover a 
maximum period of 10 years. As a consequence, it was not possible to analyse 
developments over time using panel data techniques. Even for the period 1997-2005 
analysed in Chapter 4, variation in SPE structures over time was limited. However, 
possibilities to analyse developments over time are also limited by other factors than 
data availability. Dutch SPE structures can remain in place for a considerable time after 
they have become obsolete. Some SPE structures are established at the moment a certain 
investment is planned, thus not exhibiting any within-firm variation over time, whereas 
some large complex SPE structures change continuously, even though their basic 
purpose may remain approximately the same. Due to acquisitions and divestments, the 
firms to which SPEs belong also change continuously themselves. This last factor makes 
it practically impossible to conduct a meaningful econometric analysis of tax strategies 
of very large multinationals over a period of more than 10 years. 
 Another limitation is that this thesis could not analyse the effect of FDI diversion on 
total FDI in developing countries. This is also primarily due to data constraints. As noted 
in the introductory chapter, investments diverted via the Netherlands are only included 
in FDI statistics reported by host countries. For many developing countries, such 
statistics are not available or inconsistent. 
 Furthermore, the thesis analysed effects of Dutch SPEs only without taking into 
account SPEs in other countries. This might have caused slight distortions in the 
econometric analyses. These distortions are probably small, though, because the 
Netherlands is by far the largest conduit country for FDI and the main location of 
issuing SPEs for firms from Indonesia and some other developing countries. The 
analysis could also not assess the effects of more complex structures in which Dutch 
SPEs pass on dividend and interest payments from tax havens. Such structures represent 
a substantial part of total SPE operations and ultimately affect tax revenues in non-haven 
countries as well. Moreover, no data are available on tax avoidance structures involving 
hybrid entities or hybrid financing. Adverse effects of advance pricing agreements could 
not be analysed in a comprehensive manner and avoidance of capital gains tax has not 
been analysed. As a consequence, this thesis describes only some of the most important 
adverse effects on developing countries. 
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 The analysis of SPE structures is mainly based on statistical data, company reports, 
and other sources that do not contain direct information on the motivation behind these 
structures. Direct information would have been very useful; it was beyond the scope of 
this research project to ask managers of foreign multinationals themselves about the 
rationale for Dutch SPE structures.139 Some information about the purpose of SPE 
structures was obtained from court cases and materials from tax advisors. In order to 
better understand the findings, the results on SPE structures have also been discussed 
with various experts with relevant practical experience. Thus, the research involved 
special efforts to avoid misinterpretation of data and statistical analyses. 
  The detailed data presented in Chapter 5 allow a reassessment of findings from 
earlier chapters. The SPE micro data suggest that the estimates of missed tax revenues in 
Chapter 2 assumed too high dividend payments and intra-group interest payments from 
developing countries. The micro data support the approximate volume of total missed 
tax revenues, though. Chapter 5 also showed that many extractive industry firms have 
diverted investments into countries that do not have tax treaty with the Netherlands. This 
suggests a potential determinant of FDI diversion that was not included in the analysis in 
Chapter 3 and might help to explain FDI diversion into non-treaty countries. The 
indirect evidence for profit shifting to low-tax affiliates in Chapter 4 may be questioned 
in light of the volume of interest payments to tax haven affiliates. Chapter 5 shows that 
in 2007, such payments from the EU and other high income countries were €1.3 billion. 
This is a significant amount, yet probably too low to fully explain the higher leverage of 
EU subsidiaries in firms with a Dutch onlending SPE. A larger amount, approximately 
€4 billion, was passed on to affiliates in non-havens. A possible explanation is that 
some onlending Dutch SPEs increase the average leverage of EU affiliates by acting as 
internal banks and facilitating access to short-term internal credit. If affiliates with short-
term financing needs can borrow internally at all times and at a low cost, this may 
reduce the need to retain earnings as a financial buffer.140 An alternative explanation 
might be that the use of Dutch SPEs to finance EU subsidiaries changed significantly 
from 1997 to 2007 due to on-going economic integration or developments in corporate 
tax strategies.141 SPE data for 2007 could then not be fully compatible with findings 
                                                        
139  Most Dutch SPEs do not have a physical presence in the Netherlands and it could be difficult to contact 
the right person in a foreign multinational to discuss tax planning. Moreover, multinational firms that 
engage in controversial tax planning practices are usually not very eager to discuss these. 
140  Onlending SPEs might then still be located in the Netherlands because of the absence of interest 
withholding taxes, in combination with the favourable tax treaty network. This could facilitate the pooling 
of intra-group deposits and loans for affiliates inside as well as outside the EU. 
141  A potentially relevant development is profit shifting from the UK to tax havens through bonds that are 
listed on a recognised exchange but not actually traded. In such structures, an affiliate based in a tax haven 
effectively provides an intra-group loan to a UK entity in the form of a bond loan. This enables 
multinationals to avoid UK withholding tax on interest payments to tax haven affiliates without the use of 
a Dutch onlending SPE. 
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about the use of SPEs over in earlier years.142 Chapter 5 also finds that EU firms with 
outstanding debt securities issued via Dutch SPEs are mainly based in Portugal, Spain, 
and Germany. Some UK firms included in Chapter 3 have stopped using Dutch issuing 
SPEs after 2007. This is partly due to corporate restructurings.143 It is possible that 
certain issuance structures are no longer in use because they have become obsolete.144 
Portugal and Spain continue to be significantly affected, though. 
 DNB macro data series on Dutch SPEs suggest that data for the years 2007 and 
2010, used in the Chapters 3 and 5, are representative for the overall volume of SPE 
operations in other recent years. All main balance sheet positions of the Dutch SPE 
sector are steadily increasing over time. Total assets, participations in foreign 
subsidiaries, loans to foreign affiliates, equity participations by foreign parents, and 
loans from foreign affiliates have all approximately doubled from 2005 to 2011. 
Outstanding debt securities also increased steadily, but less quickly. Income flows are 
more volatile, yet show a clear upward trend as well. Dividend and interest of Dutch 
SPEs income declined by 20% from 2007 to 2009, but in 2010 it was back at the high 
level of 2007. Thus, future adverse effects are likely to be at least as large as those 
estimated in this thesis. 
  
 
6.7 Why	   do	   countries	   sign	   tax	   treaties	   that	   have	   adverse	  
effects?	  
The findings form this thesis raise an important question. If certain tax treaties with the 
Netherlands produce substantial negative effects for developing countries, then why did 
the governments of those countries sign such a treaty? If governments of partner 
countries were fully aware of the risk for withholding tax avoidance when they agreed to 
a treaty that strongly reduces withholding tax rates without anti-avoidance provisions, 
they might bear responsibility for the adverse effects themselves. 
 This thesis did not investigate the reasons why developing country governments 
conclude tax treaties. It is generally argued that they do so expecting that tax treaties will 
promote FDI, since treaties offer legal certainty and withholding tax reductions to 
foreign investors and can signal a commitment to international investment rules. If 
developing countries are very eager to sign tax treaties, then this may weaken their 
                                                        
142  In 2007, the proportion of intra-group interest passed on to tax havens was much larger for developing 
countries than for the EU and other high income countries. Thus, the effect on subsidiary leverage 
identified in chapter 4 might still hold for developing countries, even if the situation has changed in the 
EU. 
143  For example, in 2008, UK-based Imperial Chemical Industries was taken over by Netherlands-based Akzo 
Nobel. 
144  Some debt-issuing structures remain in place for ten years or more after an SPE issues its latest debt 
securities, until all long-term debts have matured. A as consequence, issuing structures may change 
slowly and respond to regulatory developments with a long delay. 
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negotiating position and cause them to accept relatively large withholding tax reductions 
and treaties without anti-avoidance clauses. Some developing countries may also simply 
lack the administrative capacity, technical expertise, and experience that are needed to 
conclude more balanced tax treaties with fewer possibilities for abuse. 
 A few theoretical studies try to explain the network of asymmetric tax treaties 
between net capital importing (developing) and net capital exporting (high income) 
countries. In the most relevant study, Baistrocchi (2008) argues that developing 
countries are faced with a prisoners dilemma. Competition for FDI may lead them to 
sign tax treaties that reduce their taxing rights in an attempt to become relatively more 
attractive for foreign investors. However, if other developing countries sign similar tax 
treaties, then they are worse off as a group. An empirical analysis confirms that 
developing countries are more likely to conclude tax treaties if other developing 
countries producing similar exports, and thus potentially competing for export-oriented 
FDI, also expand their tax treaty network (Barthel & Neumayer, 2012). 
 For investment treaties, empirical research provides additional insights. One study 
finds that developing countries that have already succeeded in attracting substantial FDI 
are more likely to conclude BITs. This suggests that negotiations are partly driven by 
interests of existing investors (Swenson, 2009). Another study shows that developing 
countries governments largely ignore the risk that BITs can result in large claims until 
this risk materialises. After that, a country becomes much less inclined to sign new BITs 
(Poulsen & Aisbett, 2013).  
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, to some extent, these findings apply to tax treaties 
as well. Developing countries may be encouraged to conclude tax treaties that benefit 
existing foreign investors. This may also be the case for some tax treaties with the 
Netherlands and it is possible that the interests of existing investors include those of 
foreign multinationals that have invested via Dutch SPEs. Existing investors do not 
always play a role, though. The treaties with Mongolia and Uganda, concluded in 2002 
and 2004 respectively, illustrate this. No substantial investments from or via the 
Netherlands existed before these treaties were concluded and by 2012, FDI originating 
from the Netherlands itself in these countries remains low.145 
 Analogous to investment treaties, developing countries may also conclude treaties 
with low withholding tax rates and no anti-avoidance clauses until they are confronted 
with serious tax avoidance facilitated by tax treaties. Several examples seem to confirm 
this. In the case of tax treaties, affected governments have several possibilities to address 
the problem. Depending on the circumstances, they can try to renegotiate a treaty, 
terminate a treaty (often within a notice period of less than a year), or introduce 
domestic anti-avoidance regulation. In March 2000, Indonesia announced that it was 
                                                        
145  Uganda reports €14 million of inward FDI stock from the Netherlands at end-2010 (IMF, 2012a). The 
Mongolian Ministry of Economic Development registered almost €2 billion of inward FDI from the 
Netherlands in the period of 2005 to mid-2012. 98% of this amount is invested in the extractive sector 
(Mongolian Ministry of Economic Development, 2012) and probably consists of diverted FDI. 
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terminating its tax treaty with the Netherlands, because it wanted to cancel the reduction 
of profit tax on branches on extractive industry firms operating under a production-
sharing contract. The Indonesian Ministry of Finance had tried to renegotiate the treaty, 
but found that its concerns were not sufficiently accommodated. In January 2002, 
Indonesia and the Netherlands signed a new tax treaty. In 2004, Indonesia ended its tax 
treaty with Mauritius because the treaty allowed firms to avoid domestic taxes. In 2011, 
the Mongolian government requested the Netherlands and Luxembourg to amend their 
tax treaties with Mongolia after it discovered that many inward investments were 
diverted via these countries. Apparently, the Dutch Ministry of Finance responded only 
after Mongolia threatened to end the treaty and did not accept all proposed changes. This 
is remarkable, as investments by Dutch firms in Mongolia that might be affected by the 
amendments are apparently limited. In November 2012, Mongolia decided to terminate 
the treaty, which will cease to be effective after 31 December 2013. 
 High income countries learn from experience as well. For example, since the 
Lamesa Holding case, in which a US private equity firm used a structure involving a 
Dutch SPE to avoided capital gains tax, Australia includes anti-avoidance provisions in 
new tax treaties to counter this type of structures. After the Prévost case, which allowed 
dividend withholding tax avoidance via a Dutch conduit, Canada sought to renegotiate 
the tax treaty with the Netherlands. Some tax treaty problems concern tax avoidance via 
SPEs in other countries. India has been threatening to end its tax treaty with Mauritius 
because of widespread treaty abuse. Argentina recently cancelled its tax treaties with 
Spain and Chile because of tax avoidance structures. All these examples show that 
governments were not fully aware of possibilities for tax avoidance when they 
concluded tax treaties. 
 
 
6.8 Policy	  implications	  for	  donor	  countries	  
The largest adverse effects of Dutch corporate tax policy described in this thesis can be 
effectively addressed by some specific and relatively simple measures of the Dutch 
government. Therefore this section presents policy suggestions for the Netherlands. 
Some of these are also relevant for other donor countries. Without the cooperation of 
donor countries, policy options for developing countries are rather limited.146 It is 
therefore crucial that donor countries fulfil their commitment to policy coherence for 
development in the important area of tax policy. 
 It should be acknowledged that the Netherlands has already taken important steps to 
enhance policy coherence. Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Finance on international tax matters has substantially improved over the past 
years. In December 2012, the new Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development 
Cooperation announced that the government would reassess some existing tax treaties 
                                                        
146  For policy options for developing countries, see Section 5.6. 
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with developing countries. However, at the same time, the government continues to 
conclude new tax treaties with developing countries that are highly susceptible to abuse, 
as evidenced by the Netherlands-Ethiopia tax treaty signed in August 2012. Addressing 
incoherence between tax and development policies therefore remains extremely 
important. 
 The recommendations below focus on short-term actions that the Dutch government 
can implement quickly and will provide immediate benefits to some developing 
countries. In the medium and long term, more fundamental reforms of corporate tax 
policy are desirable to improve taxation of globally operating firms in a way that reduces 
the ever increasing complexity and mismatches of poorly national tax systems, which is 
also in the interest of multinationals themselves. In the short term, the Dutch 
government should do the following. 
 First, the Dutch government should not conclude new tax treaties with developing 
countries that can easily produce adverse effects. Expanding tax treaty networks is not a 
goal in itself. The Netherlands should only conclude new treaties with developing 
countries that can realistically expect to receive substantial additional investments from 
Dutch firms because of the treaty. It should refrain from concluding new tax treaties 
with countries that lack the necessary expertise to negotiate them. The Dutch 
government should allow all developing countries, including middle income countries, 
to protect their tax base by levy withholding taxes on interest, royalties, and 
management fees. If the main aim of a new tax treaty is to provide certainty to foreign 
investors, then it need not specify maximum withholding taxes. If a new treaty with a 
developing country is intended to promote investments into the Netherlands through 
reduced dividend withholding taxes, an asymmetric reduction should be proposed, 
limiting only the Dutch withholding tax.147 The geographical scope of new tax treaties 
should be limited to the European part of the Netherlands and not extend to Bonaire, St. 
Eustatius, and Saba, as the new Netherlands-Ethiopia tax treaty does. These Caribbean 
islands, which are part of the Netherlands since 2010, have a special tax regime without 
a corporate income tax that creates a large risk of treaty abuse. 
 Second, the Netherlands must include anti-avoidance provisions, such as a limitation 
on benefits clause or a main purpose test,148 in all its new and amended tax treaties. 
These anti-avoidance provisions should not be limited to dividends, as is currently the 
standard in Dutch tax treaties that include a main purpose test or limitation-on-benefits 
                                                        
147  The Netherlands-Thailand tax treaty, concluded in 1975, provides a good example. This treaty limits the 
Dutch dividend withholding tax for intra-group dividends to 5%, but allows Thailand to levy a dividend 
withholding tax of 10-20%, depending on the type of enterprise and level of corporate income tax. 
148  Article 10:8 of the 2008 Netherlands-South Africa tax treaty provides an examples of a main purpose test 
for dividend withholding tax reductions: “The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main 
purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or assignment of the 
shares or other rights in respect of which the dividend is paid to take advantage of this Article by means 
of that creation or assignment.” Limitation on benefits clauses are more extensive and more varied; 
Article 21 of the 2010 Netherlands-Japan tax treaty provides a useful example. 
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clause. The anti-avoidance provisions should also cover treaty benefits for interest, 
royalties, and capital gains. In the UK, this is standard policy for new tax treaties with 
all countries. The Netherlands should follow this example. 
 Third, the Dutch government should respond in a constructive way if a country 
wants to amend a tax treaty to address adverse effects. It should be fully cooperative to 
countries like Mongolia that seek to address obvious treaty abuse without touching the 
interests of real Dutch investors. Moreover, the Dutch government should offer other 
significantly affected developing countries – at least Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Ghana – to amend the existing tax treaties by including anti-avoidance provisions or 
increasing maximum withholding tax rates.  
 Fourth, the Dutch tax authority should immediately stop concluding advance pricing 
agreements that allow payments deductible in other countries to remain effectively 
untaxed or taxed at a very low effective rate in the Netherlands. Thus, it should not 
allow deductions against royalty income beyond costs that have actually been incurred 
for acquiring trademarks and patents, for example. Note that this policy implication does 
not refer to APAs in general, it only applies to those agreements that provide 
opportunities for international tax arbitrage. 
 Fifth, to address profit shifting through royalties or interest, the Dutch government 
should prevent that firms can easily channel untaxed income through the Netherlands to 
low-tax jurisdictions. One option to do this is to disallow deduction of royalty and 
interest payments to recipients that are not subject to an effective tax on this income of, 
say, at least 10%. Another option would be to introduce a withholding tax on royalties 
and interest paid to specific jurisdictions. Many other countries have such anti-avoidance 
rules. A subject-to-tax clause or blacklisting approach fits well with the action plan of 
the European Commission against aggressive tax planning presented in December 2012. 
This is also relevant for other donor countries that do not levy royalty or interest 
withholding taxes, such as Sweden, that facilitate similar conduits. 
 The Dutch government can also take additional supportive measures of a more 
generic nature. These include enhancing tax information exchange with treaty partners 
about corporate taxpayers, ending exemptions from filing full unconsolidated annual 
accounts with the chamber of commerce for large companies, and requiring all 
companies to publicly report material investment positions, loans, and dividend, interest, 
and royalty payments on a country-by-country basis. The government should also 
enhance substance requirements for all companies that want to claim tax and investment 
treaty benefits, and not just for financing and licencing companies that want to conclude 
an advance pricing agreement with the tax authority.149 
                                                        
149  Currently companies can even name Dutch legal persons as Dutch company directors. This leads to rather 
artificial constructions, for example in the case of Pluspetrol, an Argentinean oil firm with a Dutch parent 
company. This parent company has two directors: a Dutch trust company and a Dutch company that is 
controlled by the actual directors in Argentina. 
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 Finally, it is remarkable that the Dutch government took several measures in recent 
years to protect its own tax revenues against profit shifting and withholding tax 
avoidance. First, after it was confronted in 2008 by aggressive tax avoidance of private 
equity funds, the Dutch government introduced anti-abuse legislation against profit 
shifting through interest payments. Second, the Netherlands included specific anti-abuse 
provisions in the new tax treaty with Bahrain, in 2008, and the amended treaty with 
Barbados, in 2009. These clauses are intended to prevent avoidance of Dutch 
withholding tax. Third, in 2012, Dutch anti-avoidance legislation came into effect to 
address avoidance of Dutch dividend withholding tax by foreign investors through profit 
distributions by cooperatives. These measures clearly demonstrate that the Dutch 
government, too, finds profit shifting and withholding tax avoidance abusive. It will 
therefore not only be more coherent with development policy, but also more consistent 
within tax policy itself, if the Dutch government makes a similar effort to address tax 
avoidance in developing countries facilitated by Dutch SPEs. 
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Acronym	   Meaning	  
AfDB	   African	  Development	  Bank	  
AFM	   Dutch	  Authority	  for	  the	  Financial	  Markets	  
APA	   Advance	  Pricing	  Agreement	  
BIS	   Bank	  for	  international	  Settlements	  
BIT	   Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty	  
BOI	   Belgian	  Development	  Bank	  
BRICSM	   Brazil,	  Russian	  Federation,	  India,	  China,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Mexico	  
CDIS	   Coordinated	  Direct	  Investment	  Survey	  
CPI	   Corruption	  Perception	  Index	  
DNB	   De	  Nederlandsche	  Bank	  (Dutch	  Central	  Bank)	  
EIB	   European	  Investment	  Bank	  
EU	   European	  Union	  
FDI	   Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  
GDP	   Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  
GFA	   Group	  Financing	  Activities	  (a	  special	  Dutch	  tax	  regime)	  
GNP	   Gross	  National	  Product	  
HIPC	   Heavily	  Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	  
HQ	   Headquarters	  (of	  a	  multinational	  enterprise)	  
IBFD	   International	  Bureau	  on	  Fiscal	  Documentation	  
IFC	   International	  Finance	  Corporation	  
IMF	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  
ITC	   International	  Tax	  Compact	  
LDC	   Least	  Developed	  Country	  
LOB	   Limitation	  on	  Benefits	  
MDG	   Millennium	  Development	  Goal	  
MIC	   Middle	  Income	  Country	  
MIGA	   Multilateral	  Investment	  Guarantee	  Agency	  
ODA	   Official	  Development	  Assistance	  
OECD	   Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  
PCD	   Policy	  Coherence	  for	  Development	  
PRGF	   Poverty	  Reduction	  and	  Growth	  Facility	  
PRSP	   Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy	  Paper	  
R&D	   Research	  and	  Development	  
SADC	   Southern	  African	  Development	  Community	  
SOMO	   Centre	  for	  Research	  on	  Multinational	  Corporations	  
SPE	   Special	  Purpose	  Entity	  
STR	   Statutory	  Tax	  Rate	  
TI	   Transparency	  International	  
UNCTAD	   United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  
USD	   United	  States	  Dollar	  
VAT	   Value	  Added	  Tax	  
WDI	   World	  Development	  Indicators	  
WHT	   Withholding	  Tax	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Code	   Country	  
AE	   United	  Arab	  	  Emirates	  
AF	   Afghanistan	  
AL	   Albania	  
AM	   Armenia	  
AO	   Angola	  
AR	   Argentina	  
AT	   Austria	  
AU	   Australia	  
AW	   Aruba	  
AZ	   Azerbaijan	  
BA	   Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  
BB	   Barbados	  
BD	   Bangladesh	  
BE	   Belgium	  
BF	   Burkina	  Faso	  
BG	   Bulgaria	  
BH	   Bahrain	  
BI	   Burundi	  
BJ	   Benin	  
BM	   Bermuda	  
BN	   Brunei	  Darussalam	  
BO	   Bolivia	  
BR	   Brazil	  
BS	   Bahamas	  
BT	   Bhutan	  
BW	   Botswana	  
BY	   Belarus	  
BZ	   Belize	  
CA	   Canada	  
CD	   Congo,	  D.R.	  of	  
CG	   Congo,	  Rep.	  of	  
CH	   Switzerland	  
CI	   Ivory	  Coast	  
CL	   Chile	  
CM	   Cameroon	  
CN	   China	  
CO	   Colombia	  
CR	   Costa	  Rica	  
CU	   Cuba	  
CV	   Cape	  Verde	  
CW	   Curacao	  
CY	   Cyprus	  
CZ	   Czech	  Republic	  
DE	   Germany	  
Code	   Country	  
DJ	   Djibouti	  
DK	   Denmark	  
DO	   Dominican	  Republic	  
DZ	   Algeria	  
EC	   Ecuador	  
EE	   Estonia	  
EG	   Egypt	  
ER	   Eritrea	  
ES	   Spain	  
ET	   Ethiopia	  
FI	   Finland	  
FR	   France	  
GA	   Gabon	  
GE	   Georgia	  
GG	   Guernsey	  
GH	   Ghana	  
GM	   Gambia	  
GN	   Guinea	  
GQ	   Equatorial	  Guinea	  
GR	   Greece	  
GT	   Guatemala	  
GW	   Guinea-­‐Bissau	  
GY	   Guyana	  
HK	   Hong	  Kong	  
HN	   Honduras	  
HR	   Croatia	  
HT	   Haiti	  
HU	   Hungary	  
ID	   Indonesia	  
IE	   Ireland	  
IL	   Israel	  
IM	   Isle	  of	  Man	  
IN	   India	  
IQ	   Iraq	  
IR	   Iran	  
IS	   Iceland	  
IT	   Italy	  
JE	   Jersey	  
JM	   Jamaica	  
JO	   Jordan	  
JP	   Japan	  
KE	   Kenya	  
KG	   Kyrgyz	  Republic	  
KH	   Cambodia	  
Code	   Country	  
KP	   Korea,	  D.P.R.	  of	  	  
KR	   Korea,	  Republic	  of	  
KW	   Kuwait	  
KY	   Cayman	  Islands	  
KZ	   Kazakhstan	  
LA	   Laos	  
LB	   Lebanon	  
LI	   Liechtenstein	  
LK	   Sri	  Lanka	  
LR	   Liberia	  
LS	   Lesotho	  
LT	   Lithuania	  
LU	   Luxembourg	  
LV	   Latvia	  
LY	   Libya	  
MA	   Morocco	  
MD	   Moldova	  
ME	   Montenegro	  
MG	   Madagascar	  
MK	   Macedonia	  
ML	   Mali	  
MM	   Myanmar	  
MN	   Mongolia	  
MO	   Macau	  
MR	   Mauritania	  
MT	   Malta	  
MU	   Mauritius	  
MW	   Malawi	  
MX	   Mexico	  
MY	   Malaysia	  
MZ	   Mozambique	  
NA	   Namibia	  
NE	   Niger	  
NG	   Nigeria	  
NI	   Nicaragua	  
NL	   Netherlands	  
NO	   Norway	  
NP	   Nepal	  
NZ	   New	  Zealand	  
OM	   Oman	  
PA	   Panama	  
PE	   Peru	  
PG	   Papua	  New	  Guinea	  
PH	   Philippines	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Code	   Country	  
PK	   Pakistan	  
PL	   Poland	  
PR	   Puerto	  Rico	  
PT	   Portugal	  
PY	   Paraguay	  
QA	   Qatar	  
RO	   Romania	  
RS	   Serbia	  
RU	   Russian	  Federation	  
RW	   Rwanda	  
SA	   Saudi	  Arabia	  
SD	   Sudan	  
SE	   Sweden	  
SG	   Singapore	  
SI	   Slovenia	  
SK	   Slovak	  Republic	  
SL	   Sierra	  Leone	  
SN	   Senegal	  
SO	   Somalia	  
SR	   Surinam	  
SV	   El	  Salvador	  
SY	   Syria	  
SZ	   Swaziland	  
TD	   Chad	  
TG	   Togo	  
TH	   Thailand	  
TJ	   Tajikistan	  
TL	   Timor	  Leste	  
TM	   Turkmenistan	  
TN	   Tunisia	  
TR	   Turkey	  
TW	   Taiwan	  
TZ	   Tanzania	  
UA	   Ukraine	  
UG	   Uganda	  
UK	   United	  Kingdom	  
US	   United	  States	  
UY	   Uruguay	  
UZ	   Uzbekistan	  
VE	   Venezuela	  
VG	   British	  Virgin	  Islands	  
VI	   US	  Virgin	  Islands	  
VN	   Viet	  Nam	  
YE	   Yemen	  
Code	   Country	  
ZA	   South	  Africa	  
ZM	   Zambia	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List	  of	  Dutch	  tax	  treaties	  
 
Country	   Yeara)	   Anti-­‐
abuseb)	  
Low	  income	   	   	  
Bangladesh	   1993	   	  
Ethiopia	   2012	   	  
Kyrgyz	  Rep.c)	   1986	   	  
Malawi	   1969	   	  
Uganda	   2004	   	  
Zimbabwe	   1989	   	  
	   	   	  
Lower-­‐middle	  income	   	  
Albania	   2004	   	  
Armenia	   2001	   M:D	  
Egypt	   1999	  	   M:D*	  
Georgia	   2002	   	  
Ghana	   2008	   	  
India	   1988	   	  
Indonesia	   1973	   	  
Moldova	   2000	   	  
Mongoliag)	   2002	   	  
Morocco	   1977	  	   M:D	  
Nigeria	   1991	   	  
Pakistan	   1982	   	  
Philippines	   1989	   	  
Sri	  Lanka	   1982	   	  
Ukraine	   1995	   	  
Uzbekistan	   2001	   M:IR	  
Vietnam	   1995	   	  
Zambia	   1977	   	  
	   	   	  
Upper-­‐middle	  income	  (excl.	  EU)	  
Argentina	   1996	   	  
Azerbaijan	   2008	   	  
Belarus	   1996	   	  
Bosnia	  and	  
	  	  Herzegovinae)	  
1982	   	  
Brazil	   1990	   	  
China	   1987	   	  
Country	   Yeara)	   Anti-­‐
abuseb)	  
Jordan	   2006	  	   M:D*	  
Kazakhstan	   1996	   M:IR	  
Macedonia	   1998	  	   M:D	  
Malaysia	   1988	   	  
Mexico	   1993	   M:IR	  
Montenegroe)	   1982	   	  
Panama	   2010	  	   L:D	  
Russian	  Fed.	   1996	   	  
Serbiac)	   1982	   	  
South	  Africa	   2005	  	   M:D	  
Suriname	   1975	  	   M:D	  
Taiwan	   2001	   	  
Thailand	   1975	   	  
Tunisia	   1995	  	   M:D*	  
Turkey	   1986	   	  
Turkmenistanc)	   1986	   	  
Venezuela	   1991	   	  
	   	   	  
European	  Union	   	   	  
Austria	   1970	   	  
Belgium	   1933	   	  
Bulgaria	   1990	   	  
Czech	  Republicd)	   1974	   	  
Denmark	   1957	   	  
Estonia	   1997	   M:D*	  
Finland	   1949	   	  
France	   1949	   	  
Germany	   1958	   	  
Greece	   1981	   	  
Hungary	   1986	   	  
Ireland	   1969	   	  
Italy	   1957	   	  
Latvia	   1994	   M:D	  
Lithuania	   1999	  	   M:D*	  
Luxembourg	   1968	   	  
Malta	   1977	   M:D*	  
Country	   Yeara)	   Anti-­‐
abuseb)	  
Poland	   1979	   	  
Portugal	   1999	   	  
Romania	   1998	  	   M:D	  
Slovak	  Republicd)	   1974	   	  
Slovenia	   2004	   	  
Spain	   1971	   	  
Sweden	   1952	   	  
United	  Kingdom	   1948	  	   M:DIR*	  
	   	   	  
Other	  high	  income	   	  
Arubaf)	   1964	   	  
Australia	   1976	   	  
Bahrain	   2008	  	   L:D*	  
Barbados	   2006	  	   L:D*	  
Canada	   1957	   	  
Croatia	   2000	  	   M:D*	  
Curacaof)	   1964	   	  
Hong	  Kong	   2010	  	   L:D*	  
Iceland	   1997	   	  
Israel	   1973	   	  
Japan	   1970	  	   L:DIRC	  
Korea,	  Rep.	  of	   1978	   	  
Kuwait	   2001	   	  
New	  Zealand	   1980	   	  
Norway	   1950	   	  
Oman	   2009	   	  
Qatar	   2008	  	   M:D*	  
Saudi	  Arabia	   2008	   	  
Singapore	   1971	   	  
St.	  Maartenf)	   1964	   	  
Switzerland	   1951	  	   M:D	  
United	  Arab	  
	  	  Emirates	  
2007	  	   M:D*	  
United	  States	   1948	  	   L:DIRC	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  
Notes:	  List	  as	  of	  1	  January	  2013.	  a)	  Signature	  of	  the	  first	  full	  tax	  treaty	  with	  the	  Netherlands;	  b)	  L:	  current	  
(amended)	  treaty	  contains	  a	  limitation-­‐on-­‐benefits	  clause,	  M:	  current	  (amended)	  treaty	  contains	  a	  main	  
purpose	  test;	  these	  anti-­‐abuse	  clauses	  apply	  to	  dividends	  (D),	   interest	  and	  royalties	  (IR),	  and/or	  capital	  
gains	   (C);	   *	  denotes	  a	  partner	   country	   that	  does	  not	   levy	  dividend	  withholding	   tax	   itself;	   c)	   continued	  
treaty	   with	   former	   Soviet	   Union;	   d)	   continued	   treaty	   with	   former	   Czechoslovakia;	   e)	   continued	   treaty	  
with	   former	  Yugoslavia;	   f)	  Tax	  Arrangement	   for	   the	  Kingdom	  (of	   the	  Netherlands);	   g)	   the	  Netherlands-­‐
Mongolia	  treaty	  will	  end	  on	  31	  December	  2013.	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